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The dissertation “European Local Systems of Production in Late Modern and 
Contemporary Europe: the Case of Firearms Production in Gardone Val Trompia 
in a Historical-Comparative Perspective” aims to provide a contribution to the 
reconstruction of the events that characterized the specialization in the production 
of firearms in Val Trompia and the remaining Brescia area. To do this, this thesis 
focuses on three macro areas of study, referring to them and, hopefully, adding to 
them. The first area of study is that of industrial districts, with its theoretical 
grounding and vast corpus of empirical studies (Becattini 2004; Becattini et al. 
2009); the second is the local economic historiography1, with particular reference 
to the territory of Brescia (Taccolini and Gregorini 2013; Gregorini 2011); the last 
area is the historiography of firearms production, considered in its economic, 
social and technological aspects (Parker 1996; Labanca and Poggi 2009; Barbiroli 
2012; Aa.Vv. 2014; Carman 2016).  
The dissertation is the result of intense research work carried out not only in the 
major libraries of Lombardy and some important archives, such as Archivio di Stato 
di Brescia and Archivio Centrale dello Stato di Roma, but also in local document 
centers, such as the historical archives of the Brescia Chamber of Commerce and 
of numerous institutions and municipalities in Val Trompia. In addition to the 
original documents, several local and nationwide periodicals were consulted, as 
well as electronic resources, such as scientific articles published online and 
interviews registered at Archivio di Etnografia e Storia Locale of Regione 
1 As explained by Giovanni Gregorini (2012, p. 5; 2010), «the economic and social history of 
the last twenty years has tried to recover the dimension of local systems development as an 
interpretative – as well as descriptive - tool for the typical features of the process of Italian national 
growth in the Late Modern and Contemporary periods. This is particularly true both in terms of a 
general reflection on local development and for the leading actors in the development, with a 
particular focus on so-called intermediate institutions. Today this line of research is entwined and 
has brought to light interpretative models of the history of the Italian peninsula aimed at identifying 
several different provincial pathways to industrialization (Zaninelli 2007; Amatori 2004)» 
(translation from Italian).  
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Lombardia, and four semi-structured interviews carried out by the author with 
expert firearms entrepreneurs from Val Trompia.  
The work is presented in the form of a collection of essays and consists of four 
macro sections: this preface, the four papers, eight appendices and the 
bibliographical and archival references. The second part, the core of the work, is in 
turn divided into two further sections: the first with two bibliographical and 
historiographical essays, and the second with two empirical essays. The essays are 
based on an analytical historical study which presupposes that phenomena are 
determined and shaped by specific conditions of space and time (Parker 1999; 
Morck and Yeung 2011). For the experimental essays, research was carried out 
following the critical-historical method (Tosh 1984; Cipolla 1988). While 
researching in the archives mentioned above, useful sources were identified to 
support the research by outlining reciprocal functional connections, guaranteeing a 
thorough historical reconstruction. The documents were submitted to careful 
critical analysis, from the point of view of their reliability and intrinsic accuracy. 
Lastly, it was of paramount importance to attempt to deepen the understanding of 
the general context of these references, in order to create an overall picture of the 
reality under investigation. The study of local and national historiographical 
literature was fundamental for this phase of the research.  
The first essay is a review of the existing literature on industrial districts and, 
more generally, production systems based on a network of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Its objective is to highlight the main areas of research on the topic in 
question that stemmed from economic history. It begins with the definitions of 
industrial district, local production system and cluster, moves on to an explanation 
of these definitions based on their underlying economic concepts and then 
contextualizes them within the wider debate about the role of small and medium-
sized enterprises. In particular, the essay explains how economic historians have 
focused on the roots, the evolution processes and adaptive skills of industrial 
districts. It shows that the origin and development of the industrial districts are 
processes in which multiple factors connected with the past and the inhabitants of 
the area are at play, as well as factors related to the modern world and market 
challenges. Through the analysis of several case studies, scholars have identified 
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some recurrent factors, and have come to some general conclusions: specifically, 
the importance of guilds, factories, local banks and several intermediate institutions. 
These are the result of and engines for the process of social capital accumulation 
necessary to the formation and transformation of the district.  
The second paper includes a further review of the literature. It is a 
historiographical essay through which we introduce the case study analyzed in the 
dissertation, i.e. the production of small firearms in the province of Brescia, focused 
on Gardone Val Trompia. The paper adopts a long-term perspective which, in light 
of the concepts and research themes analyzed in the first essay, retraces the origins 
and development of the production specialization in question.  
The article shows how important the guild and the factory system were in the 
history of Val Trompia and its firearms manufacture. It is possible to divide this 
history, with all due caution, into five macro-phases. The first, from 1433 to 1796, 
coincides with rule by the Venetian Republic in the current territory of the province 
of Brescia.  Due to its favorable factor endowment, i.e. iron ore, water and wood, 
Val Trompia had already begun to specialize in the manufacturing of iron, melee 
weapons and armor. However, it was especially with the wars of the second half of 
the 16th century, that Val Trompia really nurtured its vocation for firearms. During 
this long first period, the local production system, based on craft production and 
taking place in small specialist workshops, took the shape of what Braudel (1977) 
calls fabrique disséminèe. This phase was characterized by a particularly intense 
battle between craftsmen and merchant-entrepreneurs for the control of production. 
The clash paved the way for weapons manufacturing guilds, which played a primary 
role in the institutionalization of professions and working practices, fostering the 
transmission of knowledge over the following centuries.  
The second period appears to have been a moment of transition. When Brescia 
was occupied by the Armée d’Italie in 1796, ending the Venetian supremacy, a new 
phase began in which first the French, then the Austrians, attempted to modernize, 
the firearms production process, adopting different strategies. The poor results led 
to the decline of the Brescia-Gardone production hub which lost ground to North-
European competitors. Nevertheless, certain elements that emerged for the first 
time on the local scene should not be neglected: the French built an arsenal, while 
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under the Austrians some merchant families acquired greater importance, among 
them Franzini, Paris and, above all, Beretta. These two elements were important in 
the new context of the Kingdom of Italy, for the recovery of the production system 
during the third phase. Between 1861 and 1914, the intervention of the State in 
military commissions through the Regia Fabbrica Erariale and the initiative of a 
few private citizens, including the Beretta family, launched strategies based on 
industrial concentration and the large-scale production of hunting firearms, which 
helped the production specialization to recover after the period of decline.  
The fourth phase is from 1914 to 1945, characterized by the impact of the two 
world wars, very marked in the small weapons sector. Of course, military firearms 
became the focus of attention again. During the conflicts, factories were militarized 
and the ones that had already started to concentrate productive factors were able to 
benefit most.  
The fifth and last macro phase, known as the Golden Age, began with the end 
of the Second World War. When military firearms commissions came to an end, 
the Fabbrica Erariale was drastically downsized and leading private factories also 
found themselves with too large a workforce. As a consequence, when demand for 
civilian weapons picked up, the skills consolidated by the workforce in large 
industrial plants were in place and a network of small and medium-sized enterprises 
blossomed.  
The second paper ends by highlighting some specific aspects of firearms 
production in Brescia, worthy of further in-depth analysis, which can be found in 
the two empirical essays drawing on material from the archives.  
The third paper notes the lack of a detailed analysis of the local system in the 
second half of the 20th century. Several scholars have indicated that firearms 
production developed around Gardone as an industrial district, but its precise 
geographical borders have never been established. In addition, its internal structure 
and the relations between enterprises, as well as the role played by intermediate 
institutions, are all investigations that have yet to be made.  
Two databases were used for the research. The first contains data regarding the 
labor force employed in firearms production in the territory of Brescia in the years 
1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981: these were used to calculate for each town in the 
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province the indices of geographical concentration and production specialization in 
the sector. The second database includes all the companies involved in the 
production of firearms in 1961 in the territories of Gardone, Marcheno and Sarezzo 
which, through the first database and an analysis of commuters, are identified as the 
core of the local production system. A great deal of information is included (number 
of workers, main activity, production site, etc.) providing a picture of the structure 
of the production specialization and, in light of the sources for the developments of 
the social context and its institutions, an excellent idea of the central area of Val 
Trompia as a genuine industrial district. 
The fourth paper considers another gap in the literature: there is no study of the 
contribution from the State and the factory system to the evolution of the local 
production in the second half of the 19th century. This study adopts a comparative 
perspective viewing Brescia-Gardone against the background of other firearm 
production systems in Belgium, France, England and Spain. At the same time 
(around 1850), the American System of Manufacturing started to spread throughout 
Europe following the intervention of various national governments. The study 
highlights the difficulties in attempting to overcome traditional European 
production methods and the decisive role played by public authorities, forward-
looking entrepreneurs and their factories. This radically and mostly irreversibly 
changed both the approach to markets and the intra-district relations of firearms 
companies and of their local production systems.  
As stated above, a few appendices are included along with a section dedicated 
to bibliographical and archival references. There are eight appendices which 
include the sources and data that proved to be particularly interesting for this 
research but which could not be directly included in the essays. Specifically, the 
appendices contain: 
1. the transcription of the quantitative data related to firearms tests carried out at 
the National Proof House in Gardone Val Trompia in the period between 1920-
2009; 
2. the database containing the data of the industry and services census for the years 
1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 regarding employment in the firearms sector in the 
province of Brescia; 
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3. the database of firearms enterprises in Gardone Val Trompia, Marcheno and 
Sarezzo in the year 1961; 
4. questionnaires submitted by the Brescia Chamber of Commerce and 
Associazione Industriali Bresciani on the skills and potential of the main 
industrial plants for the production of firearms in the province of Brescia in 
1952; 
5. semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs of the local production system 
carried out in the field; 
6. summary tables (processed by the author) containing data regarding the Val 
Trompia gun making industry in 1860; 
7. the prospectus containing data on the gun making industry of Gardone Val 
Trompia in 1861; 
8. data and information regarding the firearms industry in the province of Brescia 
collected by the local Chamber of Commerce in 1910. 
The appendices are introduced by brief notes in which a few essential pieces of 
information are provided regarding contents and original sources. For all 
appendices, except no. 6 and the databases, the original language was maintained 
since they include transcriptions of documents.  
This dissertation sheds light on the crucial phases in the history of the local 
production system of Gardone Val Trompia, focusing on the production 
specialization and, above all, its transformations. The development of the district, 
which experienced its heyday during the second half of the 20th century, was driven 
by a few firms who led the way in the industrialization process. These companies 
distinguished themselves not only by innovating the production system, precisely 
when the local system was fragile due to external and internal causes, but also led 
to the consolidation of technical skills and the understanding of the social and 
industrial relations, decisive in the post-war period. What emerges is not a static 
reality, but a dynamic and constantly evolving one; it is a reality finding a balance 
between the persistence of historical and local elements and innovative ones, with 
a social organization rife with consolidated values, but also willing to accept new 
market challenges. This reality was characterized by profound integration between 
production specialization and the local community, rooted in the history of the local 
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production culture, worthy of in-depth investigation, from a not purely economic 





Industrial Districts in a Historical Perspective: 
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During the last century, many expressions were coined to describe what 
Marshall used to call an “industrial district”. These multiple definitions are the 
product of a long, international, multidisciplinary debate. The debate developed 
around a concept rediscovered by Becattini and a group of Italian scholars 
searching, at the time, for new coordinates and paradigms to describe the economy 
and industrial development in their country. Fundamental to this branch of research 
was the contribution of economic and business historians who sought to investigate 
the origins of districts following the (neo)Marshallian paradigm or through new 
concepts. This paper discusses the development and trajectories of the literature 
regarding industrial districts observed from an historical perspective. It begins with 
the cardinal theoretical statements of Marshall, Becattini and Porter and the 
contextualization of the debate over the districts in the broader framework of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Finally, the paper focuses on the efforts of historians 
to add elements of novelty to this branch of research. Two aspects emerge: 1) a 
massive body of theory based on case studies that somehow seems to fail to  entirely 
capture reality; 2)  the need to pay significant attention to institutions and 






Industrial districts are a crucial part of the economy in many countries.  Albeit 
with different configurations, they are found both in advanced capitalist 
democracies1 – France, Germany, Japan, Scandinavian countries, Spain, the United 
States, the United Kingdom – and developing countries2 – Brazil, China, Mexico 
and India. However, Italy has indisputably been the stage of their success, as well 
as the point of reference for international debate among scholars (Piore and Sabel 
1984; Becattini 1987a, 1998; Goodman and Bamford 1989; Pyke et al. 1990; Fortis 
and Quadrio Curzio 2006; Galossi and Palmieri 2008). 
The origins of the concept date back to the economist Alfred Marshall: in 
Principles of Economics (1890) he discusses the development and features of 
industrial districts. In particular, he emphasizes two aspects: firstly, the 
concentration of specialized industries in certain localities giving rise to particular 
business relationships in those specific environments; secondly, the 
“extraordinariness” and relevance of the socio-cultural aspects of the industrial 
districts. In the original formulation, Marshall considers the district as a region of 
numerous locally owned firms that decide local production and investments. Scale 
economies are marginal, most of the time trade is mostly between buyers and sellers 
on the basis of long-term contracts or commitments. Relations and cooperation with 
firms outside the district are minimal. According to Marshall, what is particularly 
                                                          
1 To understand the importance of the industrial districts in national contexts, significant 
contributions have been made by both social scientists and business historians. For the case of the 
“fabriques collectives” in France see the contributions by Cotterau (1986), Raveyre and Saglio 
(1984), Saglio (1997) and Tosatti (1999). In the German case a fundamental point of reference is 
Herigel (1996). For Japan and its “sanchi” or “jiba sangyo” see Friedman (1988), Abe (1992, 1999) 
and Okamoto (2009). In the Scandinavian setting industrial districts, despite their importance, are 
not widespread (Johannisson 2009): most of them are located in Denmark on the Jutland Peninsula; 
for this case see the works of Kristensen (1992) and Kristensen and Sabel (1997). For a complete 
mapping of Spain and UK see Boix and Galletto (2004, 2006) and De Propris (2005); interesting 
details regarding  Spain are given by Ybarra (2009) and the case studies presented during session 
A2 of the 9th congress of the Asociación Española de Historia Ecónomica (Catalán et al. 2008). The 
U.S. and their local systems of production are described by Hall and Markusen (1985), Saxenian 
(1994), Scranton (1997), and Porter (1998). For comparative studies regarding the European context 
see: Crouch et al. (2004), Miranda (2005) and Catalán et al. (2011). 
2 In the case of developing countries the number of contributions decreases, but for developing 
countries such as Brazil, China, Mexico and India significant works include Schmitz (1995), 
Rabellotti (1993), Cawthorne (1995), Parilli and Garcia (2009), Tewari (2009), Wang and Mei 
(2009) and Posthuma (2009). 
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relevant and extraordinary about the industrial district model is the so-called 
industrial atmosphere. Workers and entrepreneurs are part of a homogeneous 
community characterized by a cooperative-competitive spirit based on a strong 
commitment to the district (not to the single firm), an internal and highly flexible 
local labor market, frequent contacts between suppliers and buyers along a highly-
fragmented supply chain. In other words, the access to information and 
competences is locally determined and fruitful for competitive advantages not 
individually achievable by the entrepreneur (Marshall 1890). 
Becattini (1978, 1979) recovered the concept at the end of the 1970s when 
recession hit the world and the decline of the Fordist production model was at the 
center of the stage. In particular, the notion was resurrected to better understand 
regional paths of industrial takeoff in certain Italian regions characterized by the 
onset of local entrepreneurship and of specialized small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 3. This kind of phenomenon first emerged and was analyzed in 
so-called Third Italy, the central and northeastern parts of the country4. Becattini’s 
contribution was fundamental and was soon enhanced by multidisciplinary 
perspectives: a large and fruitful debate took place, first in the Italian academic 
world and then at the international level. Therefore, the conception formalized by 
Marshall, based on external economies and the industrial atmosphere, gained 
greater traction. In the “Italian literature” the Marshallian district became a 
naturally and historically bounded place, characterized by the presence of a 
community of people and a production apparatus with a deep interrelation 
(Becattini 1990). Furthermore, four precise requisites were introduced for its 
identification: the presence of a) a system of common values  relating to the work 
ethic; b) a large variety of forms of work; c) “pure” entrepreneurs, whose major 
motivation was the enterprise as a “life project”; d) the ability to break down the 
production process into precise spatial and temporal phases (Giannetti and Vasta 
2012 p.123). 
As already mentioned, these fundamental and synthetic ideas are the product of 
an intense debate comprising the contributions of many scholars from different 
                                                          
3 Regarding dimensional classes see European Commission (2003). 




fields – political economy, sociology, industrial organization, economic geography, 
economic history etc.5. Recently, some scholars have even sought to trace its 
intellectual origins, analyzing the most cited papers (Cruz and Teixeira 2010; 
Martínez-Fernández et al. 2012; Lazzeretti et al. 2014), highlighting emerging 
topics and lines of inquiry (Oliver et al. 2014). The present work  gives a 
comprehensive review of the ideas and evidence provided by historians. Historians 
have largely discussed where, when and why the districts were born. In other words, 
they have tried to investigate the origins of what Bagnasco called “local systems of 
production”. The objective of the following pages consists in contextualizing such 





The cornerstone of the debate on industrial districts is  Principles of Economics, 
written by the economist Alfred Marshall. In 1890, , in the section dedicated to 
industrial organization (Chapter 4), the British scholar first distinguished two types 
of economies of scale: 1) internal, derived from a better exploitation of the resources 
inside the firm; 2) external, depending on overall industry development. Examples 
of the first type are the efficiencies achieved through new machinery, raw material 
savings, improvements in the division of labor and in management. On the other 
hand, external economies of scale are those related to processes of concentration of 
similar activities in specific geographical areas. This paper deals with the second 
type. 
According to Marshall, at the very basis of the processes of industrial 
concentration it is possible to identify a number of simple and important reasons 
related to the natural environment and resources (such as particularities of the 
climate and soil, the accessibility and presence of mineral deposits), but also to the 
emergence of a strong demand for a certain product. Once the industry is established 
in a specific area, the process of concentration can continue thanks to three 
                                                          
5 See Becattini (1979), Bellandi (1987) and Maccabelli (1997) for an extensive discussion 
regarding the multidisciplinary nature of the topic. 
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advantages determined by the proximity of the firms. 1) Technological spillovers: 
they are related to the quasi-public nature of knowledge and innovation; no matter 
how sophisticated a system of patents is, knowledge cannot be totally codified and 
competitors always try to copy, acquire and even improve the technological 
innovations. 2) Subsidiary industries: when  concentration in an industry occurs, 
the firms able to supply its machinery and inputs appear, making procurement easier 
and cheaper. 3) The development of a skilled labor force: in the area where a large 
number of firms in the same industry are concentrated, the workers  acquire the 
specific expertise and capabilities entrepreneurs look for; in other words, an 
enterprise is more likely to find qualified labor force (also at a cheaper cost) if it is 
located in a concentrated area. These three  types of external factor and their 
combined effects are the fundamental elements of what is commonly called a 
Marshallian district. 
In order to analyze the second turning point in the theoretical debate on districts, 
the Italian case and the broader discussion regarding small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) must be considered. The analysis of the role of SMEs acquired 
importance in the last three decades of the 20th century; in fact, after the Oil Crisis 
SMEs emerged as a pervasive and fundamental organizational form on the basis of 
two phenomena. The first one was the decentralization of production by big 
businesses for flexibility reasons. The second was the effect of the closure of many 
plants, prompting many workers to become entrepreneurs on the basis of the skills 
acquired in previous years (Brusco 1989b; Solinas 1994; De Cecco 2000, 2001a, 
2001b; Berta 2001). 
However, the presence of SMEs is not something exclusive to the last decades 
of the 20th century: in the Seventies, what really changes is the consideration of 
their existence and role. It is possible to identify three main streams of literature 
among the many positions taken by the scientific community. The first one sees 
small-sized firms as an inefficient and residual form of enterprise. Their existence 
is determined by economic backwardness or cyclical phases of economic expansion 
allowing the entry of firms under the minimum efficient size (Ciocca et al. 1973; 
De Cecco 2000; Perez 2002). This kind of position is well described in the words 
of Giulio Sapelli (1995, pp. 79-80): «Everybody knows there is a large number of 
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scholars who have studied industrial districts. I do not have a particular liking for 
this stream of literature since it was able to transform the problem of small and 
medium enterprises into a sort of fairy tale. Now that the SME system seems to 
work, the “small is beautiful” myth has its day of glory. However, if we look at the 
market change produced by globalization […], we discover that this conception of 
the SME world does not work at all. In fact, we cannot forget one of the biggest 
problems of companies of this size: the opposition to progress in a dynamic 
competitive environment with increasingly fierce challenges. Instead we should pay 
more attention to what big businesses have done and what medium enterprises are 
starting to do»6. 
Researchers who have tried to understand the permanence of SMEs and 
interpreted their presence in a “negative” way include Vera Lutz (1962), and 
Augusto Graziani (1972). The former describes the segmentation of the labor 
market. According to her, this segmentation determines the persistence of small 
firms in traditional sectors where low wages are exploited without increasing capital 
intensity. Graziani focuses the attention on the increase in exports and, more 
generally, on the productivity of sectors primarily devoted to foreign markets. 
According to him, this produces the equilibrium between the balance of payments 
and industrial development, but is not able to overcome inefficiencies in naturally 
or politically protected industries. As a consequence, there is a distortion in 
consumption with falling prices for “luxury” goods and strong price rigidity for 
necessary goods in a not-standardized-market. 
The second line of thought considers the permanence of small firms as the result 
of their ability to construct and position themselves in particular technological or 
market niches that allow them to survive even without growth. Significant emphasis 
is put on the technological aspect; in fact, authors tend to underline the different 
characteristics of the technologies adopted and their adaptability to the size classes.  
In relation to these topics, large businesses are considered models for the 
exploitation of technologies based on economies of scale, whereas small firms are 
seen as optimal to exploit technologies for achieving flexibility and adaptability 
(Audretsch 1995, 1997). 
                                                          
6 Translation from Italian. 
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However, the attention devoted exclusively to technology was soon seen as too 
restrictive (Piore and Sabel 1987; Landes 1987) and a third stream of research 
emerged, placing at center stage the agglomeration of SMEs. It associates the 
enduring capacity of small firm with the ability to construct local systems of 
production using technologies in a flexible manner (Sabel and Zeitlin 1987, 1997; 
Brusco and Paba 1997; Scranton 1997). Three major concepts were formulated (on 
the basis of the Marshall’s contribution) for these enterprises, related to each other 
through the production phases of homogeneous products, with paradigms able to 
explain regional development paths after the Golden Age of the Bel Paese (Zeitlin 
1992). 
In 1979, after a series of “preparatory” publications7, Giacomo Becattini  
suggested abandoning the concept of sector in favor of the one of industrial district 
as fundamental unit of investigation of industrial economics. In Becattini, in 
addition to the three Marshallian external factors, there are two new elements. First 
of all, the Italian scholar emphasizes the predominance of small enterprises at the 
heart of the characteristic flexibility of district dynamics; secondly, he identifies the 
sociocultural factors related to traditions, politics and institutions in the location of 
the district (Becattini 1979a, 1979b). His definition of an industrial district is 
(Becattini 2004, p. 19): 
«a social-territorial entity which is characterized by the active presence of 
both a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and 
historically bounded place». 
Becattini’s contribution represented the dawn of the so-called Neo-Marshallian 
district:  a few years went by before the discussion of the requisites and implications 
of the concentration of SMEs gained new insights. Sebastiano Brusco  also 
contributed to the debate on flexibility. While Becattini (2000a) studied the textile 
and clothing industry of Prato8,  Brusco (1982) focused his attention on Emilia-
Romagna. The Modena economist  analyzed  the decentralization of manufacturing 
that characterized, in particular, the local engineering industry in the Seventies. 
                                                          
7 See the contributions related to the scientific activity of Irpet (1969; Becattini 1975) and one 
by Forte (1971). 
8 In this case study Becattini identifies the fundamental features of his conception of the district: 
SME flexibility, sharecropping traditions and the role of the local communist party. 
24 
 
Three factors were crucial: 1) newly adopted machinery suitable for small-scale 
production, 2) the strength of Trade Unions and 3) the emergence of broad demand 
due to the increase in incomes during the Golden Age. According to Brusco, 
decentralization in Emilia-Romagna was  a result of extensive  cooperation between 
firms and the political-institutional framework able to create useful instruments for 
procurement, access to credit and the creation of profitable commercial networks. 
An Italian sociologist, Arnaldo Bagnasco (1988), also played a crucial role in 
the ongoing debate. His contribution (focused on the Third Italy9)  does not use the 
classic term “district” but opts for the neologism “local system of production”. Like 
his two colleagues, he stresses the importance of small enterprises, as well as the 
concepts of flexibility and outsourcing, crucial to cut labor costs.  Due to his 
background, he  provides details of the political and cultural sides of the debate. In 
addition to the communist tradition identified by Becattini and Bagnasco in 
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna respectively, he describes the catholic milieu 
characterizing other north-eastern regions in Italy. In Bagnasco’s treatise both 
communist cooperatives and Catholic associations are seen as the result of ancient 
and traditional cultural heritages adapted to the needs of the present situation. 
On the basis of this review of the three major points of view,  compared to the 
Marshallian conception, the Italian district is characterized by two additional 
elements: 1) the flexibility directly related to the predominance of small-sized firms 
in the local economy and 2) cooperative attitudes associated with specific cultural, 
political and institutional heritages (Catlán et al. 2011, p. 17). For sure, crucial is 
the notion of industrial atmosphere as already expressed by Marshall and as 
reformulated by Becattini (1987b, p. 8) as follows: «It is not simply an 
organizational form of the production process of a particular category of goods, but 
a social environment where human relations, inside and outside production sites 
[…] and the inclinations towards work, savings, risk etc. have a particular nature»10. 
This “particular nature” is even more central to the historical debate in which 
scholars broaden the discussion analyzing the district’s process of creation, its long-
term nature (Guenzi 1997) and its implications for institutional and local 
                                                          
9 See note 4. 
10 Translation from Italian. 
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development11 (Belfanti 1999a; Guenzi 1999; Provasi 2002; Grandi 2007). The 
following survey of the literature focuses on the processes of economic and social 
transformation underlying industrial districts: what was the crucial element called 
industrial atmosphere? Can we identify a precise framework for industrial districts 
and their development process? 
To complete this short review of the theoretical concepts related to 
manufacturing concentrations, the second important interpretation of external 
economies as formulated by Marshall needs mentioning. This contribution was 
from the renowned Harvard professor Michael Porter (1990), the father of the 
concept of cluster. To understand more, it may be useful to read his very own words 
(Porter 1998, p. 78): 
«Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked 
industries and other entities important to competition. They include, for 
example, suppliers of specialized inputs such as components, machinery, 
and services, and providers of specialized infrastructure. Clusters also often 
extend downstream to channels and customers and laterally to 
manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries 
related by skills, technologies, or common inputs. Finally, many clusters 
include governmental and other institutions – such as universities, 
standards-setting agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and 
trade associations – that provide specialized training, education, 
information, research, and technical support. […] Clusters represent a kind 
of new spatial organizational form in between arm’s-length markets on the 
one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, on the other. A cluster, 
then, is an alternative way of organizing the value chain. Compared with 
market transactions among dispersed and random buyers and sellers, the 
proximity of companies and institutions in one location – and the repeated 
exchanges among them – fosters better coordination and trust. Thus 
                                                          
11 Regarding the relationship “industrial districts-local development” see the seminal 
contribution of Brusco (1982). See also Garofoli (1994), Bellandi and Russo (1994), Becattini 
(2000b, 2009), Becattini et al. (2001, 2003), Bellandi (2003), Sforzi (2005) and Brusco (2008). 
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clusters mitigate the problems inherent in arm’s-length relationships 
without imposing the inflexibilities of vertical integration or the 
management challenges of creating and maintaining formal linkages such 
as networks, alliances, and partnerships. A cluster of independent and 
informally linked companies and institutions represents a robust 
organizational form that offers advantages in efficiency, effectiveness, and 
flexibility». 
Porter’s concept has the final aim of formulating a broader microeconomic 
theory able to explain national competitiveness in the global economy context. 
From the quotation, it is possible to identify 7 characteristic features which actually 
are the competitive advantages of the cluster: 1) access to inputs (machinery, 
components, financial services, etc.) and a highly qualified labor force; 2) access to 
information and know-how; 3) the complementarity of the activities; 4) access to 
institutions and public goods; 5) the decrease of supervision costs inside the 
enterprise; 6) innovation; 7) the creation of new enterprises. 
Compared to the Marshallian conception a few new elements emerge, the most 
relevant novelty being the focus on public goods and the impact of infrastructure 
on geographical concentrations. However, when compared to the Italian model, 
there appear to be 3 major discrepancies. Firstly, the Harvard professor does not 
abandon the concept of industry. He aims to provide a better framing of the old 
concept of industry within the new context of a globalized world. Secondly, Porter 
does not restrict the field of applicability of the cluster to SMEs, but also considers 
cases where large companies like Boeing (Seattle), Ford, GM and Chrysler (Detroit) 
are included. Last but not least, unlike the Italian district, clusters  are more 
heterogeneous in terms of production activities; indeed the service sector is not 
excluded from his consideration of the composition of a business structure (Catalán 
et al. 2011, pp. 21-23). 
Nowadays many definitions of cluster coexist with several applications to 
different socio-economic contexts. The debate on clusters has been influenced by 
the discussion of industrial districts: both concern localization factors and their 
impact on competitiveness, as well as the effects of agglomeration on economic 
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performance. Several authors12 have specified that an industrial district is a 
particular kind of more general category of cluster, whilst others13 have used the 
two concepts interchangeably (Lazzeretti et al. 2014). 
 
 
A fluid concept 
 
Scholars - both social scientists and historians - have debated the conceptual 
frameworks provided by Marshall, Bagnasco and Becattini14. In particular, an 
extensive debate has dealt with the boundaries of such definitions15. Not all 
researchers agree on what constitutes the borders of a district.  Above all, today, in 
a period of rapid and continuous change, many see the traditional formalizations as 
too restrictive16. This aversion has led to a proliferation of models in an attempt to 
capture the huge quantity of empirical cases17 (Zeitlin 2007). 
For historians studying local systems of production (no matter whether 
following the neo-Marshallian conception or searching for new paradigms) it has 
mainly meant going back to the origins of these regional aggregations. Sabel and 
Zeitlin (1985) were the first to do so. In England, they studied the manufacture of 
arms in Birmingham and cutlery in Sheffield; in Germany, they focused on 
Solingen and its knife producers; in France, they analyzed the production of 
trimmings in St. Etienne, silk in Lyon and of wool cloth in Roubaix. Municipal 
governance, strong paternalism and the centrality of the family were the backbones 
                                                          
12 For example: Markusen (1996), Gordon and McCann (2000), Porter and Ketels (2009). 
13 For example: Schmitz (1995), Tallman et al. (2004), Bell (2005). 
14 For cases of (neo-)Marshallian districts see Sheffield (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985), Cholet 
(Minguet 1992; Lescure 2002), the Arve Valley (Judet 2006), Bergisches Land (Boch 1997). 
15 For an extensive discussion of the “industrial district paradigm” see Belfanti and Maccabelli 
(1997). 
16 For historians looking for new typologies see Wilson and Popp (2003) and in particular Zeitlin 
(1992). The former distinguish between districts, clusters, and regional business networks on the 
basis of the geographical scale and the linkage between firms and industries. The latter proposes the 
formalization of the characteristics of the Marshallian district into empirical scalar variables in such 
a way that they could be used to depict several hybrid cases defined in terms of their relation to the 
classic model. 
17 Examples are: “commercial service districts” such as Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, “technological 
districts” such as Silicon Valley, “logistic districts” such as Duisburg and Venlo and “financial 
districts” like the City of London. Furthermore, Paniccia (2002) shows that just a small number of 
Italian districts actually belong to the traditional model. 
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of these districts and were the roots of all the “centralized” instruments and 
mechanisms able to ensure competitiveness and long-term development. Examples 
were unemployment subsidies  designed to prevent the dispersal of human capital, 
the procurement of fundamental resources for the life of the district, the supervision 
of prices and salaries to prevent counter-productive competition, the creation of 
professional training schools and  institutions providing assistance (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 1985, 1997). 
All of this is reminiscent of the pre-industrial guild (Farr 1997; Akoorie 2011)18. 
The relationship between the industrial district and the craft guild is a subject that 
has been widely debated by historians19. Recently, Alberto Guenzi (2014) has also 
focused his attention on it. Through a comparative work based on four case studies 
related to the production of cutlery (the industrial districts of Sheffield, Solingen, 
Thiers and Pavlovo), the Italian scholar has investigated the relationship between 
the district and the guild in different geographical areas. Taking his cue from the 
Marshallian concepts of “industrial atmosphere”, “strong division of labor” and 
“social-professional flexibility”, the author stresses the importance of the system of 
professional training in the transmission of high-level handwork20,  both in the guild 
and in the district. Furthermore, in line with Zeitlin’s call (2007) for a broader and 
smoother conception of the district and its evolutionary paths, Guenzi goes beyond 
“simple” factors of localization. He points to the obstacles faced and the subsequent 
actions taken by the protagonists of the cases in question. The author suggests that 
despite substantial similarities in terms of products, markets and production 
organization, there are no predetermined models. Each district can and must find 
its own solutions and paths. These results confirm Grandi (2007) and Magagnoli 
                                                          
18 Craft guilds have been considered negatively from the eighteenth century onwards; however, 
more recent scholarship has led to a re-evaluation of their effects. For details on this debate and the 
role of guilds in the pre-industrial economy see: Lucassen et al. (2009) and Epstein and Prak (2010). 
19 Belfanti (1996, 1999b) analyzes the case of the Lumezzane industrial district, located in the 
north of Brescia, famous for the production of firearms since the 16th century. and partially converted 
to civilian products in the following centuries. In the 18th century, local blacksmiths created a guild 
able to defend their interests by reinforcing their negotiating power with  merchants. Research by 
Veyrassat (1997) and Fallet and Cortat (2001) reconstructs the case of Neuchâtel (Switzerland) and 
its watch-making district. The guild system is evoked once again when considering the system 
adopted to train young workers. In France Olivier (2004) describes a similar scenario for the district 
of Morez. For further details see also Deakin (2006) and Guenzi (2010). 
20 Regarding apprenticeships and the transmission of working knowledge and skills through 
guilds see Epstein (1998). For the relationship between guilds and the circulation of technical 
knowledge during the Early Modern Age see Belfanti (2007). 
29 
 
(2007) and are a serious blow to the concept of the district life cycle as a rigid 
sequence of phases historically marking the dynamics and evolution of the 
manufacturing system21. 
One recurrent element that emerges from an analysis of the origins and 
evolutionary paths of local systems of production is the rural milieu22. For example, 
some districts grew from the experience of sharecropping families. With the skills 
they acquired, members of these families were able to trigger a process of wide 
dissemination of SMEs outside municipal areas. Such was the case in many Italian 
regions, including Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and Marche,  with a long history of 
sharecropping, the initial nucleus of Third Italy (Becattini 1986; Bagnasco 1988; 
Paci 1992). Very often these cases need to be considered in conjunction with the 
model of proto-industrialization known as the putting-out system. Despite the well-
known effects of proletarization produced by this model, several cases of 
entrepreneurial virtuosity in rural areas can be traced back to it (Mendels 1972; 
Kriedte et al. 1977). Examples are the districts of Carpi and  Cicognara. The former 
produced hats from the 16th century on. Manufacturing was substantially 
outsourced beyond the city walls to farmers who wanted to supplement their 
income. During World War II, the market of the particular hats produced in Carpi 
fell into decline; however, the existing commercial and production organization and 
the experience acquired were not wasted: they were converted and adapted to the 
production of knitwear (Mengoli 1993; Cicognetti and Pezzini 1992, 1994; Rinaldi 
2000). Cicognara, in the province of Mantua, followed a similar path. During the 
18th and 19th centuries a proto-industry active in hemp manufacturing flourished, 
and at the beginning of the 20th century this laid the foundation for the successful 
local production of sorghum brooms, largely based on work at home with some 
forms of seasonal labor. After World War II the district overcame hardship by the 
establishment of numerous SMEs and the introduction of new raw materials and 
products. Synthetic fiber brooms, brushes and their marketing through a large 
commercial network became the core business (Denti 1982; Ghinzelli 1991). 
                                                          
21 Carminucci and Casucci (1997), Klepper (1997), Belussi et al. (2008) Lazzeretti and Capone 
(2014) are all examples of studies that seek to apply enterprise life cycle theory to industrial districts. 
22 In support of a hybrid conception of the district, Belfanti (2009)  provides an extensive review 
of the literature on the role of guilds and the proto-industrialization model for the creation of 
industrial districts.  
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 Again, tight models and neat distinctions seem reductive23. Indeed, after 
distinguishing between the two paradigms of the guild and rural areas, Belfanti 
(2009) cites empirical cases with the characteristics of both typologies. For 
example, he considers the district of Carpi a result of the rural milieu, and stresses 
the strong relationship with the hatmaker’s guild of Modena. On the other hand, he 
considers the district of Morez an example of the guild-based model,  wilst recalling 
Olivier’s insistence (2004) on the rural matrix of this local production system. Other 
hybrids mentioned are the Geronzone Valley in the Lecco Area (Merzario 1989; 
Colli 1997, 1999) and the well-known “cottage industry” of shoemakers in the 
Italian Marche region (Sabbatucci Severini 1989). These districts developed by 
establishing a craft community utterly distinct from the surrounding rural setting. 
Belfanti (1997, 2009) also underlines the importance of two other factors in the 
creation and development of local production systems: the presence of a local bank 
and the factory.  He explains that mostly banks were the result of local initiatives 
and were therefore embedded in the local socio-economic system. They were 
crucial because they gave financial instruments to entrepreneurs on the basis of trust 
and because they facilitated the establishment of institutions and informal rules 
important for the industrial atmosphere24. In relation to factories, Belfanti recalls 
the contributions by Brusco (1989b) and Solinas (1994) that highlight their 
importance for professional training and to stimulate demand whilst sustaining 
many satellite activities. In other words, the presence of a large factory sets in 
motion processes of externalization and the consolidation of technical skills that 
trigger new entrepreneurial experiences. Among the examples cited by Belfanti 
(1997) are the cases of Castelgoffredo and Lumezzane. In Castelgoffredo (Belfanti 
1995) the flourishing of the hosiery factories was financed by the local Cassa Rurale 
and made possible by the workers of a German factory who reinvested their 
expertise when a large company was wound up. In Lumezzane (Belfanti 1996) large 
corporations like FIAT, Arsenale di Gardone and Eredi Gnutti played a crucial role 
in providing a large number of small subcontractors with work and in guiding the 
                                                          
23 Such a model was taken to  extremes and applied in Lombardy (Corner 1993). 
24 Regarding this point see also Conti and Ferri (1997). 
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process of industrial conversion after the Second World War, when many workers 
established new entrepreneurial activities. 
The fact that economic historians have found evidence of several types of 
triggering factors and no standardized lines of development does not mean the 
debate on industrial districts and how they were created should remain the prey of 
irreparable relativism.  Taking their cue from the studies of Arrighetti and Seravalli 
(1999), Italian economic historians have focused on the contribution of central and 
intermediate institutions to the evolutionary path of the districts. The approach is 
described by Grandi (2007 p. 68-70): 
«Institutions sustain the production system: they are part of the district 
community and can be seen in the indeterminate, and in certain respects 
mysterious, complex of values, implicit rules, and widespread skills many 
authors recognize as characteristic features of the district. This approach 
provides a new interpretative tool to analyze industrial districts. The 
combination of the intervention of central and intermediate institutions at 
least partially determined the development paths of industrial sectors and 
significantly influenced the nature and differentiation of industrial districts. 
However, nothing is set in stone and intermediate institutions are 
particularly able over time to change the provision of public goods, in some 
cases anticipating the demand of local enterprises. There seem to be steps, 
crucial moments, during which institutions can do more and if so they 
create the conditions for the (re)launch of the process of development». 
Such a perspective «may be linked to a broader debate regarding the so-
called ‘original social capital, interpreted as a heritage of social relations, 
knowledge and trust which have become embedded over time’25. […] 
There may be  a synthesis between this point of view and one centered on 
the action of intermediate institutions since an efficient local institutional 
architecture, which is coordinated and flexible, is possible only in local 
communities where there has been a sufficient accumulation of original 
social capital. However,  the inverse is also possible, i.e. a solid institutional 
                                                          
25 See Belfanti and Onger (2002 p. 252) 
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structure may channel a portion of the wealth produced in a certain area 
into the accumulation of social capital. This way, the growth process might 
lead more easily to widespread and prolonged development»26. 
In 1999, following this logic, Guenzi proposed an interesting interpretative 
framework based on four dimensions, intended to capture the intangible nature of 
the industrial atmosphere and able to compare the differences between the 
evolutionary paths of local systems.  Guenzi (1999 p. 88) says that such institutional 
dimensions should  provide an understanding of «the confused and inextricable 
picture of the local economic and social system»27. Four kinds of fundamental 
institutions are identified and observed for the chair production district of Friuli 
Venezia Giulia: vocational education, business associations, local banks and local 
authorities. 
In 2007, this framework was employed by Grandi to analyze nine case studies: 
the districts of Prato, Fermano, Maniago, Cadore, Sassuolo, Valpolicella, Suzzara, 
Cera-Bovolone and Viadana. In the introduction to his work, Grandi analyzes the 
characteristics of the four institutions: 1) Vocational schools have a dual impact on 
economic development: they provide firms with qualified personnel and produce 
so-called dynamic economies of scale that, in conjunction with processes of 
learning by doing, can lead to innovations and productivity gains. 2) Business 
associations are based on the crucial element of trust and may be top-down or 
bottom-up associations; the former are local branches of regional or national 
organizations outside the district community, whereas the latter emerge from the 
initiative of local actors and generally are intended to promote common rules and 
objectives for the community of firms28. 3) Local banks are crucial for the financing 
of the necessary infrastructure and for building trust. 4) Local authorities, like 
municipalities, intervene in the allocation of resources, as well as in the 
coordination and promotion of public and private initiatives to positively influence 
                                                          
26 Translation from Italian. 
27 Translation from Italian. 
28 Grandi explains that three theoretical approaches should be jointly adopted to study business 
associations: “the strictly economic”, which highlights the vertical relationship between association 
and entrepreneur; “the cooperative” that focuses on the relationship between members; “the 




local development; in particular, they stimulate the growth of the district through 
the creation of facilities and the spatial planning (Grandi 2007). 
This branch of research includes the contribution of Belfanti and Onger (2002) 
in a work edited by Provasi (2002)29. The two scholars base their essay on the 
concepts of economic institution (EI), relevant economic institution (REI)30, basic 
institution and intermediate institution, contextualized in the cases of Vigevano, 
Montebelluna, Sassuolo and Casarano to define the specific roles of different types 
of institutions in the history of the districts. The scholars conclude that: 
«the evolutionary path of industrial districts is the result of a close 
interaction between inputs and the opportunities proposed/imposed by the 
market (or the EIs) and the institutional structure produced by local society 
(REIs). The success – or failure – of a local system of production in terms 
of economic performance depends mainly on the synchronization between 
the dynamics brought about by the EIs and the regulation and, above all, 
coordination produced by the REIs. Effective synchronization can be 
achieved in different ways varying significantly according to the context. 
[…] In other words, the role and the actions of institutions change 
according to the phases of the life cycle of the local production system. In 
this perspective, it was deemed useful to adopt the distinction […] between 
basic social institutions – which we define as “original social capital” – and 
                                                          
29 The book contains a multidisciplinary work (economics, sociology and history) that focuses 
on the role of institutions with respect to local systems of production. The approach adopted consists 
in «starting from a richer and more articulated perspective of the main actor and the social 
institutions than the one adopted in the alternative interpretations of the same phenomena, 
specifically in the new institutional economics of Williamson and followers/disciples. […] More 
heuristically useful, albeit more complex to ground theoretically and apply to empirical analysis, is 
an interpretative framework that combines the vision of an actor guided by cognitive rationality in 
the pursuit of defining the world and their own strategies, in which preferences and opportunities 
(and beliefs regarding the former and the latter) are subject to positional and dispositional 
conditionings. There should also be an interpretation of the institutions that does not limit them to 
the mere extrinsically regulative aspects of the actors’ conveniences, albeit important ones, but 
rather includes even the constitutive dimension that shapes perceptions, value orientations, 
expectations, motivation and beliefs of the actors themselves. It is a framework in which the rapport 
among actors, institutions and environment is not set as a closed system such as that of stimulus-
reaction, but an evolving process whose results are often undetermined. In addition to the problems 
of coordination and cooperation, a crucial role in this framework is also played by the variety of 
the “material” available to the selection process, and these varieties may provide room for adapting 
and learning, as well as failing and surviving inefficiencies/deficits» (translation from Italian: 
Bordogna 2002 pp. XVII-XIX). 
30 For details regarding EIs and REIs see Parri (2000, 2002). 
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intermediate institutions, that is to say the most sophisticated and advanced 
institutional forms, able to synchronize with the mature phases of the 
district. The range of possibilities varies within two negative extremes. On 
one side, situations with an insufficient accumulation of original social 
capital, characterized by a lack of trust and an excess of individualism, 
make top-level institutions weak. On the other side, hypertrophic 
development of the original social capital, fostering a context where 
redundancy and the pervasiveness of basic institutions impede the creation 
of a more developed institutional setting. In light of the numerous case 
studies examined, we  also need to say that the existence of a well-
structured institutional framework does not itself guarantee real operational 
effectiveness for its constituent bodies and their ability to interact with 
economic dynamics. The matter, so often raised, regarding the different 
speeds of economic and institutional change seems to be quite important:  
institutions tend to react slowly to rapid economic transformations. […] 
The evolution of the institutional setting of local production systems is the 
result of a path-dependent dynamic that must face challenges and inputs 
from the market: the result of such a process can vary […] from case to 
case. If in this tangle of local situations, each with its own particularities – 
the major assets of industrial districts – one common feature can be 
identified, it consists in the fact that the path to success comprises both the 
straight road of EIs and the tortuous evolutionary path of REIs»31 (Belfanti 





This paper surveys the contributions of economic and business historians to the 
literature on local production systems. First of all the fundamental theoretical 
postulates of Marshall, Becattini, Brusco, Bagnasco and Porter are presented, with 
                                                          
31 Translation from Italian. 
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an explanation of the concepts of industrial atmosphere, geographical externalities 
and flexibility of production. The literature is contextualized within the broader 
debate on SMEs by analyzing the three lines of thought that have emerged so far. 
Finally, the analysis addresses its core objective based on the studies of economic 
historians, which is the search for the roots and origins of the district. The 
importance of guilds and rural proto-industrialization, as well as the role of factories 
and local banks are discussed in the literature the paper surveys. 
The first element of interest that emerges from the analysis is the presence of 
particular and overlapping traits in each paradigm identified. On the one hand, some 
general conclusions can be drawn but,  on the other,  they need to be integrated with 
additional factors as new contexts arise. The second element is that several 
historians have paid particular attention to institutions. Guilds, centralized factories 
and local banks were triggering factors, but also served as coordination and to check 
opportunistic behavior, increasing the cooperation among actors in the district. 
Several scholars have investigated the role of institutions following the contribution 
of Arrighetti and Seravalli (1999) by contextualizing their implications in the debate 
regarding original social capital. In particular, Guenzi and Grandi adopted a precise 
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This paper gives a comprehensive literature review of the gun industry in Valle 
Trompia. To carry out the analysis, the case is contextualized within the debate on 
industrial districts. Adopting a long-term perspective, the study reinterprets and 
explains the successes and vicissitudes of this production specialization in light of 
the contributions and generalizations provided by economic historians to the debate 
regarding the evolutionary paths of industrial districts. The essay focuses on 
location factors, guilds and the factory in order to analyze the multiple elements 
that crucially influenced the social capital accumulation in the local production 
system and the ability of the latter to adapt to the new challenges of the market. The 







«At the feet of Your Excellency, most worthy representative of the Public 
Majesty, the craftsmen of Gardone bow down. Born among the mountains, suckled 
on iron, raised in the smithies, from all of which they draw the sustenance that 
maintains them, bronzed by the endless heat of the fires, they can earn their living 
only by laboring with heavy hammers on the anvils. If this work is lacking, then 
they are deprived of life itself» (Giovanni Antonio Beretta, April 20th, 1683)1. 
This quotation from one of the many representatives of the world’s oldest 
industrial dynasty is evidence of the strong ties and identification of the inhabitants 
of Val Trompia2 with the gun making industry. In this area, since the 15th century, 
the production of barrels and components, and their assembly, has been more than 
simply a way to make a living. The earliest historical document on this activity in 
Val Trompia is a dispatch dated 21 April 1459 sent by the Senate of the Venetian 
Republic to the Rectors of Brescia: an order to the local master gunsmiths for «fifty 
bombards for the galleys, ten breech-loading rampart guns with two breech 
chambers each, twenty-five wall-pieces, fifty guns and fifty thousand iron-tipped 
crossbow quarrels»3. Since the Early Modern Period the development of this 
industry had its point of reference in Gardone Val Trompia with a highly-
fragmented structure in the production process based on a pronounced phase 
specialization rooted in a guild system (Belfanti 1998). Along the centuries, the 
local production of civilian and military firearms has undergone periods of great 
                                                          
1 Quotation taken from Morin and Held (1980, p. 122); for the original source see Archivio di 
Stato di Venezia (ASV), Senato, Dispacci Rettori Brescia, Filza 91, ad diem. Original version: «Ai 
piedi di Vostra Eccellenza, dignitissimo Rappresentante della publica Maestà, s’humilia la 
Maestranza di Gardone. Questa, che nata fra monti, nudrita tra il ferro, allevata nelle fucine, da 
queste pure ricava quel sostenimento che la mantiene, e soltanto che a forza di pesanti martelli 
travagliando sopra le incudini, abbronzita dal continuo calor de gli accesi carboni, vaglia per campar 
la vita. Se questo questo lavorerio gli manca, gli manca per conseguenza la vita stessa». 
2 Val Trompia is a valley (slightly more than 50 km long) in the province of Brescia, northern 
Italy. It consists of the valleys of the river Mella and its tributaries, north of the city of Brescia. It is 
situated between Val Camonica, Val Sabbia and Lake Iseo (see Pictures 1 and 2, pp. 6 and 7). 
3 Quotation taken from Morin and Held (1980, p. 24); for the original source see ASV, Senato, 
Deliberazioni Terra, Reg. 4, Fol. 104r. Original version: «Facere debent bombardas quinquafinta a 
galea, decem a reparo cum duabus caudis pro qualibet, spingardas XXV, sclopetos quinquaginta et 
quinquaginta millaria ferrorum veretonorum». 
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prestige and utter neglect4, alternating phases characterized by warring merchants 
and masters fighting for the control of the system of private and State orders (Morin 
and Held 1980).  
The particular organization of production in Gardone - famous throughout the 
world through the export of barrels, rifles and their components - has led several 
scholars (Tombola 2000; Del Barba 2008; Fontana, 2009) to the concept of the 
industrial district as the description of this local system. In our opinion, Becattini’s 
framework (1979, 2004) is useful when trying to disentangle and interpret the weft 
of relationships and the long process of accumulation of know-how characterizing 
this area and its industrial change. Adopting a long-term perspective, the aim of this 
study is to describe the birth and evolution of this industrial district, analyzing the 
multiple key social and economic factors that crucially influenced its continuing 
ability to adapt to the new challenges of the market.  
 This will entail giving a comprehensive review of the literature on Val Trompia 
and its arms industry. Existing studies are considered in a long-term perspective 
where the characterizing evolutionary factors of the local system are analyzed in 
the light of contributions by economic historians to the roots and developments of 
industrial districts. This perspective has a long-established tradition in the scientific 
literature (Belfanti and Maccabelli 1997; Guenzi 2009) and its relevance was 
recently noted in a special issue of the journal Investigaciones Regionales – Journal 
of Regional Research (Sforzi 2015, pp. 22-23). 
The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction setting out the 
premises, aims and methodology of the study, the second section reviews the 
contributions of economic historians to roots and evolutionary paths of industrial 
districts, the third and fourth sections analyze the role of preindustrial forms of work 
organizations and the factory in the case of Gardone and the final section 
summarizes the paper, pointing out what is missing in the literature. 
 
 
                                                          
4 As highlighted by all scholars of the gun making industry in Brescia, the reason for the success 
of the firearms produced in this area has always been the master craftsmanship of the local 
gunsmiths. The result of their work is a product of the highest quality, a unique object painstakingly 
crafted down to the smallest detail – almost an art form. The high degree of product recognition is 
discussed at length in three major publications, by Gaibi (1968), Morin (1980) and Belinda (1990). 
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Roots and evolutionary paths of industrial districts 
 
The concept of industrial district dates back to Alfred Marshall (1890) who 
described and analyzed specialist British agglomerations of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). In the 1980s, the theoretical framework was revived and 
extended by the Italian scholars Giacomo Becattini (1979, 2004), Sebastiano 
Brusco (1982, 1989a, 1990) and Arnaldo Bagnasco (1988) «to capture the 
extraordinary efflorescence of similar industrial complexes across the central and 
northeastern regions of their own country. Economist, geographers, sociologists, 
political scientists, and business scholars quickly discovered a broad array of 
analogous local and regional production systems scattered across Western Europe, 
North America and East Asia. […] Many of these districts specialized in light, 
labor-intensive industries like clothing, textiles, shoes, jewelry, and furniture, but a 
substantial portion could also be found in more technologically demanding and 
capital-intensive sectors such as metalworking, machine tools, ceramics, plastics, 
aerospace, electronics, film and other entertainment/communications media» 
(Zeitlin 2007, pp. 219-220). 
These geographical agglomerations distinguished themselves for excellent 
results in terms of «economic performance, as measured by new firm formation, 
employment, and exports; their capacity for endogenous development; and their 
ability to sustain high relative wages and labor standards in the face of international 
competition. No less remarkable, however, were the districts’ flexibility in adapting 
to changing markets and demand patterns; their capacity for generating and 
diffusing technological competition and cooperation among local actors» (Zeitlin 
2007, p. 220). Thanks to these results and features, industrial districts became a 
significant alternative to the Fordist model and attracted the attention of numerous 
economic historians who began to investigate their historical roots. 
Sabel and Zeitlin (1985) were among the first to focus on this model of industrial 
development, highlighting three features of the institutional set-up at the basis of 
the competitiveness of the district: «a local/municipal governance of the productive 
system, a paternalistic vision of industrial development and a network of family-
run businesses. Such a set-up ensured the stability of the productive system itself, 
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guaranteeing its sustainability both in social and economic terms by disbursing 
unemployment subsidies with the aim of avoiding dispersion of the human capital 
of the district, supervising prices and salaries with the intent of warding off damage 
due to excess competition, building or funding highly-indivisible resources 
available to the whole production community, safeguarding the brand that identified 
the typical products of the district, creating professional training schools, and 
activating a chain of bodies that could supply assistance». However, «these are 
practices that are anything but innovative, although renewed and revised in the light 
of changed contexts – as they see, to be direct descendants of that organizational 
culture that had grown up in urban Europe around the institutions which for 
centuries, albeit with alternating fortunes – had represented the prevalent form of 
regulation of craft activity: that is, the craft guild» (Belfanti 2009, pp. 10-11). On 
this basis, the search for the roots of guilds or continuity between the craft culture 
of guilds and industrial districts became a hot research topic for economic 
historians, triggering a series of case studies5. 
Another factor which stands out as a significant element in the history of 
industrial districts (at least in central Italy) is the model of protoindustrialization. 
Very often, areas of SME agglomeration had a history of sharecropping and so-
called putting-out system. «According to the literature this common origin implies 
certain skills and, in most cases, the belonging to a particular kind of institution, 
namely the “enlarged family”. According to Bagnasco (1977) the experience as 
sharecroppers taught them to develop an organizational ability within the family 
structure, together with an extreme flexibility and adaptability in terms of working 
time and variability of income. The importance of the enlarged family for the small 
entrepreneur of the Italian industrial district can be related at least to two different 
aspects. First it is necessary to refer to the need for a flexible labor force to organize 
and manage (abilities to be seen as opportunities), and second the possibility for the 
entrepreneur to reinvest all the income in the firm, without having to share it 
regularly into salaries. The diffusion of the agricultural labor organized and shared 
in the family-organization helped to create a flexible workforce “whose skills and 
motivations were very well suited to the development of small business” (Triglia 
                                                          
5 On this topic see Guenzi (1997, 2009). 
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1992). In fact, the presence of a high number of members of different ages, which 
developed different skills, provides the entrepreneurs with the labor force and 
necessary working abilities» (Tappi 2001, pp. 9-10)6. 
To conclude, the third element was the factory. As explained by Belfanti (2009, 
p. 15), «artisans and pluriactive peasants – rather than proto-industrial peasants – 
were the actors who created forms of local development based on small businesses, 
but in many cases the presence of a factory, even though limited to a certain phase 
of the history of the territory, had a decisive role. The centralized industrial 
settlement played a fundamental role in the acquisition of technical competence and 
professional ability on the part of the local workforce: such an apprenticeship 
constituted a vital passage in the history of local development». In other words, 
factories were incubators for SMEs generally with concrete effects after their 
closure or downsizing. Such traumatic events forced jobless workers to reinvest 
their technical skills in small new entrepreneurial activities. A typical example is 
the case of Castel Goffredo where numerous small or minuscule businesses 
emerged after WWII due to the closure of an important hosiery factory. 
The following pages describe and analyze the history of the local system of 
production of mid Val Trompia highlighting aspects either confirming or 
contradicting the work of economic historians. 
 
 
The guild and putting-out system in the background 
 
«All kinds of guns are made, muskets with all their mounts, crossbows, cannon 
balls, weapons of every kind, as well as tools of tempered steel, and all kinds of 
cutlery, farm implements, and nails. Every year the said valley produces XXV 
thousand shotguns that are fetched off by merchants into foreign lands. Iron ore 
abounds in this valley, because all the mountains are full of it and out of fifty pits, 
or shaft mines, they dig enough to keep XV refining furnaces busy»7. 
                                                          
6 More details in Belfanti (1997). 
7 Quotation taken from Morin and Held (1980, p. 20); for the original source see ASV, Collegio, 
Relazioni, b. 37, fol. 35rv. Original version: «Si fanno schioppi d’ogni sorte, Moschetti con tutti i 
suoi fornimenti, balestre, balle d’Artigliaria, arme di tutte le sorte, stromenti da fuoco, et di 
qualunque sorte da taglio et da Agricoltura, et chioderie. Si traggono di detta Valle ogni anno XXV 
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As stated in the first section, the vocation for gun making in Val Trompia was 
first recorded in the mid-15th century. Instead, the quotation above is from a letter 
from the Podestà Paolo Partua to the Senate of the Venetian Republic in 1562 and 
describes the first localization factors giving rise to this specialization. Because of 
the unlikelihood of developing agriculture and thanks to the abundance of iron ore, 
wood and water, the valley specialized in the production of ferrous items from the 
Middle Ages if not earlier. In 1341, the first statute for the exploitation of mining 
sites was promulgated in Bovegno: it focused on property and the use of facilities 
dedicated to mining, as well as on the legal recognition of the workforce. The raw 
material extracted from the upper zone was sent to Gardone Val Trompia and other 
villages in the central valley where it was worked in furnaces to produce different 
types of tools, in particular blades, armor and spearheads known as Dardi Gardoni 
(Simoni 2010, pp. 17-20; Camparoni 1805, pp. 74-80). In 1406, the so-called 
Privilegio Malatestiano, named after the ruler of Rimini whose control of the area 
interrupted the domination of the Visconti family, gave stability to the production 
of armor and weapons, no longer a seasonal activity. Under Venetian rule (1433-
1797) the contents of the Privilegio were substantially confirmed in the Statuto di 
Valtrompia comprising 23 chapters8. 
Scholars identify the wars of the second half of the 16th century as triggering 
factors for local specialization in gun manufacturing9. During the conflicts, firearms 
were used on a large scale for the first time and iron replaced bronze for the 
production of cannons based on the local know-how in processing the mineral 
(Morin and Held 1980, p. 180; Tombola 2000; Del Barba 2008, p. 13). 
It is worth  noting that since the end of the 15th century the organization of the 
iron manufacturing assumed the configuration of the disseminated manufacturing: 
                                                          
mila schioppi che sono condotti da mercanti in stati alieni. È copiosa questa Valle in vena da ferro, 
perché tutti questi monti ne sono pieni, et se ne cavano più di cinquanta busi, ovveramente fori di 
continuo, talmente che ne forniscono XV forni». 
8 Iron ore is almost pure spathic siderite, poor in phosphorous and rich in manganese, which is 
easy to work and excellent to forge. The history of this valley is doubly linked to the extraordinary 
quantity of this natural resource in its upper mountains. Despite extensive scholarly debate, it is still 
difficult to date the beginning of the local mining activity. For a lengthy discussion of mines, the 
local iron and steel industry, as well as the endowment factor in the valley see Brocchi (1808), Rosa 
(1977), Bonardi (1930), Tucci (1970), Bonetti and Rizzinelli (1982), Bernardi (2003), Simoni 
(2010). For an anastatic copy of the Statuto see: Anon. (1976). 
9 For a general review of the adoption of firearms for military purposes in this period see Parker 
(1996, pp. 16-24). 
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about sixty thousand people were employed in the sector, with smelting furnaces 
managed by companies and associations of co-owners for financial and 
organizational reasons (Montanari 1982, p. 175). However, for the purpose of this 
study, what is most worthy of note is that this type of production organization was 
strengthened when gun making became the core business. As described by Marco 
Belfanti (1998, pp. 269-270) «the firearms production cycle resembled a long chain 
rooted along the Mella river and in the city of Brescia. In this chain each craftsman 
held a specific task10, although some phases of the manufacture required more 
sophisticated techniques and more complex tools than others. At the apex of the 
craft hierarchy there were the masters who forged the gun barrel, who in general 
owned a forge able to exploit water power. […] While the various phases of gun 
barrel production were exclusively located in Gardone Val Trompia (the forges, the 
plants and the workshops being distributed in fact over the territory of that small 
town)11 the manufacture of the firing mechanism was, instead, the prerogative of 
other villages in the valley. For example, a large number of the inhabitants of 
Marcheno, Sarezzo and Lumezzane were employed in the construction of gunlocks 
to be mounted on firearms. […] In other places along the valley, scattered forges 
and cottage industry, organized under a putting-out system, produced bayonets, 
firing rods, powder horn, munitions and other accessories for firearms. Finally, in 
the city itself, there were the craft workshops whose principal task was to serve the 
“good taste” of wealthy clients: it was in fact thanks to the artistic ability and to the 
loving attention to detail paid by engravers and etchers that butts and gun barrels 
were made more precious for these civilian clients». 
                                                          
10 This long chain of craftsmen is described in detail by Gaibi (1964) and Belfanti (1998, pp. 
268-269): 1) bollitori: the masters of the barrels based in Gardone, the head of the chain, responsible 
for forging, the most important part of the manufacturing process; 2) trivellatori: they smoothed 
down the inside of the barrel; 3) livellatori: grinders using drills and filing the inside of the barrel; 
4) fondellieri:  who ‘ended’  the barrel with large screws to close the breech; 5) molatori: responsible 
for the external surfaces of the barrel; 6) brunitori:  burnishers; 7) fornitori: applied the sights and 
appliances for the firing mechanism; 8) azzalinieri: for the production of locks, especially flint 
gunlocks; 9) incassatori:  makers of wooden blocks; 10) ferradori: producers of iron parts to fix the 
butt to the other components of the gun; 10) lissadori: had the task to inlay and polish the wood 11) 
camuzzadori: engravers of the metal parts. 
11 On this topic see Rossi (1981). 
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A second aspect of firearms production in the valley was the long and fierce 
battle between craftsmen and merchants (Morin and Held 1980)12. Towards the end 
of the 16th century the territories of the Serenissima Republic were involved in a 
social and economic revolution which had begun in northern and central Europe 
more than a century earlier. Craft production was hit by the rise of the merchant 
class which gradually reduced the craftsman-producer to a salaried workman. 
Marketing of the products, procurement of raw materials and the associated credit 
were monopolized more and more by merchants who aimed to make labor as cheap 
and as maneuverable as possible, without distinguishing between a workshop’s 
master-artisan owner and assistant journey-men. In the case in question, the conflict 
between the two groups was particularly fierce and long due to the resistance of the 
masters and, in particular, because of their strategic role. Well aware of the 
importance of the craftsmen’s know-how, the Venetian Republic tried to solve the 
problem and protect this patrimony from the chronic negative effects on the 
firearms sector13. The measures adopted led to the creation of a “centralized 
                                                          
12 The volume by Morin and Held (1980) is a seminal work that led the way to subsequent 
contributions. Despite focussing on the history of the most famous family of Gardone (Beretta), it 
includes and analyzes the developments of a firm in the broader context. In order to explain the path 
followed by the world’s oldest industrial dynasty, Morin reconstructs the crucial relationships of the 
gunsmiths of Val Trompia with the Venetian authority that controlled the area throughout the 
Modern Age. Not only does the scholar analyze the impact of the government, he also sheds light 
on the most important aspects of this particular local system of production: the production and 
workforce organization, the conflictual relationships between gunsmiths and merchants and the 
export of products are all described in detail and seen in conjunction with the achievements of the 
Beretta family. Evidence of the importance of the volume by Morin and Held are essays by Rossi 
(1981) and Belfanti (1998). The two historians take the cue from Beretta. La Dinastia Industriale 
più Antica al Mondo to investigate two specific topics. Rossi notes the lack of statistical analysis 
able to outline the structure of the sector and of precise details on the organization of work, and 
describes the geographical distribution of production units and the functions of the fòndaco. He 
provides the results of systematic research into the forges in Gardone Val Trompia and their owners. 
Based on the Estimi of Gardone for the period 1657-1810, the work describes the types of forges by 
verifying the report by Da Lezze (podestà of Brescia) and giving significant details on the 
relationships between craftsmen and “pure entrepreneurs”, the concentration of capital, technology, 
military procurement and natural disasters. Belfanti reviews production in the entire valley and 
focusses on the role of guilds. Rossi criticizes the study by Morin and Held for its failure to use 
sources in Brescia archives and for its over-simplification due to its monographic cut. He also points 
out that the reference to employment law and to the Da Lezze report – two crucial sources for the 
seminal work – inolves bias; according to Rossi, the former was adopted in times of crisis and the 
latter was written in a non-representative early period. Belfanti, on the other hand, thinks the 
seventeenth century Da Lezze report is not only accurate but also true of the following century. This 
is supported by a reference made by Frumento (1985) to a manuscript by Giuseppe Franzini (1801) 
where the firearms production cycle is described exactly as the podestà had previously described it. 
13 To be more precise, the measures adopted by the central government in Venice were somewhat 
contradictory. The Serenissima wished to preserve the know-how of the masters of Gardone, but at 
the same time was sensitive to the needs of other craftsmen and wanted to control firearms exports 
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warehouse” during the 16th century and support for the creation of craft guilds 
during the 17th and the 18th centuries. 
In 1588, the warehouse was established and subcontracted to a merchant, who 
was required to acquire a large stock of gun barrels for cash (partially lent without 
interest by Venice) in order to market them as he saw fit. Furthermore, this merchant 
also distributed iron at regulated prices. The indirect intervention of the State was 
intended to break the monopoly the merchant class was establishing (Montanari 
1982, p. 169). 
In 1619, the Corpo delle maestranze di canne was founded in Gardone and 
joined by all gun barrel makers. The guild, soon followed by others created by 
manufacturers in Brescia and Lumezzane, fought fiercely in defense of craftsmen’s 
privileges and a fair distribution of orders. In particular, a rigid system of affiliation 
was imposed based on family ties and non-natives were excluded from the 
profession. Specific rules were adopted for the quality and organization of 
production, and craftsmen were not allowed to move to other countries (Montanari 
1982, pp.175-176). 
However, these stratagies, aimed at safeguarding the economic independence of 
craftsmen14, were little by little overcome by the countermeasures of the merchants. 
First of all, using their political influence, they took control of the warehouse; 
secondly, in 1726, they created the Società de padroni de fuoghi della terra di 
Gardone in response to the emergence of the guilds and obtained the monopoly on 
sales of gun barrels from the Venetian administration. In other words, despite the 
institutionalization and rationalization of gunsmithing that tightened the 
relationship with the local community, the new merchant class gradually prevailed 
through its ability to influence political power and its control over capital goods. 
Belfanti (1998, p. 282) dates the end of the conflict to 1784, when «an agreement 
stipulated that the group of merchants should guarantee the craftsmen “constant 
work for the decade to come on ten thousand gun barrels per annum”. Finally, the 
workforce saw a concrete prospect of regular orders, but, in exchange for such 
                                                          
to foreign kingdoms. One of the first and most negative effects on the local gun industry was the 
ban on exporting unstocked barrels. After the loss of market opportunities, gunsmiths began to move 
to other countries, spreading their art to other territories (Morin and Held 1980, pp. 55-56). 
14 Especially through the maintenance of their principles of “moral economy” based on an 
equitable division of orders. 
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The role of the factory 
 
The turning point in the relationship between master craftsmen and merchants 
described by Belfanti was followed by another significant event laying the 
foundations for a new era in the history of this local specialization. In 1796, the 
Armée d’Italie occupied Brescia ending the dominance of the Venetian Republic 
and in 1807 the French decided to establish an arsenal to exploit the skills of the 
valley in gunsmithing, distributing State orders among the exponents of the 
merchant class. The introduction of a large production unit and a coordinating factor 
like the arsenal, in conjunction with the growing power of the family owners of the 
forges, was the first step in the subsequent contribution of the “factory element” to 
the local production system (Montanari 1981; 1983a; 1999)15. 
After the difficult period of Austrian domination (Guizzetti 1995) which tried 
to gradually dismantle local production by closing the Arsenal and minimizing State 
orders, a new era began with the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy. The 
reopening of the State plant, and the gradual introduction of the innovations of the 
second industrial revolution, caused a definitive break with the old Early Modern 
system. This turning point, particularly evident at the beginning of the new century, 
could be seen at three levels16. 
First, the ability of the valley to attract State orders. The reopening of the arsenal 
in 1859 was just the first piece in the complex puzzle of public procurement, crucial 
to the recovery of firearms production. Lobbying by different local actors in the 
following years was even more important. At the beginning of the 1870s, the State 
plant was enlarged and modernized through the direct intervention of the local 
municipality; furthermore, entrepreneurs achieved important results by exploiting 
                                                          
15 On the role of the arsenals in military procurement see Degli Esposti (2009). 
16 About the 19th century and the advent of industrialization in Val Trompia see Boccingher 
(2008); details regarding the local production of firearms in this century can be found in Zanardelli 
(1857, pp. 89-101). 
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strong ties with Giuseppe Zanardelli17, a famous politician who had his 
constituency in the area (Montanari 1985; 2002). Due to these efforts, the arsenal 
of Gardone obtained a strategic position in the overall framework of public 
procurement. It became an important element for the development of the production 
specialization at least until the second half of the following century, and the center 
for the distribution of commissions in the valley (Filandro 1930; Aa. Vv. 1982, p. 
10). 
The second new factor was the end of the age-old relationship with the upper 
valley and its mines. Substantial improvements in the wire drawing of metal and 
the introduction of electricity created new procurement systems for the raw 
materials needed for the production of firearms. In the second half of the 19th 
century, when the local steel industry was undergoing restructuring, the local iron 
and charcoal resources were gradually replaced by imported semi-finished steel 
products and coke. Several gun producers tackled the power problem by investing 
in hydroelectricity, first replacing water wheels with turbines, then fitting electrical 
generators to transform mechanical energy into electricity. This became systemic 
over the following years when a consortium was set up for the management of the 
water of the Mella river (Del Barba 2008, pp. 36-43; Bonetti 2004)18. 
Finally, the third big change was the decision to invest in the mass production 
of civilian firearms. This strategic move was first made by Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro 
Beretta (hereafter FAPB)19, the first step in the process of emancipation from 
military procurements for the local production system. Followed by the other 
                                                          
17 See Chiarini (2004) for a biography of Giuseppe Zanardelli. 
18 It is worth noting that in Gardone Val Trompia the first plant for public lighting was established 
by the Arsenal in 1889. For more details on the iron, steel and mechanical engineering industries in 
the province of Brescia at the turn of the century see Camera di Commercio ed Arti della Provincia 
di Brescia (1870, p. 52), Aa. Vv. (1872, pp. 300-303) and Gnaga (1905, pp. 127-156). See Mocarelli 
(1997) for a long-term perspective on ironworking in the area. 
19 For the Beretta industrial dynasty see Morin and Held (1980), Onger and Paris (2012). For 
details on Morin and Held (1980) see note n.12. The study by Onger and Paris traces the fundamental 
features of the career of Giuseppe Beretta. The son of Pietro, father of Ugo and brother of Carlo, 
Giuseppe stands out as a crucial figure not only in the history of the Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta 
but in the entire economy of the province. On the basis of the documents in several important 
archives and a few interviews, Onger and Paris describe the most important challenges (new 
products, diversification, export and internationalization, generational change) faced by this 
industrialisty and his family contextualizing them in the development of the local system of 
production. On FAPB also see Wilson (2001) and Bruni et al. (1997); on the recent years of the 
Beretta Holding Group see Tombola (2007b). Further details about the life of Giuseppe Beretta can 
be found in Zanotti (2010). 
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producers in the valley, Beretta decided to start the mass production of civilian 
firearms when hunting and target-shooting were becoming widespread sports 
activities. Soon, firms fell into two groups: large companies and small craft 
workshops. The former were able to compete in both the markets of military and 
civilian products; the latter specialized in the manufacturing of high quality firearms 
for private customers or in the supply of parts for the champions of the sector 
(Onger and Paris 2012, pp. 31-32) 20. 
In this framework, subcontracting and its interrelated network of SMEs did not 
disappear, however the leading role was taken by three companies: FAPB, Glisenti 
and Bernardelli (Facchini 1980, p. 13-14). These family firms pursued a strategy 
focused on the concentration of factors of production and growth, becoming leaders 
on the social as well as industrial level. For example, Glisenti had a strong 
relationship with Giuseppe Zanardelli and through its political ties became the 
major contractor of State procurements in the area (Onger 2009) 21. FAPB was at 
the frontline of lobbying by gun producers to ask for tariff reductions and for the 
establishment of a National Proof House22. The Beretta family clearly adopted a 
paternalistic approach as shown by numerous initiatives in favor of its workers, 
Gardone and the community. They included the construction of a hotel, a theatre 
and kindergarten, and a fundamental role in social housing through the 
establishment of the Cooperativa Triumplina Casa del Popolo, as well as the 
opening of a holiday home and a factory shop for employees (Onger and Paris 2012, 
pp. 47-55). Società Anonima Vincenzo Bernardelli strengthened the ties with the 
parish of Gardone and became prominent figure in the provincial Catholic area. 
Pietro Bernardelli wanted his company to be the catholic alternative23 for the 
                                                          
20 These specializations were also highlighted by Segreto (1997, p. 23) in his study of the Italian 
armaments industry in the period 1861-1940. As in the rest of Europe, the arsenal took on a central 
position for raw materials procurement and military firearm testing; moreover, the sector could count 
on one group of private companies almost exclusively specializing in the military field and on 
another set up by firms active in civilian production and the supply of semi-finished and specific 
products for military orders. 
21 For the Glisenti family and its different entrepreneurial initiatives see Montanari (1983b), Aa. 
Vv. (2004) and Varini and Onger (2005). 
22 Regarding the National Proof House see Morone (1930), Bernardelli (1990), Tombola (2007a), 
Pagani and Camarlinghi (2010). 
23 To understand this strategy, we have to refer to the so called “Third Way” proposed by Leo 
XIII in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum (May 15th, 1891) and the successive moderate turn called for 
by Pius XI in conjunction with a corporatist conception of economy and society in the Encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno (May 15th, 1931). 
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management of industrial relations, which at the time were dominated by Pietro 
Beretta, the leading liberal (Del Barba 2008, pp. 67-104). 
Despite the process of catching up started with the Italian Unification, in the 
first half of the 20th century the local firearms production fell on hard times. The 
superiority of foreign competitors24 determined by national economic events and 
poor levels of investment, together with the consequences of the Great Depression, 
were the principal threats for local producers. Military procurements were, once 
again, crucial and their relevance became almost the only source of survival source 
in the years of the two world wars25. The production system underwent immense 
growth during the wars only to dramatically fall off at their end. In periods 
characterized by an arms race, the Arsenal and large plants were important for the 
entire valley and its forges, channelling State procurements and increasing the 
workforce (Belfanti 2009, p. 16). 
In 1939, the State factory could count on a workforce of 2,200 units, FAPB on 
2,000 and Bernardelli on 1,000: this was just the beginning of a period lasting 
throughout the war, when military firearms, the internalization of the production 
process and reduction of the craft entrepreneurial network were the main features 
of the local system. Details regarding this period and the social and economic 
environment in Gardone are available in the form of direct testimony by two Beretta 
workers: Guido Baglioni (2012) and Gian Battista Sabatti (Cucchini 2005)26, 
important eye-witness accounts of the years that prepared the way for the decades 
of the Golden Age, when the district experienced its heyday. 
                                                          
24 In the 1920s, the high production costs represented the biggest problem for the Italian gun 
industry. The local manufacturers obtained the increase of the tariff on foreign products; however, 
the revaluation of the Lira, as well as legal and tax regulations frustrated this protectionist strategy 
(Camera di Commercio ed Industria di Brescia 1922; Onger and Paris 2012, pp. 51-53). About 
foreign competitors see Roffia (1997b). In Europe other cases like Gardone Val Trompia are: Liège 
in Belgium (Anon. 1965; Gaier 1985; Francotte and Gaier 1989; Gadisseur and Druart 2005), Saint-
Étienne in France (Forissier 2005; Viret 2007; Bacher et al. 2014), Eibar in Spain (Goñi Mendizabal 
2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Catalán et al. 2014) and Birmingham in the UK (Dunham 1955; 
Fries 1975; Bailey and Douglas 1978; White and Trudgeon 1983; Lumley 1989; Behagg 1998; 
Williams 2004). 
25 Regarding WWI and the role of the provincial firearms industry see Zane (2015). Anon. (1910, 
pp. 24-28; 1924, pp. 19-24) provide statistics for the local system in the periods of peace of the first 
half of the 20th century. 
26 An interview with Gian Battista Sabatti is also available in Archivio di Etnografia e Storia 
Sociale (AESS). It was carried out by De Virgiliis Ruggero (director), Fausti Carla (researcher) and 
Trani Daniele (cameraman) on November 26, 2004. 
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Baglioni and Sabatti describe Gardone as a town entirely based on the 
mechanical engineering sector. In addition to the gun industry, another large 
company, Redaelli, was active in the sector of ironworks and wire drawing27. Local 
inhabitants saw these factories as their natural employment destinations, providing 
them with a secure future and safe social environment, and encouraged the younger 
generation to find a job in the field of firearms. Added to this was the high regard 
for the work and its value. Laziness and absenteeism were the object of strong social 
disapproval, in favor of self-sacrifice, effort, technical precision and professional 
prestige. In other words, employment had a crucial influence on the individual, the 
family, social relationships and the broader social climate, comprising almost the 
sole element of identity for the individual and the reputation of the family. The large 
factories mentioned above created the social milieu28. 
Workers, almost all men, fell into two groups: the skilled and unskilled. The 
first group, which could count on technical skills acquired in the local vocational 
school29 and honed by long apprenticeships, was fully involved in the life of the 
factory and saw its own future as one and the same as that of the plant. The second 
group carried out more menial tasks, dependent on the first. The factory was a sort 
of training ground for technical and social skills featuring skilled workers. This is 
not of secondary importance: after WWII several workers employed in these 
factories became the backbone of the emerging craft business network30. As shown 
in other case studies (Belfanti 2009), not only were large factories the hotbed for 
know-how and new actors in the local system31, but also incubators for the SMEs 
that spread after their closure or reconversion. 
                                                          
27 For Redaelli see Anon. (1930). 
28 On this point see also Abbiatico (1984), a rather famous entrepreneur from Inzino. In addition 
to a couple of important books on firearms engraving (Abbiatico 1976; 1980), he collected into one 
volume information and memoirs concerning other entrepreneurs in the sector and, more generally, 
people of the valley. He stresses the sense of duty and commitment to work, clearly a distinctive 
feature of the second half of the 20th century as well; the author describes whole families employed 
in the same factory whose private and social lives were determined by the life of the factory. 
29 On the local vocational school see Abbiatico (1984, pp. 65-69) and Maranta and Sotgiu (2010). 
30 For a clearer idea see the curricula of numerous entrepreneurs reconstructed by Abbiatico 
(1984). Regarding WWII in Gardone, its factories and the resistance movement see Anon. (1987; 
1988). 
31 Once again see Abbiatico (1984, pp. 148-149, 155-162), who describes a working group set 




At the end of the Second World War, the large firms faced a lack of State orders 
and the consequent unavoidable return to civilian production. Their first response 
was to cut staff or, in the worst cases, close plants. The newly unemployed set up a 
series of small workshops. Numerous unemployed gunsmiths and laborers 
reinvested their skills in family businesses with success in the niche market of high-
quality hunting shotguns or the manufacturing of specific parts (Tombola 2000)32. 
In the 60s and 70s, in the period Becattini (2000a) considers crucial for the 
resurgence of industrial districts, Gardone Val Trompia underwent immense growth 
based on its continuing gun making tradition. When other other countries were 
experiencing phenomena of concentration and vertical integration, Val Trompia 
was able to regain its age-old prestige through a system based on a myriad of 
family-run craft businesses with strong phase specialization. This is shown by the 
data and observations of Piccoli (1981) in Il settore delle armi civili. Scelte di 
sviluppo e riconversione. In a section dedicated to the area of Gardone, he says that 
99% of the regional production of light weapons and more than 90% of the national 
production was from Val Trompia. In the area, more than 60% of employment and 
85-90% of local units belonged to what Belfanti (1998) calls - with reference to the 
Early Modern Period - the chain of skills for the production of firearms. 
The large network of SMEs, focused around two historical firms, Beretta (Onger 
and Paris 2012) and Bernardelli (Del Barba 2008), drew on deeply rooted and 
widespread technical skills able to win over foreign markets and on a social milieu 
where informal and formal institutions fostered an atmosphere of competition and 





This paper provides a comprehensive literature review for the gun making 
industry in Val Trompia, centered on the municipality of Gardone Val Trompia. 
The survey follows the general conclusions of economic historians regarding the 
                                                          
32 For the province of Brescia during the postwar period and second half of the 20th century see: 
Gregorini and Taccolini (2015); Taccolini (2013). 
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roots and evolutionary paths of industrial districts, i.e. a long-term perspective was 
adopted to analyze and explain the development of this famous local production 
specialization. 
Contributions by Morin and Held (1980), Montanari (1982) and Belfanti (1998) 
highlight two aspects that have been long debated in economic historiography 
regarding the Early Modern Period. The first is the guild, the second the 
intervention of coordinating agents, recalling Becattini’s impannatori, who took 
control of the production process and created a large salaried workforce by capital 
and know-how accumulation and concentration. The historical reconstruction of the 
local “proto-district” identifies as the essential areas Gardone Val Trompia, 
Marcheno, Lumezzane, Sarezzo, the villages of Inzino and Magno and the city of 
Brescia. The district remained almost unchanged until after Italian Unification 
despite the hard times of the first sixty years of the 19th century under foreign 
domination. 
After the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy and the advent of the industrial 
revolution, factories became incubators of new technical skills and, in the postwar 
period, of new entrepreneurial activities. Between the 19th and 20th centuries, 
supported by a vocational school and a National Proof House, factories made the 
strategic decision to invest in the mass production of civilian firearms and 
rationalized the manufacturing process. In this context, despite the loss of 
competitiveness compared to foreign gun makers, the local community could 
continue to identify itself with the profession of gunsmithing and to mold the spirit 
of self-sacrifice that was to characterize the valley and its entrepreneurial vitality 
during the Golden Age. 
Based on the review the following ideas emerged for further studies related to 
three major gaps in the literature: 
1) closer analysis of the development of the production system in the second half 
of the 20th century, in particular during the Golden Age. Studies so far have 
focused on the main events in the small arms industry in the area; however, 
none rigorously analyze the concentration of SMEs in the light of the 
framework of Becattini (2004). In our opinion, two aspects are especially 
worthy of further investigation: a) the definition of more precise geographical 
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boundaries for the industrial district, often not distinguished from or seen as 
subordinated to Lumezzane; b) analysis of the new production chain and the 
relationship of integration between firms. 
2) the historiography regarding local intermediate institutions includes articles and 
books but none provide detailed insights on their contribution to the 
development of the local productive chorality33. Three topics need further 
investigation: a) the role of the local vocational school in the production of 
human capital34; b) the intervention of the municipality in favor of the 
enlargement of the Arsenal in the second half of the 19th century35; c) the role 
played by the local business association in solving the problems faced by local 
producers during the 70s and its contribution to the subsequent transformation 
of the district36. 
3) comparative analysis of the case of Gardone in light of the numerous similar 
cases scattered around Europe: Birmingham, Liège, Saint-Étienne, Eibar, all 
examples of areas specializing in gun making and characterized by a 
concentration of small and medium-sized enterprises. Attention should focus on 
the last decades of the 19th century and the first of the 20th in order to understand 
how Gardone Val Trompia tried to catch up with the rest of Europe after the 
negative period of the Austrian domination. In particular, the suggested research 
should focus on two important actors with a crucial role in the then district 
dynamics: the state and the large corporation. Their role should also be 
considered with regard to the mechanization of production processes. 
 
                                                          
33 Regarding the concept of productive chorality see Becattini (2015). 
34 The archive of the vocational school is held by the local Mountain Community in Gardone 
Val Trompia (Comunità Montana di Valle Trompia): 
http://www.cm.valletrompia.it/cittadino/cultura-e-istruzione/sistema-archivistico (last accessed on 
December 30, 2016). 
35 An initial study on the topic was carried out in a graduation thesis (Guizzetti 1995). 
36 In particular, it may be interesting to analyze how the business association was the vehicle by 
which new resources were sought outside the district and a new balance was found, following the 
process of internationalization pursued by Beretta. 
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The Revenge of the Masters: 





Keywords: industrial district, phase specialization, institutions, gun making, 





The Brescia gun making industry has roots that can be traced back to the Early 
Modern Age and the Venetian Republic. In the second half of the 20th century, in 
particular during the Golden Age, it underwent a period of extraordinary growth. 
This growth was driven by civilian firearms, especially long-barreled firearms, 
exported by local producers all over the world. The industry was concentrated 
around the town of Gardone Val Trompia which, together with its surrounding 
municipalities, comprised a local production system characterized by flexibility and 
adaptability. This work analyzes the historical and geographical boundaries, 
internal structure and intermediate institutions of this production system to verify 






«You come today among us, to a community that lives exclusively off its work, 
highly-qualified and honed by centuries of experience and commitment, and if the 
living conditions here are on the whole better than in other centers, it is due to the 
ability of our workers, the initiative of our entrepreneurs and hundreds of craftsmen, 
and the rich tradition of our vocational schools»1. 
In 1966, with these words the mayor Angelo Grazioli presented the municipality 
of Gardone Val Trompia to the Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro. Grazioli was 
clearly referring to the gun industry when emphasizing the crucial role of work in 
the life of his community. Despite the serious problems faced by the local 
production specialization at the end of WWII, the municipality of Gardone was able 
to participate in the Italian Golden Age through its long tradition in the field of 
firearms. Through the umpteenth restructuring process in its history, the production 
specialization survived and reconfigure itself into a network composed by the oldest 
large production units and countless craft businesses. The presence of many small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), together with a production organization 
based on subcontracting, phase specialization and work at home, led several 
scholars to depict the central Val Trompia as an industrial district (Tombola 2000; 
Del Barba 2008; Fontana, 2009). However, the structure of this production system 
has remained largely unexplored: its geographical boundaries, the phase 
specialization and the interrelated subcontracting practices, as well as the role of 
institutional actors, are some of the major aspects that call for further study. Hence 
this paper aims to observe the gun industry in Val Trompia in the light of the 
theoretical concepts relating to the definition of the industrial district as a «social-
territorial entity which is characterized by the active presence of both a community 
of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded place» 
                                                          
1 Welcome address by Angelo Grazioli, Mayor of Gardone Val Trompia, to Aldo Moro, 
President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic, on an official visit to the municipality 
(Aa. Vv. 1988, p. 57). Translation from Italian: «Ella è venuto oggi in mezzo a noi, ad una comunità 
che vive esclusivamente del proprio lavoro, di un lavoro altamente qualificato e affinato da 
un’esperienza e da un impegno secolari, e se qui le condizioni di vita sono nel complesso più positive 
che non in altri centri, va precisato che ciò è dovuto alla capacità delle nostre maestranze, alla 
iniziativa dei nostri imprenditori e delle nostre centinaia di artigiani, alle ricche tradizioni delle 
nostre scuole professionali». 
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(Becattini 2004, p. 19). In other words, this research wants to provide evidence of 
the existence of an industrial district in the central Val Trompia during the second 
half of the 20th century, focusing particularly on the Golden Age2. 
The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction presenting the 
premises and aim of the study, six sections and a concluding paragraph compose 
the body of the article, for a total of eight sections. The second section provides 
details of the methodology and sources used in the work. The third introduces the 
fundamental concepts of the industrial district framework guiding the following 
analysis. The fourth sketches out the historical and geographical coordinates of the 
long process of accumulation of social capital that took place in Val Trompia during 
the centuries. The fifth describes products and markets of the local producers and 
gives some information on other European firearms industries. The sixth provides 
a detailed description of the production process focusing on phase specialization, 
work from home and the role of the family. The penultimate section presents the 
formal and informal institutions variously connected to the gun making industry 
and completes the analysis of the “productive chorality” (Becattini 2015). Finally, 
the concluding paragraph summarizes the main steps and findings of the paper as 
well as identify some limitations and possible future developments of this study. 
 
 
Methodology and sources 
 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objective, the paper is based on a 
historical narrative study under the perspective that phenomena are shaped by 
specific environmental conditions concerning location and time (Parker 1999; 
Morck and Yeung 2011). This perspective has a long-established tradition in the 
literature of industrial districts (Belfanti and Maccabelli 1997; Zeitlin 2007; 
Belfanti 2009; Guenzi 2009) and its relevance was remarked in a recent special 
issue of the journal Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research 
(Sforzi 2015, pp. 22-23). Moreover, we adopt a «case study approach that is very 
                                                          
2 The so-called Third Italy and its local systems of production experienced their days of glory 
during the Golden Age (Bagansco 1977). For a periodization of the evolutionary paths of the IDs 
see Guenzi (2007) and Bellandi and De Propris (2015). 
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useful for shedding light on how industrial districts function and particularly on the 
rules governing the relationships among firms and people» (Paniccia 2003, p. 271). 
Such an approach requires the support of several methods and empirical sources to 
gather and construct empirical material in order to offer a holistic understanding of 
the phenomenon in question (Yin 1989; Eisenhardt 1989). 
To analyze the production system, the original questionnaires and summary 
charts of the industry and services censuses carried out by Istat in 19513 and 19614 
were used. Data and information regarding the gun industry found in these sources, 
preserved in Archivio Storico della Camera di Commercio di Brescia, were used to 
build two databases. In the first5 they were employed in conjunction with official 
statistics by Istat to calculate the indices of geographical concentration6 and 
production specialization7 in order to carry out the initial analysis of the local 
system boundaries in the 1951-1981 period (Giacomini et al. 2013)8. The second 
                                                          
3 For documents concerning the 1951 census in the province of Brescia see Archivio Storico 
della Camera di Commercio di Brescia (ASCCBS hereafter), Carteggio 1943-1963 – Categorie 
XXII-XXXII, bb. 854-878; in the present work for the database: Ibidem, bb. 867-868.  
4 For documents concerning the 1961 census in the province of Brescia see Ibidem, bb. 890-991; 
in the present work for the database: Ibidem, bb. 902-911, 913-914, 919, 928, 934, 938, 940, 944, 
947, 949, 954-955, 958-959, 963, 969, 973, 980, 989. 
5 See Appendix 2 (p. 159). 
6 Geographical concentration: this provides information about the ratio and relative importance 
of each municipality on the regional workforce within the sector in question. It is obtained by 
dividing the number of people employed in the gun industry in a given municipality by the number 
of those employed in the same industry in the entire region. 
7 Production specialization: this shows the degree of specialization of a given area with respect 
to an industry that has significant relevance in the economic activities of the same area. In other 
words, it is possible to identify areas characterized by the prevalence of a specific type of production. 
This index (IPS) is calculated as follows: 










Where: 𝐴𝑖𝑗= number of employees in the i-th municipality in the j-th sector; 𝐴𝑖𝑣= number of 
employees in the i-th municipality in the manufacturing industry; 𝐴𝑣𝑗= number of employees in the 
region in the j-th sector; 𝐴∞= number of employees in the region in the manufacturing sector. Given 
the nature of its structure, the index presents a lower bound equal to zero, but not an upper bound. 
Such index, despite some distortions, represents a simple method for the analysis of the sectorial 
specialization of a given territory compared to the average of a much wider area which includes it. 
When the value obtained is higher than 1, there is a specialization in the sector. For greater 
comparability of data, they can be normalized by creating a range of values between -1 and +1 as 
follows: 




8 Data regarding manufacturing and the mechanical engineering sectors were taken from official 
statistics. Those for the gun industry were taken from archives for the years 1951 and 1961 and from 
official statistics for 1971 and 1981. For 1951 summary tables of the census are available (see note 
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database9 lists all the firms active in the gun industry located in the territories of the 
municipality of Gardone Val Trompia, Marcheno and Sarezzo in 196110. This 
database allows to reconstruct the internal structure of the production system as it 
sheds light on a large number of its features: phase specialization, year of 
incorporation of the firms, participation of the entrepreneur in production activities, 
the involvement of relatives and parents, production sites, level of mechanization, 
order system and legal forms adopted by the firms. 
To carry out the historical reconstruction, four further archives were consulted: 
Archivio del Consorzio Armaioli Italiani, based in Gardone, Archivio Storico and 
Archivio di Deposito del Comune di Gardone Val Trompia, and Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato in Rome. 
The documents in the latter were used together with records in the archive of 
the Brescia Chamber of Commerce, to reconstruct the context and challenges faced 
by the gun industry in the postwar period. Specifically, documents from the 
Chamber of Commerce are a survey carried out by the same institution for the 
Italian Ministry of Defense and a report of the local entrepreneurs’ association sent 
to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; documents in the Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato were produced by the section “Armi” of Sottocommissione Alta Italia11. 
                                                          
3). For 1961 it was necessary to go through all the questionnaires filled in by each firm of all 
municipalities in the province (see note 4). Note that for the first two censuses (1951, 1961) original 
documents were used because the official statistics of Istat do not include such refined data. 
9 See Appendix 3 (p. 169). 
10 There are discrepancies between the data for 1961 in the two databases. This is because the 
first database includes only enterprises classified by the census as belonging to the gun making 
sector, whereas the second includes other activities not exclusively related to this industry that, due 
to census classification, were included in specific categories. The latter, more in-depth, analysis was 
carried out by studying the questionnaires filled in by each company one by one (see note 8) and it 
was particularly important to obtain a more comprehensive picture of so-called subsidiary activities. 
11 Immediately after the Liberation, by ordinance Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, on behalf of 
the Supreme Allied Commander, set up the Consiglio Industriale Alta Italia (CIAI) with the aim of 
starting the reconversion of Northern Italian firms to civilian production. CIAI was suppressed on 
28 February 1946 when the Allied Military Government returned the control of Italian territories to 
the Italian government. The responsibilities of CIAI for the entire country were given to 
Commissione Centrale Industria, created by Legal Decree 211 dated 12 March 1946 with advisory 
functions for industrial issues. It was active until 1949. By means of Ministerial Decree 6 June 1946, 
the Minister of Industry and Trade established the rules of the commission and created 4 
subcommittees: for Northern Italy, based in Milan; for Central Italy and Sardinia, based in Rome; 
for Southern Italy, based in Naples; for Sicily, based in Palermo. The subcommittee in the North 
was called Sottocommissione Alta Italia and included several sections, each dedicated to a specific 
industry. The section for the mechanical engineering industry had 21 sectors for which experts were 
asked to write regular reports. “Sector Z” was for small arms production: Giuseppe Beretta, 
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These dossiers collected information regarding the strategic sector of gun 
manufacturing at a difficult time, and describe the critical areas and potential of the 
industry. 
The sources in the Consortium and Council archives were useful to trace the 
role of institutions and organizations in the area, operating as facilitators and 
representatives of the gunsmiths. In particular, the records in the Consortium 
headquarters shed light on the vicissitudes of the production specialization in the 
1970s12. 
Finally, oral sources were also used, specifically 4 semi-structured interviews 
with local system entrepreneurs (Sala 2010; Miller and Glassner 2016): Cristina 
Abbiatico, Pierangelo Pedersoli, Giuseppe Pirlo and Luigi Zanardini13. Finally, 
both quantitative and qualitative information relating to firearms production were 
found in the literature and in newspaper articles on the topic. 
 
 
State of the art: the Marshallian district and Gardone Val Trompia 
 
Alfred Marshall was the first economist who highlighted the potential 
advantages of the division of labor in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
through their participation in the production process according to a model of phase 
specialization. He first theorized a differentiation between internal and external 
economies of scale. The British scholar saw the second type in conjunction with 
geographical concentration: firms tend to be set up in geographically and 
historically bounded areas because of factors of localization and in order to pursue 
advantages related to their proximity. In particular, there are three types of this kind 
of advantage: technological spillover, subsidiary industries and a “constant market 
for skill”14 (Catalán et al. 2011). All are linked to the concept of “industrial 
atmosphere” according to which «where large masses of people are working at the 
                                                          
Vincenzo Bernardelli and Enrico Masi, representatives of the most important firms (Fabbrica 
d’Armi Pietro Beretta, Bernardelli Vincenzo and Breda respectively), were the experts. 
12 Records in all the archives are inventoried, except for the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani. 
13 For further details regarding the interviews and their transcriptions see Appendix 5 (p. 217). 
14 Continuous development and availability of skills: employers have access to various skills and 
employees are more likely to find a range of firms that are able and need to use their skills. 
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same kind of trade, they educate one another. The skill and the taste required for 
their work are in the air, and children breathe them as they grow up» (Marshall and 
Paley Marshall 1879, p. 53).  
These are milestones of economic theory and represent the roots of the concept 
of industrial district. However, as recently pointed out by Fabio Sforzi (2015 p. 12), 
«the Principles of Economics (Marshall 1890) and Industry and Trade (Marshall 
1919), as well as The Economics of Industry (Marshall and Paley Marshall 1879), 
do not provide a definition of industrial district neither as a “unit of investigation” 
nor as a “socio-economic notion”. […] The industrial district definition remained, 
so to speak, “in search of an author” until Giacomo Becattini proposed a new 
interpretation of Marshall’s work». This new interpretation, outlining a fresh 
theoretical approach to industrial change, was formulated by the Italian scholar in 
two seminal papers: Il concetto di industria e la teoria del valore (Becattini 1962) 
and Invito a una rilettura di Marshall (Becattini 1975b). In the first, the industrial 
district was conceptualized as a “unit of investigation” of industrial economics, 
whereas in the second it was conceptualized as a “model of production”. To say it 
with Sforzi (2015, p. 13): «the place of living (the Marshallian “economic nation”) 
as the unit of investigation for understanding the economic change that the 
integration between a “community of people” and a “population of firms”, 
supported by a given “system of values”, engenders through an industrial 
organization which fosters the accumulation, free circulation, sharing and increase 
of knowledge among entrepreneurs and workers (the Marshallian “external 
economies”)». 
The above-mentioned system of values is the expression of an ethic of work and 
activity, of the family, of reciprocity, and change. It is passed on and developed 
through generations and is simultaneously cause and effect of a system of informal 
and formal institutions and rules involving the family, the market, the firm, the 
education system, the local administration, as well as many other public and private, 
economic and political, cultural and charitable, religious and artistic bodies 
(Becattini 2004, p. 20)15. In other words, Becattini places side by side Marshall’s 
                                                          




idea of “industrial atmosphere” with what he calls the “sense of belonging”, the 
tendency of the “community of people” to identify itself with the district and the 
production system. 
The community of people and firms, through the systems of values and rules 
that rely at the very basis of their configuration and interactions, can count on the 
intrinsic tendency of the district to reallocate human resources. This feature is a 
fundamental element of a district’s productivity and competitiveness: it enables the 
district to retain the know-how of workers and to disseminate it among the 
population of firms16. From this perspective, the set of mechanisms and rules which 
determines the internal competition of the district and a sort of solidarity among 
local rivals should also be considered. In particular, Becattini (2004, pp. 27-28) 
looks at the internal market of the goods and services most frequently exchanged 
in the district (especially phase products and specialist services) providing new 
opportunities to actors in the system by increasing its flexibility. As a result, not 
only can workers find a new job more easily, but entrepreneurs can start up again 
after failure. 
The concept of “population of firms” does not mean a haphazard group of 
businesses of different types. Each specializes in one or more phase in the 
production process characterizing the district. As explained by Becattini (2004, p. 
21), «the district is an instance of a localized realization of the process of division 
of labor, which is neither diluted in the general market, nor concentrated in one or 
just a few firm. Localization stands here for something different from an accidental 
concentration in one place of production processes which have been attracted there 
by pre-existing localization factors. Rather, the firms become rooted in the territory, 
and this result cannot be conceptualized independently of its historical 
development». The population is dominated by one industrial branch in the broadest 
sense. Here Becattini (2004, p. 22) points to Marshall’s (1919) concepts of “main 
industry” and “auxiliary industry”: a district does not include only a single type of 
activity, but also subsidiary industries that take care of the incidental requirements 
of the main one. No definite statements can be made regarding the size of the 
                                                          




production units: large firms cannot be excluded, but where multiple phases are 
involved, naturally the optimal technical size is fairly small. 
In addition to skilled workers and phase entrepreneurs, the district includes so-
called “impannatori”, as well as people working at home and in part-time jobs. The 
“impannatori” are special actors «who coordinate the chain of production, from 
design, ordering of raw materials, work specification to weaver, finishing and 
checking, and final delivery to the customer, arranging finance for independent 
subcontracting firms (Jaikumar and Upton 1993). Some “impannatori” are purely 
entrepreneurs with no physical assets; other undertake some activities in-house – 
hybrids of the pure “impannatori” and a vertically integrated firm» (Bijaoui 2015). 
Home and part-time workers, according to Becattini (2004, p. 25), represent crucial 
ties between the production activity and the daily life of the district: they are 
fundamental factors in the process of identification of the community with the 
industrial branch as they are the link between the system of firms and the families. 
Furthermore, their presence, together with phase entrepreneurs, is the primary 
source of one of the most important characteristics of the district: its adaptability. 
In short, they allow a quick and simple reorganization of production according to 
market changes by adjustments in the time budget of individuals and families and 
continuously stimulating the recruits of small entrepreneurs. 
Gardone and its gun industry have been repeatedly defined as an example of 
Marshallian district. In particular, three studies directly address the issue. After a 
historical review of local firearms production and its localization factors, Carlo 
Tombola (2000) reconstructs the demographic map of the provincial firms in the 
1990s. Del Barba (2008) deals with the history of one of the most important firms 
in the local system, Vincenzo Bernardelli S.p.A. (hereafter Bernardelli), describing 
its vicissitudes within the broader context of the valley, especially with reference 
to labor disputes in the gun industry. Fontana (2009) reconstructs the history and 
social features of Gardone in conjunction with the industrial specializations of 
Lumezzane and Nave17. These contributions provide significant insight into the 
                                                          
17 Particularly important, albeit conceived as a contribution to the history of Beretta, is the work 
by Morin and Held (1980). In their monograph the two historians provide crucial details about the 
development of the organization of the local gun industry down the centuries (especially in the 
Modern Age) and the closely-related process of accumulation of social capital. 
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case of central Val Trompia, although several aspects call for further study. In 
particular, although not exclusively, this paper focuses on three: 1) the historical 
and geographical boundaries of the district; 2) phase specialization; 3) the role of 
local institutions. 
Following the above works it verifies the applicability of the district framework 
to Gardone, examining the geographical concentration of SMEs specializing in one 
or more phases of the production process, phenomena of vertical and horizontal 
subcontracting, the existence of intermediate institutions and, most importantly, the 




Historically and geographically bounded 
 
The roots 
The gun industry in Val Trompia has ancient roots. Many authors have traced 
the history of this production specialization, based on the factor endowment of the 
area, rich in iron ore, wood and water. Firearms manufacturing in this portion of 
the province of Brescia grew out of the prosperous mining and iron industries that 
flourished in the area from the Middle Ages if not before. This activity was soon 
organized according to a scheme based on strong fragmentation of the production 
process, putting-out system and strong family ties. The network of workshops 
active in the field with different skills and duties was centered on Gardone Val 
Trompia and spread to the territories of Sarezzo, Marcheno, Inzino, Magno and 
Lumezzane and, following the Mella river, reached the city of Brescia (Belfanti 
1998)18. 
As explained by Morin and Held (1980), since the 17th century, as in the rest of 
Europe, Val Trompia saw the rise of a new category in its social and economic life: 
merchants. With their economic and political power, they sought to take the lead in 
the production chain breaking the age-old rules of solidarity on which craftsmen 
                                                          
18 Each town specialized in one phase of the production process; the center was Gardone where 
gun-barrel manufacturing (the most important and difficult phase) took place providing local 
craftsmen with the skills and ability to coordinate the entire process. 
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organized their activity and imposing low prices through subcontracting. The 
reaction of the gunsmiths was to set up guilds to defend their interests gathering 
and giving an institutional shape to the different producers of firearm components. 
Such a move was aimed at granting some form of coordination in order to increase 
the bargaining power of the craftsmen. 
The guilds did not stop the merchants and the know-how in gun manufacturing 
was seriously threatened by the opportunistic choices of the Austrians, who 
dominated the area from 1814 to 1859. However, the local specialization survived. 
First it was revived by the reopening of the Arsenal after Italian Unification, then it 
gradually caught up with the rest of Europe thanks to Glisenti, Beretta and 
Bernardelli, big firms able to cope with the market challenges of the first half of the 
20th century through political connections, investments in the mass production of 
civilian firearms and alternating externalization and internalization strategies. As a 
consequence, in the central Val Trompia and in the city of Brescia, the number of 
forges and small workshops increased and diminished according to the needs of 
war, periods of peace and the introduction of Fordist innovations (Montanari 1982; 
1983a; 2002; Onger and Paris 2012) 19. 
 
The postwar period  
At the end of WWII, the problem of restructuring the production process was 
back again. On 25 April 1945, the province of Brescia was in a dramatic situation: 
both agriculture and industry faced significant problems. In the secondary sector, 
the most urgent matters were the destruction of portions of plants and the process 
of reconversion, particularly difficult and intense for the local gun industry 
(Gregorini 2008). In the period 1935-45, large firearms firms and the State arsenal 
grew in terms of labor force and production capacity based on military orders of 
which they had a sort of monopoly on the basis of their size, organization and 
technological features (Baglioni 2012). As a consequence, when Italy was finally 
                                                          
19 Regarding the role of guilds and large factories in the process of the accumulation of social 
capital required to create an industrial district see Belfanti (2009). 
66 
 
free of Nazi occupation and the province could no longer count on military orders 
the situation collapsed20. 
In the provincial territory, where all national small arms producers were located, 
5 enterprises had 7 production units: Breda, Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta 
(hereafter FAPB or Beretta), Bernardelli, Fabbrica Nazionale Armi and Franchi.  
There were also a few craft companies like Gitti Umberto & C., Fabbrica Armi 
Anelotti & Gualla and Faverzani Pietro21. The plants most damaged by the 
bombings were in the provincial capital; those of Breda and Beretta lost 
respectively 70% and 10% of their production capacity. In 1946, the local gun 
making industry accounted for 6,500 employees with 40/50% actually surplus to 
needs22. To survive local firms had three alternatives: 1) shift to the production of 
civilian firearms23; 2) diversify production24; 3) heavily reduce the workforce25. 
With regard for the latter, in 1948 in Val Trompia, the situation deteriorated when 
the company OM (automotive sector), which took over the former arsenal after its 
closure by the Nazis in 1943, decided to leave Gardone to reduce costs: around   
                                                          
20 Beretta and Bernardelli were put into temporary receivership until 1948: following the peace 
treaty, an international commission for the control of Italian investments in the military field was 
established (Del Barba 2008, p. 138). 
21 Several other companies in the province (e.g. Gnutti and Tempini) took part in the efforts 
required for military production during the war years. However, these firms were not part of the gun 
making industry, but were in the steel and mechanical engineering sectors: they temporarily adapted 
their production to take advantage of military orders adapting to the needs of the moment and for 
them the reconversion was less difficult.  
22 Archivio Centrale dello Stato di Roma (ACS hereafter), f. «Ministero dell’Industria e del 
Commercio – Commissione Centrale Industria. Sottocommissione Industria Alta Italia», b. 107, 
«Relazione. Sulla situazione industriale nel settore “Armi”, pp. 1-4». 
23 For the period 1945-50, the data of the National Proof House show a significant increase in 
the number of civilian firearms (Appendix 1, p. 151). 
24 The diversification strategy had little success because of difficulties in adapting the machinery 
of this sector to new types of manufacturing. For two reasons: their specificity and the wear and tear 
produced by intensive use during the war years. A list of the products introduced by the local firms 
follows. Beretta: combustion engines, brakes, various types of mechanic manufacturing; 
Bernardelli: screws; Breda: motorcycles, machine tools, springs, needles; Fabbrica Nazionale Armi: 
ovens, decorticating machines, agricultural tractors, bicycles; Gitti: fishing reels. Regarding 
diversification, it is worth noticing that FAPB kept on pursuing this strategy in the following decades 
obtaining good results. Building alliances with other entrepreneurs and companies, Giuseppe Beretta 
invested especially in the automotive sector and in the production of machine tools. See: ACS, f. 
«Ministero dell’Industria e del Commercio – Commissione Centrale Industria. Sottocommissione 
Industria Alta Italia», b. 105, «Programma produzione anno 1946/1947»; Ibidem, b. 107, 
«Relazione. Sulla situazione industriale nel settore “Armi”, p. 3»; Onger and Paris (2012, pp. 85-
109); Paris (2016). 
25 Aggravated by high tax charges and social security contributions labor cost accounted for 75-
80% of the price of the product. Raw materials were estimated to account for the 15%. ACS, f. 
«Ministero dell’Industria e del Commercio – Commissione Centrale Industria. Sottocommissione 














Fabbrica Armi Esercito       
(Gardone V.T.) 




700 0 500 0 
S.A. Fabbrica d’Armi 
Pietro Beretta 
(Gardone V.T.) 
3,000 0 1,625 0 
Armerie Gnutti26 
(Lumezzane) 
3,000 0 0 500 
S.A. Officine Carlo 
Gnutti & Figli 
(Lumezzane) 




600 0 0 170 
Breda Meccanica 
Bresciana (Brescia) 
5,800 0 710 0 
S.p.A. Metallurgica 
Bresciana già Tempini 
(Brescia) 
4,500 1,500 0 1,300 
S.p.A. OM 
(Brescia) 




2,650 0 470 0 
S.A. Luigi Franchi 
(Brescia) 
300 0 100 0 
F.lli Marzoli & C. 
(Palazzolo s/O) 
2,000 1,000 0 2,100 
Table 1 - Source: ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943-1963 (Cat. X-XXI), b. 261, f. 5. 
  
                                                          
26 S.p.A. Serafino e Andrea Eredi Gnutti. 
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1,500 jobs were lost. In 1949, around 5,000 people were estimated to be 
unemployed and the workforce of local gun firms had been severely cut (Sotgiu 
2012). Table 1 (p. 67), with data sent by the Brescia Chamber of Commerce to the 
Italian Ministry of Defense, shows the consequences of the transformation of the 
gun industry in terms of employment27. 
The condition of the sector started to slowly improve in the first half of the 
1950s when the effects of the gradual integration of Italy into international markets 
provided new opportunities to local producers28. Massive unemployment and the 
conversion to civilian firearms became fundamental in the umpteenth evolution of 
the local production system. Many people who lost their jobs were skilled workers 
trained inside large factories in the valley; some were trained in the local vocational 
school with general studies in mechanical engineering, and specific training in 
gunsmithing (Baglioni 2012). Wishing to reinvest their technical skills in hunting 
shotguns, many inhabitants in the valley decided to start up their own business, 
opening small workshops. These micro-enterprises occupied two fields: 1) niche 
markets based on a high degree of product customization, because these small firms 
could dedicate themselves entirely to meeting the needs of their customers; 2) the 
market of subcontracting, where they were able to carry out tasks or provide 
specific firearms parts for the newborn craft enterprises and the large companies at 
a lower cost29. 
                                                          
27 For the same enterprises, the Brescia Chamber of Commerce carried out a survey to investigate 
conditions and the potential of provincial plants in 1952 (Appendix 4, p. 195). 
28 Since the end of the war, exports were a sore point in the recovery of the sector. The domestic 
market which had promised something in the early postwar period was soon blocked by the poor 
economic conditions of the country (customers were mainly hunters, in particular farmers, who had 
the opportunity to hunt); therefore entrepreneurs in the sector repeatedly called for more help from 
the State to reach foreign markets. In particular, they identified three major problems: 1) the heavy 
duties imposed by countries on Italian civilian firearms as a consequence of the exclusion of this 
type of product from the trade agreements and the difficulties of Italy in obtaining the Most Favored 
Nation status; 2) the lack of foreign currency reserves (especially for South American countries, 
good markets before WWII) and the custom of paying on receipt of goods, a serious obstacle for 
companies with poor liquidity; 3) the fierce competition of Belgian products at prices 30% lower 
than for Italian products, which were not helped by favorable trade treaties. The rivalry with the 
firearms sector in Liège was also highlighted in 1950 when Bernardelli and FAPB wrote to the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce to suggest stricter conditions for imports into Italy. See Ibidem, 
«Relazione 1948, pp. 128-129»; Ibidem, b. 111, «Accordi commerciali. Import-Export». 
29 Anon., “Le armi da caccia bresciane ritornano sui mercati mondiali”, Il Cittadino, December 
13, 1953, p. 6; Fausti, M., “La secolare industria delle armi sempre fiorente a Gardone V.T.”, Il 
Cittadino, October 3, 1954, p. 5; Fontana, S., “Lo sviluppo dell’artigianato a Gardone V.T. legato 
allo spirito di cooperazione: nostra intervista col sindaco Angelo Grazioli”, Il Cittadino, February 
13, 1955, p. 4. 
69 
 
Due to the gradual emergence of these craft-family businesses and the slow 
gradual recovery of Beretta and Bernardelli, Gardone Val Trompia and its 
surrounding municipalities were not only able to catch up with the postwar 
reconstruction, but to drive the rapid growth in the province of Brescia in the steel 




In the period under investigation, the provincial production specialization in gun 
making also reconfigured itself from a geographical perspective. The 
transformation began in the first half of the century and sped up after WWII in the 
two side valleys of Val Trompia: Valgobbia and Valle del Garza. Lumezzane 
completed its transition to civilian metal works, specializing in cutlery and valves, 
and Nave focused on the steel industry. Gun production remained in Gardone Val 
Trompia and the provincial capital (Porteri 1995; Fontana 2009). 
To identify the boundaries of the two production areas, two indices were used: 
geographical concentration and production specialization. The indices, here 
calculated for the period 1951-1981, identify areas characterized by phenomena of 
concentration and specialization in a given manufacturing activity. Such 
phenomena are two basic characteristics of industrial districts, according to both 
Becattini31 and Italian Law32. 
                                                          
30 The growth of an intense network of craft businesses was noted by large factory entrepreneurs. 
In 1950, when the sector was still struggling with problems in the domestic and foreign markets, 
they wrote a report to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce complaining of the illegal position of 
the many small workshops which had opened recently. According to the industrialists, there were 
two major problems: 1) many craft businesses were not in the Companies Register or authorized by 
the relevant authorities for the production and marketing of firearms. In particular, the report 
estimated that 4,338 shotguns out of a total of 9,985 in 1948 and 3,970 out of 15,778 in 1949 were 
produced on the clandestine market; 2) craft businesses largely relied on black market labor, paying 
the labor force half the normal salary with no social security contributions. Entrepreneurs in large 
firms noted that small workshops could draw on a mass of unemployed people or workers from 
other factories during their non-working hours (prefiguring the district organization of the following 
decades). ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943-1963 – Categorie I-IX, b. 97, f. 19. 
31 See the introduction. 
32 Law October 5, 1991, art. 36: industrial districts are geographical areas characterized by a high 
degree of SME concentration, with particular reference to the relationship between enterprises and 
the resident population, as well as to the production specialization of the firms. Translation from 
Italian: «aree territoriali locali caratterizzate da elevata concentrazione di piccole imprese, con 
particolare riferimento al rapporto tra la presenza delle imprese e la popolazione residente nonché 
alla specializzazione produttiva dell'insieme delle imprese» (Istat 2001, p. 10). 
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The tables in Appendix 2 (pp. 161-165) show how Gardone Val Trompia was 
the capital of local and Italian gun production. In 1951, significant levels of 
specialization, together with a considerable number of local units, were recorded 
only in Gardone; whereas in the provincial capital, the second municipality for 
number of workers in the sector, the gun industry was diluted in a context generally 
oriented toward manufacturing and mechanical engineering products. The chart for 
1961 shows how new towns became involved in the production specialization. 
Marcheno led the increasing trend both in terms of the number of employees and 
local units. This is significant for three reasons: firstly, because Marcheno borders 
with Gardone; secondly, in view of the fact that the trend strengthened in 1971 and 
1981; finally, because in the following years production specialization spread to the 
neighboring villages including Sarezzo, Lodrino, Tavernole sul Mella and, to a 
lesser extent, some towns in the upper valley. 
It is worthy of attention the fact that the production specialization tended to 
spread according to these coordinates. As a matter of fact, it confirms that the 
neighboring village of Marcheno became the first solution to space availability 
issues for old and new entrepreneurial activities and highlights the role of Gardone 
as barycenter of the central and upper valley in terms of employment dynamics33. 
This second aspect is particularly relevant as commuting is a fundamental factor 
used to identify local labor systems and, on their basis, industrial districts (Istat 
2001). In this sense, the results obtained from the two indices confirm the 
information in two other sources. The first comprises documents in the archive of 
the municipality of Gardone Val Trompia: in 1949, when unemployment was a 
serious problem, the mayors of Marcheno, Tavernole sul Mella and Lodrino wrote 
to the director of the provincial labor office, the prefect and the mayor of Gardone 
to remind them of the importance of the factories of the town in the central valley. 
In particular, they complained that the local administration of Gardone pressed 
firms to employ its inhabitants34.  The dispute was solved on 28 December 1949: 
in the provincial labor office, several local mayors signed a document establishing 
                                                          
33 Anon., “Una realtà che sta cambiando per il ‘boom’ delle industrie”, Giornale di Brescia, 
February 27, 1976, p. 9; Anon., “Una cittadina conosciuta nel mondo per le armi che ‘firma’ da 
secoli”, Giornale di Brescia, August 9, 1978, p. 8. Marocchi was an important example of a firm 
moving to Marcheno in the early 70s in order to grow (Abbiatico 1984, pp. 187-194). 
34 ASCG, b. 790, f. 4.3, «All’Ill/mo sig. Direttore dell’Ufficio Provinciale del Lavoro». 
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the rules for the rehiring of the unemployed in the firms located in Gardone.  New 
jobs were allocated according to the following percentages: Gardone 40%, Sarezzo 
25%, Tavernole 11%, Marcheno 10%, Polaveno 9%, Lodrino 5%35. Furthermore, 
the accusation against the municipality of Gardone Val Trompia was disproved by 
the list of the employed that year: half were from other towns in the valley, and half 
from Gardone, confirming its traditional role as the center of attraction for the local 
labor force36. 
The second source for the importance of Gardone Val Trompia in the dynamics 
of local commuting is a study by Consolati (1989, pp. 7-12), who analyzed 
workforce movements in the period 1971-81. He shows that during the 1970s, the 
attractiveness of Gardone for workers resident outside its boundaries increased, 
strengthening a well-rooted role in the area: in 1971 the local imported workforce 
was 39.3%, rising to 39.9% in 1981. Moreover, a significant increase was recorded 
in the share of the active population of Gardone working outside its territory: from 
15.4% in 1971 to 22.4% in 1981. Consolati also points out that Gardone Val 
Trompia mainly influenced 9 towns in the central and upper valley. Specifically, 
the local system was characterized by two kinds of interconnection, one group of 
towns comprising Marcheno, Sarezzo and Villa Carcina which was thoroughly 
integrated with Gardone and among themselves37; and a second group comprising 
Polaveno, Lodrino, Tavernole sul Mella, Pezzaze, Bovegno and Collio that 
provided a large pool of workers for the industrial activities of the center of the 
system38. 
On the basis of the data in Appendix 2 (p. 159) and in light of the information 
on the local labor market above given, it seems reasonable to assume that the core 
of the local system included the towns of Gardone Val Trompia, Marcheno and 
Sarezzo. This does not mean that firms in other towns of the province had no 
interactions with those of the three above, or that they played no part in external 
                                                          
35 Ibidem, f. 4.4, «Verbale di riunione». 
36 Ibidem, f. 4.3, «Disoccupati. Avviamento al lavoro». 
37 Gardone was well integrated with Marcheno and especially Sarezzo. In 1981, the greatest 
mobility was between Gardone and Marcheno with 30% of the active population in Marcheno 
working in Gardone. Villa Carcina was involved in the core part of the local system through its 
strong relationship with Sarezzo. 
38 The interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli and Cristina Abbiatico confirm these dynamics in 
the local labor market and in the spread of the production specialization. 
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economies of the geographical concentration. However, the central Val Trompia 
was indisputably characterized by higher degrees of concentration-specialization, 
more intense labor dynamics and, as we shall see in the following sections, by a 
sense of belonging to an industrial branch that was unique and with a strong impact 
on the culture of the people. This is why the analysis of the structure of the 
production system focuses on firms in the three towns specified above. 
To conclude this first part of the analysis, it is worth noting that the production 
concentration and specialization of Gardone, Marcheno and Sarezzo was based on 
a large number of SMEs. This is clearly visible in Charts 2.1 and 2.2 (pp. 166-167) 
where the gun making firms and labor force of the three towns are shown according 
to size classes. 
 
 
Products and markets 
 
The gun making sector has two main product categories: military and civilian 
firearms. This paper focuses mainly on the latter. Indeed, civilian firearms grew 
considerably and steadily throughout the period under consideration and were the 
main driver of development for the central Val Trompia production system. They 
include the following main categories: 
• shotguns and semi-automatic shotguns with one or multiple smoothbore barrels; 
• manual double-barreled rifles; 
• manual combination guns; 
• rifles, carbines and muskets with one rifled barrel, even though designed for 
automatic operation system; 
• revolvers; 
• semi-automatic pistols; 
• replicas of antique and muzzle-loading firearms models before 1890; 
• rifles and carbines that, while employable in a war situation, present specific 
characteristics for hunting or sporting purposes; have a limited fire volume and 
are intended to be used with non-military types of ammunition.   
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After the war, the production of long guns gradually increased from zero to a 
peak of 475,438 units in 1977, passing the thresholds of 100,000, 200,000 and 
300,000 units in 1954, 1964 and 1968 respectively. An important part in the 
recovery was played by the double-barreled hunting shotgun. More specifically, 
immediately after the war and throughout the 50s the recovery was led by side-by-
side shotguns whereas under and over shotguns led local production in the 60s, first 
produced industrially and then by craftsmen, reaching 183,979 pieces in 197539.  
From the 60s onwards, the growth of semi-automatic rifles and shotguns was 
extremely significant. Production following traditional typologies began in 1960 
and continued up to the 70s, then it developed according to the typical concepts and 
systems of the Italian labor capacity, reaching 152,383 units in 1976. This product 
drove the development of the most heavily industrialized companies, whose 
potential was significantly limited between 1977-1980 by statutory regulations 
limiting the use and distribution of shotguns and rifles. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the reproduction of ancient firearms acquired 
considerable importance for firearms production in Gardone and the surrounding 
municipalities. The first producer was Aldo Uberti in 1959, when the United States 
were preparing to celebrate the centenary of the American Civil War. He received 
an order for 4,000 units of muzzle loading rifles and pistols. After this unexpected 
event, producers in the valley were able to move into a new unexplored market 
segment based on North America. Especially in Montana, North Dakota and Texas, 
a large number of collectors and aficionados of hunting and target-shooting 
practiced with this type of firearm40. 
In addition to the production of long guns, short-barreled firearms were 
manufactured for personal defense, mainly by larger and more heavily 
                                                          
39 See Appendix 1 (p. 151) for figures relating to small arms tested by the National Proof House 
before going on sale.  
40 All manufacturers of historical firearms replicas were in Gardone Val Trompia. In the 1960s 
the local gunsmiths specialized in the reproduction of Colt and Winchester models, and in particular 
firearms from the American Civil War (Daffini 1969). They made replicas of revolvers (Navy mod. 
1851 – cal. 36, Navy mod. 1861 – cal. 36, Army mod. 1860 – cal. 44, Remington New Army mod. 
1859 – cal. 44, Reb Navy mod. 1851 – cal. 36, Baby Dragon mod. 1848 – cal. 31, Welles Fargo 
mod. 1848 – cal. 31, Walker mod. 1847, Dragoon 2º mod. 1848, Colt Single Action), pistols 
(Kentucky, Derringer 22 L.R. – 38 special, Bodyguard) and rifles (Winchester mod. 1866). For this 
topic see also Barbieri, P., “Cominciò tutto col centenario della guerra di secessione…”, 
Bresciaoggi, February 2, 1979; as well as the interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli and Luigi 
Zanardini (Appendix 5, pp. 219, 253). 
74 
 
industrialized companies. This figures for this product were similar to those of 
shotguns in the 50s, but fell into the background in the following decade. The albeit 
short-lived peak occurred in the last three years of the 60s and the second half of 
the 70s.  
These products found their way into national and international markets. The 
Italian market was important in the years immediately after the Second World War 
but in the first half of the 1950s its relevance rapidly diminished due to the limited 
potential and increasing constraints of the state for the possession and sale of 
firearms41. The domestic market mainly comprised hunting firearms, a popular 
activity with a strong tradition (amongst industrial and craft workers, farmers, 
craftsmen and office workers) and was extremely sensitive to legislative norms. 
Severe fiscal tightening of the tax for hunting licenses between 1961 and 1962 led 
to a rapid decline in firearms sales and, as a result, a fall in production. Only after 
a partial reversal of the tax decisions did the decline come to an end. In addition 
and closely related to the legislative norms, two further factors influenced the 
domestic market: seasonality and geographic concentration. The hunting season 
was limited during the year and this concentrated sales in one period only (from the 
end of May to the beginning of October), leading to some problems in the 
distribution of firearms and forcing the industry to stock up sufficiently for the sales 
period. With regard to the geographic concentration, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and 
generally the whole of Northern and Central Italy had high numbers of hunters and 
sales compared to the South, Sardinia and Sicily. This was because of higher 
disposable incomes with users often buying more than one shotgun, and greater 
interest in hunting due to the natural abundance of game.  
Consequently, a major role in the relaunch of the sector was played by foreign 
markets. Indeed the gun trade started to significantly improve after two important 
events: membership of the Gatt and Italy joining Nato. The first allowed Italy to 
market its hunting and sports shotguns outside its borders; the second definitively 
included the country in the Western Bloc allowing (after review of the constraints 
imposed by the peace treaty) the industry based on military orders to begin a process 
                                                          
41 Restrictive measures introduced by the public authority included: the increase in the fee for 
the hunting license in 1961 and the gradual shortening of the hunting season. Further details on the 
impact of legislative measure are provided in the paragraph “Local institutions”. 
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of reconstruction and the industry based on civilian orders to increase the sale of 
pistols for self-defense to the police under the public order management taken from 
the American model (Del Barba 2008, pp. 141-146). 
From relatively low levels in the first half of the 50s, exports gradually improved 
both as absolute values and in relation to total production, reching 50% of 
production in the second half of the 60s. In particular, four countries were the main 
buyers of the civilian products made in Brescia: the United States, France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, representing 77% of the whole. The United States was 
the biggest market and, as already mentioned, the main driver behind the 
reproduction of antique firearms. France traditionally represented a good outlet for 
Brescia shotguns, due especially to the high number of hunters, whereas Germany, 
in which hunting is not widespread, acted as an intermediate market between 
production and destination: due to its superior financial organization, it was able to 
reach markets inaccessible or too expensive for exporters from Brescia (see Table 
2 and Chart 1, pp. 76-77).  
With reference to the 60s and, more specifically, to 1962-1967, the data 
regarding units sold abroad, both short and long firearms, are available. Tables 3 
and 4 (p. 76) and Charts 2 and 3 (pp. 78) show the increasing foreign market share 
of local products from Brescia. For long firearms, once again it is possible to infer 
the important role of the hunting shotguns. Among short firearms, the leading 
position was taken by the 6.35 and 22 caliber pistols, produced mainly by the largest 
industries in the sector (Bontempi 1970)42. 
Despite the difficulties of the oil crisis and the first signs of industrial maturity, 
Italy became the largest exporter of hunting and sports firearms during the 70s. As 
far as the long-barreled firearms were concerned, there was a significant 
improvement in 1979, compared with the beginning of the decade and the period 
from 1976 to 1978, during which a 23.4% fall in exports was recorded. It is worth   
                                                          
42 These data refer to the number of export licenses requested by producers. Two points require 
clarification: 1) not all licenses could be used for export; 2) so-called “temporary imports” are 
included, that is all those long and short firearms imported from abroad in order to be repaired and 
subsequently re-exported. Therefore, the data do not reflect actual exports, which were lower, albeit 
not by much (perhaps 1%).  
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Country 1967 1968 1969 
Germany 1,423,491  2,045,365 2,383,520 
USA 4,558,910 6,734,655 5,532,420 
UK 246,495 406,954 317,023 
France 1,741,510 3,068,864 2,822,699 
Spain 343,086 165,762 238,614 
Greece 37,821 85,361 32,843 
Australia 75,538 60,122 60,077 
Indonesia 314,774 161,729 217,345 
Canada 257,005 184,563 831,802 
Portugal 129,023 143,955 148,044 
Japan 254,154 188,866 144,301 
Israel 1168,768 67,970 153,641 
Switzerland 1176,233 146,252 215,287 
Jugoslavia 1170,649 14,930 69,595 
Algeria 72,978 119,568 19,113 
Others 111,016,434 1,411,217 1,600,274 
Total 10,686,869 15,006,133 14,786,598 
Table 2 - Exports in $ per country. Source: Bontempi (1970) 
 
Type of firearm 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Shotguns: O/U, S/S 
and semiautomatic 
73,872 71,712 83,866 83,504 78,630 102,593 
Carbines 2,484 2,044 5,106 5,802 4,780 6,035 
Muzzle loading 
rifle replicas 
1,881 682 907 1,200 1,645 1,916 
Total 78,237 74,438 89,879 90,506 85,055 110,544 
Table 3 - Long Firearms Exports (quantity). Source: Bontempi (1970) 
 
Type of firearm 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Cal. 7.65 4,497 11,245 4,264 4,873 10,745 13,008 
Cal.6.35 20,484 31,008 33,727 49,542 63,507 80,072 
Cal. 22 24,971 28,065 35,847 46,729 44,974 42,270 
Muzzle loading 
hand gun replicas 
9,839 10,433 10,753 12,341 20,063 20,275 
Total 59,791 80,751 84,591 113,485 139,289 155,625 
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noting that in 1979 the ratio of exports to the total production of long-barreled 
firearms was 66%, the highest recorded since 1973. Limiting the analysis to long-
barreled firearms, the breakdown of exports per country was practically the same 
as in the previous decade. In line with the percentages on the international level of 
hunters and shooters, the USA was still the leading importer - although Italian 
products had lost some market share to domestic producers - followed by France, 
West Germany, Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom (Tosini 1980). 
In an attempt to thoroughly explain the re-emergence of the vast network of 
small and medium-sized production units and the success of local producers in 
Brescia, it is worth describing the foreign competition that they had to face during 
the period covered by this paper. Historically the firearms industry was organized 
according to the fabrique disséminée pattern assuming the form of a proto-district 
(Braudel 1977): similar cases to that of Val Trompia, characterized by an 
extraordinary concentration of workshops specializing in the manufacturing of 
firearms components, existed in Belgium (Liège), France (Saint-Étienne), England 
(Birmingham) and Spain (Eibar). Nevertheless, in the second half of the 20th 
century, foreign production systems, including those that achieved excellent results 
both qualitatively and in terms of sales before World War II, were forced to give 
way to Brescia companies. This success was determined by the strengths of the 
national production and the increasing problems of foreign producers. The former 
included the relatively low cost of specialist skilled labor and the considerable 
improvement in the quality and image of the products, due to the extreme care of 
the new craftsmen employed. The latter included diverse factors according to the 
country, but generally involved a strong reduction in the activity of craftsmen 
accompanied by the vertical integration of foreign production set-ups.  
In other words, the gradual weakening of foreign counterparts favored the 
emergence of a network of small and medium-sized production units in Brescia. It 
is therefore worth reviewing the main issues faced by foreign industrial districts.  
After the Liberation in Liège, the arms industry suffered the same problems it 
faced after the First World War: loss of manpower and markets, political instability, 
import restrictions, withdrawal of the Eastern bloc and modernization by 
competitor nations. A combination of social, economic and technological factors 
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seriously weakened the Belgian district which shrunk to eight towns with the center 
of gravity shifting from Liège to Herstal due to the pre-eminence of the famous 
Fabrique Nationale as a source of employment. The decline of the home-based 
system and increasing wage costs affected the competitiveness of Liègeois firearms 
in world markets. The cheap and readily available supply of manpower, previously 
a manufacturer’s vital asset, gradually disappeared. Recruitment difficulties, 
training costs, the mobility of arms workers (in demand from the labor market), 
increased wages and social security contributions all compelled manufacturers to 
produce weapons (especially in the civilian sector) which, without improved 
quality, could no longer compete with rival products. This tendency, which began 
after the Great War, became more marked after the Second World War, particularly 
as Liègeois arms manufacturers were still using traditional techniques, and unlike 
their competitors, had failed to reduce the manual element in their production 
methods. Hence, recovery after the Liberation was slow and difficult. The 
precarious and contradictory growth of the postwar period reach a peak in 1969, 
just before a new crisis caused by the fall in the dollar and inflated labor costs from 
which Belgium, in particular, suffered (Gaier 1985, pp. 213-230). 
In Birmingham, the introduction of machinery clearly contributed to the decline 
of the craft gun trade in the second half of the 19th century, although the mechanized 
companies able to produce military magazine rifles and machine guns prospered. 
This, tough competition from European and North American manufacturing centers 
and periods of economic depression continued to gradually erode the size of the 
hand-made sports gun trade, which continued to shrink after the First World War 
and was hit by the Great Depression. Continuing legislation to limit the ownership 
of weapons in the UK also impacted on the trade, as did air-raid damage in the 
Second World War. In the 1950s, the old gun trade was very restricted in terms of 
supplies, and molds and forgings for guns were becoming very scarce indeed. Even 
more critical was the supply of tubes for shotgun barrels. With the exception of 
imported tubes, there was virtually only one source for these, making the position 
of the traditional gun makers rather precarious. The final step in the decline was the 
development of the Smallbrook Ringway in the 1960s, leading to the demolition of 
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many traditional workplaces in the so-called Gun Quarter of the city (Williams 
2009, pp.140-146; Dunham 1955, pp 33-35; White and Trudgeon 1983). 
The production of Eibar was specialized in short-barreled firearms. After its 
heyday, between the second half of the 19th century and the first decades of the 
following century (Goñi Mendizabal 2010), local producers faced increasing 
difficulties, first due to the civil war and later to the regulations introduced by the 
Spanish government for the manufacture of firearms and explosives. In particular, 
two regulations approved in 1941 and 1944 respectively, made authorization for the 
production of short firearms conditional on production in a single building, thus 
excluding workshops and allowing only the three principal producers to continue: 
Unceta, Bonifacio Echeverría and Gabilondo. The situation was not ideal for 
shotgun production either: due to the disorganization of the production system after 
the Civil War and lack of raw materials, Spanish companies were not able to find a 
place in a market partially freed up by the major continental competitors involved 
in World War II. Nor did the situation improve at the end of the conflict: both the 
handgun and shotgun industries struggled due to the Spanish commercial embargo 
and the limitations of the domestic market. The turnaround occurred in the 50s 
when the Basque gun making industry managed to return strongly to international 
markets following the provision of significant aid for exports by government 
institutions. One initiative of the Guipúzcoa Chamber of Commerce of was of 
paramount importance. The Chamber made it easier to import raw materials and 
machinery for metallurgical companies, which were in turn able to export their 
products. This intensified during the 60s, but if this on the one hand allowed local 
companies to achieve good results in foreign markets, on the other it made them 
even more dependent on institutional aid. Lastly, another weakness emerged in the 
production system of Spain: the excessive dependence on the American market, 
which became catastrophic when in 1969 the United States introduced the Gun 
Control Act, thus significantly penalizing the import of short-barreled firearms to 






The structure of the district: phase specialization, subcontracting, family ties 
 
With the introduction of the American System of Manufacturing in the 19th 
century, the military sector embraced the path of mechanization and parts 
interchangeability, whereas the civilian sector remained true to craftsmanship43. 
Especially in the field of hunting shotguns, where Gardone Val Trompia had a 
leading position, customers continued to look for products created by traditional 
manufacturing methods where hand fitting played a fundamental role44. The 
production of a shotgun required the work of a large number of skilled workers in 
a sort of production chain, comprising (Zoli 1969): 
• Preparatori di canne (gun barrel makers): divided into diverse “specialists”. 
The first prepares the tubes, ribs and bolts to braze them together (copper or 
brass). The second checks the effectiveness of the brazing. The third (the 
leveler) perfectly straightens the barrels by using a simple hand wheel press. He 
verifies the straightness by sighting the inside of the barrel through a light 
source arranged horizontally and by observing the double shadow that it casts 
on the inner polished bore. The double shadow, when the barrel is perfectly 
aligned, is made up of two lines that have to look straight once the barrel is 
rotated along 360°. The fourth “specialist” is in charge of giving the appropriate 
uniformity and regulating gun dispersion, as well as reducing the recoil.  
• Basculatori: these are skilled craftsmen in charge of pairing the barrels to the 
locking mechanisms of the receiver. Their main tools are the chisel and file.  
• Acciarinai (lock manufacturers): they create the percussion and shooting 
devices for shotguns.  
• Preparatori del movimento (movement preparers): these skilled craftsmen pair 
the lock mechanism and the trigger guard of the receiver. They mount the key 
with its pin and prepare the pieces in such a way that the movements of all the 
locking and firing mechanisms are synchronized according to strict rules.  
                                                          
43 See the study by Rosenbloom (1993). Regarding the importance of the military for 
interchangeability see Smith (1977, 1985). 
44 For small hand guns an approach based on mechanization and standardization is more 
common. One example is the gun making district of Eibar (Goñi Mendizabal 2010). 
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• Modellatori or tiratori (modelers): with the help of a chisel, hammer and file, 
they carve the receiver out of a shapeless steel block.  
• Incassatori (inlayers): these apply the suitable carvings and slots to the stock so 
that the metallic and wooden parts perfectly match and the firearm, on the 
whole, is perfectly tailored to the physical features of the shooter45. 
• Lucidatori (polishers): they are in charge of the stock by applying the finishing 
touches to the external surfaces. They sand it down with sandpaper and a metal 
scouring pad, then they apply layers of polish that make the stock waterproof 
and shiny.  
• Zigrinatori (checkerers)46: they checker the part of the stock and fore-end that 
is gripped when using the firearm producing a crisscross pattern with a small 
and simple hand tool.  
• Incisori (engravers): with the help of hand-gravers they decorate the main 
metallic parts of the firearm47. 
• Riparatori (repairers): they re-finish the triggers, hammers and trigger guards, 
they adjust the screws, the safety, the lock mechanisms and many other pieces.  
• Pulitori (smoothers): with brushes, tape, abrasive pastes, felts, etc. they 
perfectly polish all the metal parts of the firearm in order to allow for a uniform 
burnishing.  
• Tempratori (brazers): they are in charge of “hardening” the metal parts that are 
most exposed to wear and tear in order to increase their hardiness. They heat 
the parts up to a precise temperature and then cool them down quickly by 
immersing them in water or oil.  
• Brunitori or verniciatori (burnishers or finishers): they treat the metal parts of 
the firearm with chemicals to avoid oxidation.  
                                                          
45 Inletting is a very difficult profession that requires long training (around 3/4 years). Because 
of this the number of experts fell considerably; details regarding inletting and the story of a famous 
inlayer can be found in Abbiatico (1984, pp. 43-48).  
46 Women usually carried out this kind of work.  
47 Engravers are considered genuine artists: a qualified craftsman could earn more self-




• Assemblatori in nero (assemblers): they assemble all the parts of the firearm, 
perfecting the pairing between the receiver and the barrels and permanently 
setting the “locks”. They set the mechanisms, synchronize the extractors and 
verify the percussion. 
These craftsmen could be employees or self-employed, but for some it was more 
natural to start up their own business and be directly involved in outsourcing. The 
rationale behind subcontracting was the reduction of fixed costs, shared with the 
surrounding community of firms48. Through the documents in the archive of the 
Brescia Chamber of Commerce it is possible to reconstruct a complete picture of 
the gun making industry in the central Val Trompia in 1961. As noted in 
Methodology and sources, they comprise questionnaires and summary tables for 
the census of industrial and commercial activities in Gardone Val Trompia, 
Marcheno and Sarezzo. They allow to identify firearms producers as well as 
subsidiary industries49. 
Table 3.1 and Charts 3.1 and 3.2 (pp 183, 187-188) show the formation of a 
district structure in the post-war period: perhaps this is mainly related to the re-
launch of the production of civilian firearms. At the time, 101 local businesses, or 
37% of the total production system, were end producers who manufactured civilian 
firearms, employing 593 people, thus representing 19% of the labor force for 
firearms production in the three towns under investigation. They were mainly 
craftsmen who re-invested their technical skills by opening small businesses 
working on a small number of products, particularly in the post-war period side-by-
side shotguns and subsequently under and over shotguns. Further confirmation that 
the network of these small and medium-sized businesses underwent significant 
development after the Liberation is given by the incorporation dates: only 5 of the 
101 businesses in the category “Civilian firearms manufacturing” were founded 
before 1945. Of the 272 production units in the local system, only 19 were founded 
before that date.  
                                                          
48 As stated by Cristina Abbiatico, outsourcing was almost unavoidable for small producers who 
could not afford to permanently employ a large number of people (Appendix 5, p. 233). 
49 For the database, its tables and charts see Appendix 3 (p. 169). 
85 
 
22% of the workers somehow associated with firearms production were in so-
called subsidiary industries, in other words, businesses that carried out specific 
phases in the production cycle of firearms or other activities in support of the end 
producers. 62% of the businesses in Gardone, Sarezzo and Marcheno were engaged 
in subsidiary activities. These were specialists in the production and repairing of 
parts and in the specific phases of assembly, engraving, inlaying, checkering, 
smoothing and stock manufacturing. Mechanical engineering and wood firms 
worked on and off in the industry: they participated in the handguns and shotgun 
according to the particular needs and opportunities of the market. Subsidiary 
activities were mainly for third parties, which meant that they were different from 
the end producers in the type of order management: if the majority of the former 
carried out their work exclusively on customer orders, the latter mainly operated 
with and without pre-orders (see Table 3.2 and Chart 3.7, pp. 184 and 192).  
Three significant aspects emerged from the field interviews enhancing the data 
from the census documents. The first is that in the 50s and 60s, firearms parts 
manufacturers had a key role: they supplied the so-called serie, i.e. all the main 
components of shotguns, to end producers who, in most cases, were unable to 
produce them. The producers then carried out and/or outsourced assembly and 
refining operations of the serie in order to customize the final product, becoming 
coordinators of the production process50.  
The second aspect is related to the “permeability” between the classes of the 
industry identified by the analysis carried out through the census. This type of 
flexibility was particularly significant for so-called end producers: it was not 
uncommon for both small workshops and larger firms, who maintained their 
licenses for firearms production but essentially dedicated themselves to repairs. In 
other words, in a period of slack, it was common that craftsmen decided to work on 
a particular phase of the production process on behalf of a colleague or much larger 
company51.  
                                                          
50 Interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli and Cristina Abbiatico (Appendix 5, pp. 219 and 233).  
51 By crosschecking the data in the registry files of the registry for businesses of the Brescia 
Chamber of Commerce it is clear that almost all craft workshops in the valley specialized in firearms 
repairs and maintenance and, in some cases, in the production of single parts. A particularly 
significant example of how gun makers could adapt to market opportunities and relationships with 
the other craftsmen is provided in the interview with Giuseppe Pirlo: he had his own production 
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The third aspect is the fact that flexibility of the production system was also 
assured by a flourishing “intermediate market”. There is no information on the retail 
of tools and work machines, but it was certainly common practice for an 
entrepreneur to buy from a competitor forced to close or unable to make a decent 
living. Skilled craftsmen usually purchased unfinished shotguns and pistols, 
completed them and then sold them under their own name52. 
A crucial element in local production dynamics was the family. According to 
the database, 61 companies out of the total of 272, approximately 22.5%, were run 
by family members or included family members among their employees. However, 
excluding single person businesses (120), the percentage rose to 68.5% (see Table 
3.1, Charts 3.4 and 3.5, pp. 183 and 190). Moreover, in all likelihood we cannot 
exclude that even within those businesses that officially presented themselves as 
sole proprietorships, family ties were widespread with family members helping 
with work in a sporadic and unreported manner. Anecdotal evidence and the 
interviews indicate that the degree of family ties was underestimated in the official 
statistics.  Knowledge and skills in the field of gun making were passed on within 
the family, from father to son, or from grandparents and uncles to grandsons and 
nephews, as repeatedly shown by the life stories of gun makers collected by Mario 
Abbiatico (1984). The interview with Cristina Abbiatico brought to light an 
eloquent example: an inlayer in her company refused to teach his job to non-
relatives, a problem for the owner because of the shortage of inlayers. In the end, 
she was forced to hire the employee’s nephew53. Another practice based on family 
ties was the temporary allocation of licenses to a family member (usually the wife) 
by employed craftsmen setting up their own businesses. In this way, aspiring 
entrepreneurs solved two problems: on one hand, they could overcome the 
constraints that prevented the assignment of the license to employed workers and, 
on the other, it provided them a sufficient margin of time to start the business and, 
if they deemed it necessary, end the relationship with their own employer 
(Abbiatico 1984, p. 221).  
                                                          
(which was restricted to shotguns), made parts (barrels) for other local businesses and he also 
repaired and assembled firearms (Appendix 5, p. 247).  
52 Giuseppe Pirlo says this practice became particularly profitable for him at the beginning of the 
70s (Appendix 5, p. 247).  
53 Interview with Cristina Abbiatico (Appendix 5, p. 233).  
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As can be seen in Table 3.1 and Chart 3.3 (pp. 183 and 189), although a 
significant 23% of craftsmen worked at home, most of the companies in the census 
said they had their own premises. However, two aspects deserve special attention. 
First, these data did not have a homogeneous distribution: for certain categories, 
especially businesses specializing in engraving, inlaying and checkering, the 
situation was exactly the opposite. Secondly, all the interviewees say the home was 
seen as an additional workplace at the end of the long day. After their shifts many 
workers in large factories brought their work home or worked for local craftsmen 
in their own garages or basements. Moreover, it is worth highlighting the fact that 
the interviewees (recalling another characteristic feature of the district) associated 
the reconstruction of these aspects of their lives at the time with the idea that those 
who merely carried out the canonical 8 hours were considered by the locals as 
“slackers”. In other words, work permeated people’s lives; it was often carried out 
by the whole family and was regularly brought home. People spent most of the day 
and many evenings working54.  
Table 3.2 and Charts 3.6 and 3.8 (pp. 184, 191, 193) provide further 
confirmation of two aspects of the local production system mentioned above. At 
the beginning of the 60s, the large network of small and medium-sized businesses 
used craft working methods: 76% of the businesses that took part in the census said 
they did no mass produce, and only 16% used partially or fully mechanized methods 
(data for the remaining 8% was not available). The second aspect is participation 
by the employers in work activities: the data demonstrate a system based on 
technical expertise with 80% of the owners working in their own company in close 
contact with their employees. 
Last but not least, the enormous impact of Bernardelli and Beretta on 
employment should not go unnoticed. These two businesses were categorized 
separately in the database under “Firearms producers” and were the only end 
producers to also work for the military market. It was especially FAPB that led the 
production system and molded its structure. After the vicissitudes of the early 
postwar period, the company was able to recover through the sports sector and, as 
                                                          
54 Interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli, Cristina Abbiatico, Giuseppe Pirlo and Luigi Zanardini 
(Appendix 5, pp. 219, 233, 247, 253).  
88 
 
soon as the political and economic context allowed, it returned to military orders. 
Despite the importance of civilian firearms in this phase, very soon the centuries-
old company set up a division dedicated to military products, obtaining under 
license from American companies, orders from the U.S. Army and Nato. These 
efforts put a stop to the ongoing downsizing and created a sort of virtuous cycle 
further boosting the relaunch of hunting shotguns. One significant example is the 
famous Garand M-1: by producing this rifle, FAPB acquired the know-how 
associated with the interchangeability of parts, which it then adapted for civilian 
production. R&D and investments in quality were exploited by the company in a 
cautious commercial strategy aimed at foreign markets. Crucial were the trade 
contacts Giuseppe Beretta set up in the early postwar period in South America, 
leading FAPB to establishing a plant in Brazil55. The following step was the U.S.: 
through a strategic and long-term partnership with Galef & Son, a company based 
in New York, Beretta started to promote and export its products to North America, 
the first move in the process of penetration of the American market that was 
completed in the 1970s with the establishment of Beretta Arms in Connecticut and 
the acquisition of The Firearms Industries in Maryland (Onger and Paris 2012, pp. 
63-85). 
The importance of FAPB to the local system was evident not only in terms of 
production volumes and reputation but also in shaping district dynamics in two 
ways. First it contributed to the emergence of the network of SMEs participating to 
the subcontracting practice, especially in the manufacturing phases characterized 
by low tech procedures. Secondly, FAPB employees often had a second job in the 
numerous craft workshops in the valley. This way, a mutual virtuous relationship 
was set up with FAPB able to outsource to smaller units in order to reduce 
production costs and the workshops able to use highly trained workers (Onger and 
Paris 2012, p. 85)56. 
To summarize, the system was characterized by a strong division of labor, 
creating a process of progressive sub-specialization and accentuating the 
                                                          
55 It is worthy to recall that the famous M9 pistol was first produced in Brazil for the local 
government. 
56 For details see also the interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli, Giuseppe Pirlo and Cristina 
Abbiatico (Appendix 5, pp. 219, 233, 247); Barbieri, P., “Decentramento e doppio lavoro: un terreno 
scivoloso per tutti”, Bresciaoggi, February 3, 1979. 
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interdependence of its various parts. In some cases, the predominant relations 
between the two main sections of the system were vertical, but mostly they were 
horizontal. Subcontracting allowed companies to minimize total unit costs through 
the expulsion of destabilizing production functions which presented non-
homogeneous trend curves for unit costs. These functions were entrusted to 
companies whose creation was often stimulated by the same company responsible 
for the decentralization. The new firms, primarily and traditionally handling one 
production function, gradually increased their “professionalism” through a process 
of learning by doing.  
When, with the 1973 oil crisis, the first signs of industrial maturity appeared, 
fragmentation and production specialization intensified throughout the remaining 
years of the decade. The protagonists of this phenomenon were the businesses that 
did not require specialist machinery and equipment so a single worker (polishing, 
checkering, cleaning) or small workshops (stock manufacturing) could carry out 
the work at home. But the process also included activities that required a higher 
level of specialization which a skilled craftsman could carry out on his own 
(engraving) with the intention of securing higher earnings.  
Large and medium-sized businesses underwent restructuring through the 
introduction of laborsaving technological innovations in some phases of the 
production cycle and by outsourcing particularly labor-intensive activities. In other 
words, the response of the production system of civilian firearms consisted in 
rationalizing production units, and innovating the process for every part of the cycle 
in order to reach higher production levels and thus maintain competitiveness in 
terms of quality and value for money. Such processes mainly took place through a 
reduction of the employment in the industry, only partially absorbed by the existing 
and new craft workshops (Piccoli 1981, pp. 129-131).  
With the general decline in demand for civilian firearms, especially for hunting, 
companies diversified. Entrepreneurs began to pay more attention to the rapidly 
growing market for sport shooting firearms, a product that required greater 
precision and technical perfection and hence with higher added value. In addition, 
firearms replicas became increasingly important. Lastly, in most industries total 
revenues increased for components and manufacturing phases for the military. In 
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general, more attention was paid by end producers to quality enabling workshops 
to detach themselves from parts producers and abandon their role as assemblers. 
They no longer bought the so-called serie, but created their own serie in order to 





As stated above, local institutions can play a significant role within a district. 
They can act as regulatory authorities and as triggering factors for the establishment 
of other organizations and institutions that strengthen the local system and foster its 
development. In the case in question institutions played both roles: a significant 
“institutional thickness” (Amin and Thrift 1994) can be detected and is worthy of 
attention. 
 
The local administration 
Gardone Val Trompia can be included in the long list of towns in northeastern 
Italy characterized by a strong Catholic subculture (Triglia 1986). This can be seen 
in the lengthy political hegemony of the Christian Democrats between 1951 and 
1980. During this period, the local party was led by Angelo Grazioli, mayor for six 
consecutive terms. Furthermore, the other force in Italian politics, the Communist 
Party, also had a strong tradition in the valley through the working class employees 
of Beretta, Redaelli and Glisenti (Bonetti 1987; Aa. Vv. 1988). 
The local authorities, especially the mayor, backed several initiatives for the 
development of the gun industry. In addition to strengthening the position of 
Gardone as administrative capital of the valley58, the municipality supported other 
institutions which were important for the production specialization, and mediated 
between actors in the local system and between the system and the Sate. 
                                                          
57 See interviews with Pierangelo Pedersoli and Cristina Abbiatico (Appendix 5, pp. 219 and 
233).  
58 The local administration paid great attention to infrastructure and services; they opened Inail 
and Inam clinics in 1953 and 1955 respectively, built a new hospital (1961-1969), built and 
renovated new and old schools at all educational levels (Aa. Vv. 1988). 
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On 8 September 1943, following the withdrawal of Italy from the war, the Nazis 
closed the local Arsenal and its factory passed under the control of the company 
OM, a truck manufacturer. At the end of the war, with unemployment rife, the firm 
decided to abandon the plant due to operating costs and brought production back to 
the provincial capital. The Gardone local administration, other municipalities in the 
area, the labor force and their representatives, opposed this decision. Their intense 
lobbying had no effect on the decision of OM but did produce two results. The first 
was to delay the inevitable traumatic event, that finally occurred in 1948, while 
obtaining the introduction of allowances, training courses and a social canteen for 
the unemployed. The second result was the reopening of the Arsenal in reduced 
form under the name of Stabilimento Militare per l’Armamento Leggero (Smal). In 
the following decades, around 100 people worked on the repair and production of 
guns for the Italian army and, in particular, controlled the orders of the state to 
private producers59. In 1949, the remainder of the plant was bought by Mival, a 
machine tools manufacturer which also produced audio-video equipment, 
electronic components, mopeds and motorcycles. Crucial to the success of what can 
be considered the first full-scale conversion in the gun industry of the valley was 
the contribution of FABP. In fact, Mival was created on the heritage of a mechanical 
engineering company, Officine Minganti, with equity held by FABP from the 
outset. From a 5% share of the capital in 1950, FABP reached a 26% stake in 1952, 
56% at the beginning of the following decade and 98% in 1965 (Onger and Paris 
2012, pp. 90-104). 
Over the following years Mayor Grazioli and the local administration lobbied 
intensely on behalf of the gunsmiths. They pressured deputies, senators and 
ministers during debates on possible regulatory changes for the marketing and 
possession of weapons. They organized public and private meetings with actors in 
the local system, sent letters to Mino Martinazzoli, Aldo Gitti and Adelio Terraroli 
providing them with data regarding the performance of the sector. Examples in this 
                                                          




sense are the efforts made against the introduction of the so-called Tambroni Law60, 
the increase in the cost of hunting licenses61 and Decree Law 6/7/197462. 
The municipality often found itself mediating in conflicts between 
entrepreneurs and unions. The end of the 60s and the 70s was a time of industrial 
disputes and strikes throughout the country: in Gardone significant downsizing was 
carried out by Bernardelli and FAPB, following the introduction of labor saving 
innovations, with the opposition of the workforce. Italian metalworkers obtained 
significant results including the new National Collective Employment Contract. In 
1970, the position of the workforce was strengthened by the introduction of the 
Statuto dei Lavoratori (Workers Charter). The strikes continued, indeed were 
intensified by the reactions of entrepreneurs to the achievements of the unions, and 
the widespread practice of subcontracting became a new fight63 (Del Barba 2008, 
pp. 175-187). In this context characterized by harsh debates, the local 
administration tried to mediate and, as an example, we can recall the words uttered 
by Mayor Grazioli during a meeting of the city Council meeting in 1971: «On 14 
May the long and serious labor dispute in Beretta ended by agreement, truly 
creditable for the unions and the company. The agreement includes very important 
economic and legal aspects […]. As in other circumstances, the local administration 
contributed to the resolution of the dispute […] mediating in favor of a fair 
settlement for both parties» (Aa. Vv. 1988, p. 55). 
                                                          
60 ASCG, b. 833, ff. 3-4. In particular, Law 1274 dated 22/11/1956 banned on sale of handguns 
to people not in possession of a firearms license. On 16 September 1957, the mayor received a thank 
you letter from Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta for his commitment to the local gun industry. 
61 ADGVT, b. «Pubblica sicurezza 1961 – Circolari». In 1961, the Council of Ministers approved 
an approximately 120% increase in the cost of hunting licenses. Mayor Grazioli went to Rome to 
discuss the problem with the Finance Minister, Trabucchi. Hunting licenses were important for 
Gardone since most local small and medium-sized enterprises were entirely devoted to the 
production of hunting shotguns. Furthermore, hunting was very popular and a traditional activity 
handed down from father to son in many families. Handguns provided a living but also leisure and 
exploration of the surrounding mountains and forests (Salvini 1969; Abati 2010). 
62 Lazzari, E., “Si vogliono uccidere gli armaioli”, Giornale di Brescia, July 14, 1974, in ACAI, 
f. «Famigerato decreto legge n. 258 sull’imposta armi da caccia». 
63 In 1977 for the first time the principles of subcontracting were strongly criticized by workers 
representatives at Beretta. Outsourcing, working at home and people with two jobs (all crucial in 
the district) were described by the unions as a serious threat for the employees of Beretta. In 1979, 
it was estimated that around 20-25% of the production of Beretta was made outside the factory and 
about 30% of local workers had two jobs (one official and another undeclared, at home, after work 
hours). Barbieri, P., “Decentramento e doppio lavoro: un terreno scivoloso per tutti”, Bresciaoggi, 
February 3, 1979. 
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Finally, the local administration also supported sports activities. Mayor Battista 
Guerini established a pioneering shooting range in 188464, Grazioli encouraged the 
creation of a field for clay pigeon shooting. After a couple of failed attempts, a 
suitable area was found in Ponte Zanano (a hamlet near Sarezzo) and fitted out by 
the municipality in 1968. Through the direct intervention of a group of local 
entrepreneurs (including Beretta, Zoli and Marocchi) a society was set up to 
manage the activity: the Skeet Trap Club Valtrompia. The purposes of this initiative 
were: 1) to organize events to attract potential customers with the opportunity to 
visit workshops and firms in the valley; 2) to demonstrate the quality and reliability 
of the products; 3) to allow local producers to test prototypes and products; 4) to 
revitalize the area (Abbiatico 1984, pp. 287-295). 
 
The National Proof House 
One of the institutions associated with the districts for the production of firearms 
is the National Proof House. As a matter of fact, Piore and Sabel (1991, p. 51) cite 
the Banc d’Epreuve of Saint-Étienne as a typical district institution, but also Eibar, 
Liège and Birmingham had similar centers65. The National Proof House is the 
“technical supervisor” for the compliance of firearms and ammunition with 
technical and legal standards, and can be considered a “Registry Office” for all the 
weapons produced in Italy as well as for most of the imported ones. To the firearms 
that have passed the testing process, the National Proof House applies its proof 
marks. 
A forerunner of the National Proof House was established by the Serenissma 
and continued to operate until the fall of the Venetian Republic. The current test 
center was established in 1910 with two premises, in Brescia and Gardone Val 
Trompia. It was created by both private producers and public institutions including 
the local Chamber of Commerce and the municipalities of Brescia and Gardone. 
FABP coordinated the process, aware that the only way to compete with foreign 
                                                          
64 It is worth noting that the facilities found a definitive location at the end of the 1960s after 
numerous logistic problems. The first area dedicated to the activity was occupied by Mival, so the 
company agreed to build a new shooting range as part of the transformation of the Arsenal. 
65 In Liège it was founded in 1672, in Saint Etienne in 1782, in Birmingham in 1813 and in Eibar 




producers was to improve the quality of production and protect its reputation from 
badly made guns. In 192366, driven by the same motivation, leading public and 
private actors in the sector succeeded in making testing compulsory and no longer 
voluntary (Onger and Paris 2012, pp. 47-55; Tombola 2007). 
Since its foundation the National Proof House has supported itself with the 
revenue from testing. On 15 March 1930, the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
decided temporarily to close the premises in Brescia due to the woeful condition of 
the industry. Indeed in the second half of the 1920s the production of firearms 
underwent significant losses in sales and its competitiveness was significantly 
reduced compared to foreign producers, especially Belgians67. This severely 
impacted on the institution, making it impossible to maintain and innovate the less 
busy and rather out-of-the-way branch in the provincial capital. Nothing changed 
in the two following decades and in 1950 the temporary closure became definitive: 
activities were moved entirely to Gardone, undergoing the umpteenth renewal and 
expansion of the gun industry68. 
In the second half of the 20th century the activity of the Proof House followed 
the growth in national production and became indispensable for gunsmiths, 
                                                          
66 The law took effect in 1925. Albesio, A., “La storia del Banco di prova che è l’unico esistente 
in Italia”, Giornale di Brescia, May 15, 1963, p. 8. 
67 It is worth noting that compulsory testing made this institution and its data very important: test 
figures provide a reliable picture of the state of the industry and allow for comparisons in the market 
trends for different types of guns. The producers and the municipality of Gardone Val Trompia used 
these data to attract the attention of the central State to a negative situation or the consequences of 
what they considered detrimental regulations. 
68 Leading producers in Gardone played a significant role in the decision. They wrote a report 
on the conditions of the Proof House and recommended solutions to the problems of the institution. 
This document shows that the Proof House faced two problems: a) a drop in the number of tests and 
consequently in earnings (in the second half of 1929 Brescia contributed ¼ and Gardone ¾ of total 
earnings, 28,000 Lire and 85,000 Lire respectively); b) the need to move the premises of the 
provincial capital to the neighborhood of Mompiano (the former was assigned by the Podestà to the 
Moretto vocational school despite the significant contribution of 15,300 Lire from producers in 
Brescia for its equipment). In light of this situation, manufacturers in Gardone, together with a group 
from Brescia, made four proposals: 1) to unify the two branches for the tests in Gardone; 2) preserve 
the official premises in Brescia in the Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia, as in the past and as in 
France; 3) to have the Proof House pay for the cost of transporting firearms produced in Brescia; 4) 
to allocate a portion of the funds given by the Brescia municipality for the construction of the new 
premises in Mompiano to purchase a van for transport purposes and to renovate the branch in 
Gardone. Faced by the opposition of producers in Brescia, Pietro Beretta wrote a second letter on 
25 February 1930, in which the entrepreneur stressed the importance of cost rationalization and 
suggested temporary closure. ASCCBS, Carteggio 1900-1932, b. 71, f. 1; see also Barbieri, P., 
“Tutte le armi italiane controllate a Gardone”, Bresciaoggi, February 1, 1979, p. 10. 
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particularly in Brescia and the valley69. In addition to its institutional duties, the 
National Proof House carried out complementary activities, such as testing the 
ballistic resistance of vests, helmets, bulletproof glass, window and door frames, 
and armor plating in general, for Police Forces, manufacturers and Security 
Services. Two new branches were opened, both directly dependent on headquarters 
in Gardone: one in FAPB and the other in Benelli (part of the Beretta Group). The 
decision was taken for security reasons in light of the production volumes at FAPB 
and the distance from Urbino where the Benelli is located (Pagani and Camarlinghi 
2010)70. 
 
The Giuseppe Zanardelli vocational school 
The Zanardelli vocational school is one of the oldest and most important 
institutions in Gardone Val Trompia. Its establishment and importance were and 
still are deeply connected to the specialization of the valley in the mechanical 
sector. Officially recognized in 1902, its origins can be traced back to 1860 when a 
holiday and night school were opened. 
The school went through several regulatory changes and in the 1920s a specific 
course in gunsmithing was created, albeit this specialization had already 
represented a focal point in previous industrial design courses. After WWII and the 
postwar reconstruction, the school provided three 3-year courses: mechanical 
design, machine maintenance and gunsmithing. 
The course in gunsmithing included practical and theoretical subjects. The 
former comprised weaponry practice, machine tools practice, welding and 
engraving; whereas the latter included general education, technical drawing, 
technology, weaponry techniques, mechanical engineering and physics. The course 
hit on hard times after the mid-1970s with a local business association described in 
                                                          
69 As highlighted by Pedersoli and Abbiatico in the interviews, the compulsoriness of the proof 
made the institution unavoidable and pushed the gunsmiths, whether they liked it or not, to adjust 
their production to international standards and in a certain way to the pace of the Proof House. In 
this sense the interviewees recall the frequent encounters and chats between the gunsmiths when 
delivering/collecting the guns for the proof, but also the labor disputes in the institution which 
caused significant delays in the commercialization of the products (Appendix 5, pp 219 and 233). 
70 See also Albesio, A., “Le prove attuate dal Banco per il collaudo delle armi”, Giornale di 
Brescia, May 16, 1963, p.8. 
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the following paragraph playing a crucial role in its survival (Abbiatico 1984, pp. 
65-69; Maranta and Sotgiu 2010). 
It is worth highlighting that for the subsidiary activity of engraving, an 
entrepreneur, Cesare Giovanelli, opened an engraving school in 1979. He started 
up his engraving workshop in the 1960s for the mechanical reproduction of 
engravings on mass-produced rifles, without losing sight of hand-made engraving. 
His desire to create a future for his profession led him to move his house and 
business to Magno, a hamlet near Gardone71, where he opened the school. Pupils 
attended the school 40 hours per week: drawing classes were given by a local 
painter, and Giovanelli himself and a couple of engravers from his workshop gave 
the practical lessons (Abbiatico 1984, pp. 71-75). 
 
Consorzio Armaioli Italiani 
Business associations have a troubled history in the Val Trompia gun making 
industry. Entrepreneurs are immensely proud of their work and territory: the 
profession has always been more than a way to make a living; it is part and parcel 
of the daily life of the local community shaping its activities and relationships. 
However, such strong spontaneous relations nourished by craftsmanship and strong 
family ties, are difficult to institutionalize and bring under an associative spirit. 
After several attempts, the gunsmiths found a balance in the Consorzio Armaioli 
Italiani72. 
In 1952, around twenty craftsmen established an association called ArtArm, 
linked to the Unione Artigiani. It was located in the small village of Inzino and 
headed by Giuseppe Gitti. The main purpose of ArtArm was to provide members 
with a common sales system and to help them to export shotguns, particularly to 
Greece. Initially successful, according to various local witnesses the association 
failed probably due to self-interest and envy.  
In 1970, a group of gunsmiths created another business association, Comunità 
Artigiani Armaioli, with the intention of defending and promoting the art of gun 
                                                          
71 Since 1927 Gardone Val Trompia has included two small villages: Inzino and Magno. 
Previously they were independent towns. 
72 For further insight into the poor associative spirit of local entrepreneurs see the interviews 
with Pierangelo Pedersoli and Cristina Abbiatico (Appendix 5, pp. 219 and 233). 
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making, in particular the craft activities in Val Trompia. Associates wanted to open 
a showroom in Gardone, where locals and potential customers could see the latest 
products, and get to know the centuries-old history of the valley. Other important 
topics frequently addressed during the general meetings of members were: lobbying 
against the taxes burdening the sector, labor supply, the vocational school, group 
purchases and the black list of unreliable customers. In particular, in 1971 and 1972 
the Comunità made significant efforts to stimulate the training of new apprentices. 
In fact, as often occurs in high added value sectors, there was a lack of specialists 
in gun making and the association looked for new workers in the towns around 
Gardone, canvased schools in the province and bought a minivan to move pupils to 
and from. 
On 21 December 1972, the Comunità became the Consorzio Armaioli 
Valtrumplino giving the association legal status, but the poor results in training, 
difficulties in establishing the show-room and the same problems that beset ArtArm 
led to closure of the Consortium in September 1973. However, not all was lost. The 
1970s was a troubling decade for firearms manufactures: the tragic events of the 
so-called Anni di Piombo – Red Brigade terrorism – and a growing hostility to 
hunting encouraged the State to introduce new restrictive regulations for the 
possession and transportation of guns. Despite the previous difficulties, several 
gunsmiths saw the need to work together in opposition to the excesses of the new 
legislative measures and to revive a sense of belonging. On 15 June 1974, a new 
association, Comunità Armaioli Bresciani, was created73. 
Initially the principal concern of members was the vocational school, but soon 
their attention shifted to Decree 258 published in the Official Gazette on 6 July 
1974. Not only did it complicate the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining a 
firearms license, it also introduced a production tax on firearms and ammunition: 
for hunting shotguns the tax was 10,000 Lire74. Immediately the newborn 
association started to lobby intensely:  spokesmen were sent to Rome to express the 
                                                          
73 “Draft of an unpublished book on the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani” in ACAI, f. «Libro del 
Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani». 
74 Anon., “Imposta di fabbricazione e sovrimposta di confine su armi da sparo, munizioni ed 
esplosivi”, Il Sole 24 Ore, July 11, 1974 in ACAI, f. «Famigerato decreto legge n. 258 sull’imposta 
armi da caccia». It is worthy to notice that a side-by-side normally costed 36-40,000 Lire, whereas 
a cheap over-under 33-35,000 Lire. 
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point of view of local producers to parliamentary committees, meetings with the 
local administration and an intense press campaign were organized75. 
On 8 March 1975, the Comunità was transformed into a Consortium, rather like 
three years earlier: the main idea behind the transformation, once again, was to give 
legal status to the business association in order to obtain subsidies from public 
institutions such as the Lombardy Regional Authority. The Consorzio Armaioli 
Bresciani (CAB) was headquartered in via Matteotti 315 with 31 founder 
members76 (see Table 5, p. 99). The main purposes of the Consorzio were to77: 
• receive and redistribute orders among the associates; 
• organize the collective participation of associates in exhibitions and trade 
shows; 
• carry out market research for the sale and promotion of members’ products; 
• promote a system of group purchases to supply members with raw materials, 
semi-finished products, machine tools and other instruments of work; 
• keep members informed of the latest technological and professional 
innovations; 
• promote the training and specialization of the labor needed by associates 
supporting the gunsmithing course in the vocational school of Gardone Val 
Trompia; 
• collect and facilitate the exchange of information among members, as well as 
assist them in all operational needs; 
• promote the image of gunsmithing; 
• help associates to modernize their firms, if requested; 
• carry out any activity and economic and financial operations related to the 
above aims.
                                                          
75 Bertussi, E., “Gardone Valtrompia: la paura della disoccupazione”, Bresciaoggi, July 14, 
1974, p. 7 in Ibidem; Valerio, S., “Per gli armieri un supercontrollo”, Bresciaoggi, July 14, 1974, in 
Ibidem; Lazzari, E., “Si vogliono uccidere gli armaioli”, Giornale di Brescia, July 14, 1974, in 
Ibidem.  
76 ACAI, f. «Statuto Consorzio. Elenco soci fondatori presenti all’assemblea generale 8/3/75», 
“Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani. Elenco dei Consorziati”. 
77 ACAI, f. «Statuto Consorzio. Elenco soci fondatori presenti all’assemblea generale 8/3/75», 
“Statuto del Consorzio”. 
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Member Place and date of birth Residence Firm Location 
Zubani Diamante Marcheno, 13/1/1923 Marcheno N.O.M.A. Marcheno 
Contento Eugenio Brescia, 31/10/1925 Collebeato M.V.T. Collebeato 
Benetti Vincenzo Gardone V.T., 31/12/1931 Gardone V.T. Benetti Vincenzo Gardone V.T. 
Piotti Faustino Gardone V.T., 8/6/1936 Gardone V.T. F.lli Piotti Gardone V.T. 
Bolis Alberto Mario Iseo, 9/12/1933 Gardone V.T. S.I.L.M.A. Gardone V.T. 
Beschi Mario Lonato, 10/12/1935 Gardone V.T. Beschi Mario Gardone V.T. 
Fabbri Ivo Poggio Berni, 4/12/1928 Concesio Fabbri Ivo Concesio 
Redolfi Arturo Leno Manerbio Redolfi Arturo Manerbio 
Contrini Giovanni Gardone V.T., 17/9/1935 Gardone V.T. C.O.M. Gardone V.T. 
Lucchini Stefano Sarezzo, 13/12/1912 Sarezzo Sport Italia Ponte Zanano (Sarezzo) 
Di Maggio Guglielmo Gardone V.T., 13/9/1925 Gardone V.T. F.lli Di Maggio Gardone V.T. 
Scalfi Italo Prevalle, 22/7/1919 Prevalle Scalfi Italo Prevalle 
Rubagotti Angelo Toscolano Maderno, 28/6/1916 Gardone V.T. Rubagotti Angelo Gardone V.T. 
Castellani Bruno Macerata, 20/1/1924 Gardone V.T. Castellani Bruno Gardone V.T. 
Giacomelli Pietro Magno (Gardone V.T.), 17/5/1920 Gardone V.T. Giacomelli Pietro Gardone V.T. 
Mino Andrea Gardone V.T., 22/7/1908 Gardone V.T. Mino Andrea Gardone V.T. 
Rizzini Isidoro Marcheno, 29/5/1946 Marcheno Tecni-Mec Marcheno 
Ferraglio Libero France, 28/1/1924 Gardone V.T. Ferraglio Libero Gardone V.T. 
Pedretti Simone Gardone V.T., 18/12/1935 Gardone V.T. Pedretti Simone Gardone V.T. 
Brignoli Silvio Gardone V.T., 14/1/1941 Gardone V.T. Brignoli Silvio Gardone V.T. 
Bolognini Bruno Gardone V.T., 5/12/1938 Gardone V.T. Bolognini Bruno Gardone V.T. 
Gasparini Aldo Gardone V.T., 16/11/1942 Gardone V.T. Gasparini Aldo Gardone V.T. 
Rizzini Amelio Gardone V.T., 22/10/1937 Gardone V.T. Rizzini Amelio Gardone V.T. 
Rizzini Emilio Gardone V.T., 15/2/1933 Marcheno Rizzini Emilio Marcheno 
Abbiatico Mario Gardone V.T., 26/2/1934 Gardone V.T. Famars Gardone V.T. 
Poli Paolo Gardone V.T., 2/10/1940 Gardone V.T. Poli Paolo Gardone V.T. 
Pirlo Giuseppe Gardone V.T., 9/1/1922 Gardone V.T. San Giorgio Gardone V.T. 
Boniotti Angelo Monticelli Brusati, 11/4/1927 Gardone V.T. SIACE Gardone V.T. 
Dalè Roberto Brescia, 11/5/1924 Brescia Boniotti Angelo Brescia 
Varini Giuliano Moglia, 10/12/1929 Sarezzo Varini Giuliano Zanano (Sarezzo) 
Fausti Augusto Marcheno, 23/7/1933 Marcheno Fausti Augusto Marcheno 
Table 5 - Founders of the CAB. Source: ACAI, f. «Statuto Consorzio. Elenco soci fondatori presenti all’assemblea generale 8/3/75», “Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani. Elenco dei Consorziati”
  
 
Meanwhile the regulatory fight was ongoing: on 21 April 1975, Law 110 
governing arms, ammunition and explosives was published in Official Gazette. 
Firearms manufacturers were unable to prevent the introduction of masses of red 
tape in the new law, but they did manage to get the production tax under Decree 
258 revoked. 
In the following years, the Consorzio continued to lobby to prevent the 
introduction of regulations with more bureaucratic hurdles and punitive limitations 
for the sector, particularly by not distinguishing between civilian and military 
weapons. Significant fights included measures for the control of transportation and 
exports in 1979, and the referendum for the abolition of hunting in 1980-8178. 
Furthermore, the association continued to provide assistance to members for 
compliance with the complicated laws passed by Parliament79. 
In the late 1970s, the Consorzio was faced with numerous problems for gun 
making. First, it prevented the abolition of the gunsmithing course in the local 
vocational school. The public authorities wanted to cancel it after it failed to meet 
its economic targets: through intense lobbying and after providing instruments for 
the classes, the association convinced the relevant institutions to take a step back80. 
A second aim achieved by the Consortium was to finally establish a showroom. On 
4 December 1976, in the presence of local and regional authorities, the President of 
the Consortium inaugurated a permanent exhibition of sports and historical 
firearms. The intention was the same as before, but this time the Lombardy 
Regional Authority took an active interest, as did the Brescia Chamber of 
                                                          
78 Barberi, P., “Artigiani sul piede di guerra: non possono esportare armi”, Bresciaoggi, January 
26, 1979, p. 10, in ACAI, f. «Allegati libro CAB 1971»; Barberi, P., “Il decreto che tutti avversano”, 
Bresciaoggi, January 26, 1979, p. 10 in Ibidem; Anon. “Alt ai fucili da caccia via libera ai bazooka”, 
La Notte, January 26, 1979, in Ibidem; Anon., “Allarme: le novità alla dogana paralizzano l’industria 
armiera”, Giornale di Brescia, January 28, 1979, p. 4, in Ibidem; Borta, A., “L’esportazione di armi 
esce dalla paralisi”, Il Sole 24 Ore, February 27, 1979, in ACAI, f. «D.M. 27/11/78 Export. D.M. 
16/3/79»; Mondini, L., “Sbloccato lo ‘scoglio dogane’: ossigeno ai produttori di armi”, Corriere 
della Sera, February 27, 1979, in Ibidem. 
79 “Draft of an unpublished book on the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani” in ACAI, f. «Libro del 
Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani». 
80 Corvi, G., “Premiati gli studenti ‘meccanici-armaioli’”, Giornale di Brescia, July 13, 1977, in 
ACAI, f. «Allegati libro CAB 1971»; Anon., “A Gardone corso per armaioli”, Diana, September 
24, 1977, in Ibidem; Anon., “Premiati gli allievi del Corso Armaioli della Scuola professionale di 
Stato”, Caccia e Pesca. Tiro a Volo, August, 1977, in Ibidem; Anon., “Promozione degli allievi del 
C.A.B.”, Tac Armi, October, 1977, in Ibidem. 
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Commerce, the local administrations of Gardone and Marcheno and the Comunità 
Montana di Valle Trompia (Abbiatico 1984, pp. 265-271)81. 
The search for new markets, in particular foreign markets, was another field of 
action soon tackled by the association. The Consortium promoted the collective 
participation of craftsmen in international trade shows, starting with Copenhagen 
in 1976, followed by Paris and Nuremberg in 1977. After positive results, 
participation in this type of event intensified after 1978 with participation in the 
N.S.G.A. Show, the European Trade Show of Hunting and Shooting and most 
importantly the IWA (probably the leading exhibition in the sector) becoming 
regular appointments for associates to promote their products with the logistics and 
bureaucratic support of the association. The Consortium also decided to contribute 
to the organization of the increasingly important local trade show: EXA. Organized 
by the Brescia Chamber of Commerce, this meeting was held for the first time at 
the headquarters of the Chamber in 1979. After a hiccup in 1980, the event became 
indispensable for professionals and amateurs alike82. 
Last but not least, the business association promoted the image and tradition of 
gunsmithing in the province, sought new pupils for the vocational school in 
Gardone, promoted specialist courses for gun making in numerous middle schools, 
awarded the best students and provided classes with tools and specialist personnel. 
Activities for the reinvigoration of the tradition of the sector included the 
publication of videos and catalogues where the history and current situation are 
illustrated and explained, along with promoting associates and their activities. Most 
of these initiatives sought cooperation with other institutions such as the Lombardy 
Regional Authority, the local Chamber of Commerce and the municipality of 
Gardone. In this sense it is worth highlighting that in 1983 the course of 
specialization in gunsmithing was suppressed by the State, but reintroduced in 1990 
as a regional training course. 
                                                          
81 The Lombardy Regional Authority, the municipality of Gardone, the local mountain 
community and the Chamber of Commerce provided a subsidy of 7,000,000 Lire, 1,000,000 L. and 
500,000 L. respectively. ACAI, f. «Conti consuntivi. Bilanci preventivi. Reale situazione 
finanziaria»; “Draft of the unpublished book about the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani” in ACAI, f. 
«Libro del Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani». 
82 Ibidem. 
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At the beginning of the 1990s the association underwent a new transformation.  
After lengthy debate in the 1980s, the Articles of Assocaition were modified: 
entrepreneurs from subsidiary industries and owners of larger firms were allowed 





This paper traces the historical development of the gun making industry in the 
central Val Trompia during the second half of the 20th century: the main objective 
is to verify whether the area can be seen as an industrial district. It focuses on three 
major aspects: a) the identification of the historical and geographical roots and 
boundaries of the local system; b) the analysis of the production process with 
particular attention paid to phase specialization and the consequent relationships 
between firms; c) the role of institutional actors in the area. The study demonstrates 
that most of the characteristics of the so-called Marshallian district (Becattini 
2000a, 2004) can be found in Gardone Val Trompia and its neighboring 
municipalities. Some were inherited from the past, others emerged as an answer to 
the problems of large local factories, the conversion to civilian production and the 
integration of international markets in the postwar period. 
The industrial district of Gardone produced different types of a quite 
homogenous product. Hunting and sports shotguns, historical gun replicas, pistols 
and revolvers found their way onto national and especially international markets, 
taking advantage of a period when foreign production was either vanishing or 
undergoing profound restructuring. Local production featured long firearms, in 
particular hunting shotguns, which required highly skilled workers. As a 
consequence, the average size of production units was quite small and the 
phenomena of working at home and self-employment were widespread. Indeed, the 
gun making industry of the valley relied on a large network of SMEs specializing 
in different phases of production where one company, Beretta, played a leading role 
both as producer and as social actor. The resulting chain comprised producers of 
                                                          
83 Ibidem. 
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weapons parts, small workshops (often home based) dedicated to specialist 
manufacturing, assemblers and small-sized firms devoted to high-quality firearms. 
Most of these businesses were set up by self-made entrepreneurs, who used to work 
in others factories in the valley: encouraged by the social atmosphere and not 
ashamed of or frightened by their poor education, they responded to the increasing 
demand for civilian firearms in the Golden Age. 
Another relevant aspect of Gardone Val Trompia in the second half of the 20th 
century was the presence of inherited or newly created institutions and 
organizations able to provide the local system with positive externalities, crucial 
for the so-called industrial atmosphere and the process of social capital 
accumulation. They included: 1) the local administration, 2) the National Proof 
House, 3) the Giuseppe Zanardelli vocational school, 4) the business association 
Consorzio Armaioli Italiani. Examples of their contributions were training courses 
for labor force, the promotion of gunsmiths interests when faced with detrimental 
laws and establishing quality standards for manufacturers. 
Actually, the presence of a business association should not mislead; according 
to our reconstruction, it reflected typical district dynamics but also the greatest 
weaknesses of the local system. The consortium (which still exists) is the result of 
several previous attempts to form an association and was finally established when 
gun making was undergoing problems due to restrictive regulations. As explained 
in this paper, the business association had a significant role in the defense of small 
producers and was able to intervene to stem the gradual erosion of the sense of 
belonging that in the 1970s and 1980s was affecting and infecting the local system. 
It also partially responded to the familiar problems of local producers in marketing 
their products through the organization of exhibitions and cooperation with regional 
actors. However, for a long time the association was dedicated only to a small 
number of actors in the local system84 and it never succeeded in organizing 
initiatives bringing together the various producers in their daily activities. All 
cooperation for the procurement of raw materials and semi-finished products and 
the sharing of tools soon ended. There were two main reasons for these difficulties. 
                                                          
84 The craft producers of firearms. The opening to the producers of loose parts and to the 
subsidiary industries of the district only occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. 
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The first is related to the type of market approached by small producers: as 
explained in the article, the SMEs focused on product customization and on poorly 
standardized work, factors which made cooperation difficult due to the resulting 
different needs of firms and their customers85. The second is strong individualism: 
in several books, as well as the interviews we carried out, the individualistic and 
cantankerous character of gunsmiths comes to the fore appearing as a problem for 
the cooperation between the actors of the district. It is worth noting that the same 
remarks regarding difficulties in cooperation were made by Goñi Mendizabal 
(2010) in relation to the gun making district of Eibar and Gaier (1985) in the case 
of Liège86. 
                                                          
85 “Draft of an unpublished book on the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani” in ACAI, f. «Libro del 
Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani». 
86 This is not the only feature that Gardone shares with the other European gun making districts. 
In addition to the above-mentioned test centers and similarities on the production side, common 
elements can also be found in customs and traditions as a consequence of the shared craft roots of 
these production systems. An example is so-called “St. Monday”: the gunsmiths of Valle Trompia 
still used to take Mondays off in the second half of the 20th century (Abbiatico 1984; Behagg 1998; 
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The aim of this study is to contribute to retracing the events and transformations 
affecting some of the main local small arms manufacturing systems in Europe in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. After the early nineteenth century 
development of the technology required to achieve firearms component 
interchangeability by United States arsenals, the European powers also decided to 
break through the delays and focus on mechanizing production. This marked the 
beginning of a phase, which saw the various national governments getting involved 
on a large scale in the strategic firearms sector, of fundamental importance in 
preparing their armed forces for World War One. Even production centers hinging 
on craftsmanship and small production units which had been the main suppliers of 
the Old Continent for centuries were swept up in this epoch-making change. This 
phase is a particularly important vantage point from which to observe the state-
district relationship and for further in-depth study into the adoption of the factory 
system within concentrations of small and medium sized firms. This study focuses 
in particular on Italy but for a better understanding of events it provides a 
contextualization within a broader framework encompassing England, Belgium, 







Over the 19th century arms production underwent a number of key changes and 
innovations. In the latter half of the century in particular, in the wake of the second 
Industrial Revolution, small firearms production played a center-stage role in a 
series of crucial advances in manufacturing, chief of which was the so-called 
American System of Manufacturing. The United States took a leading role in this 
phase of firearms history with state investment and a growing contribution from 
large firms playing a primary role in stimulating and taking a central part in 
armaments manufacturing. At the same time craftsmanship and traditional arms 
production frameworks did not disappear and continued to play a crucial role in the 
civilian arms sector and hunting in particular. In other words, the two sub sectors 
of military and civilian arms moved apart with the former increasingly working at 
the technological frontier while the latter continued to accord a primary role to 
manual labor. 
A number of European small arms districts also took part in this period of 
extraordinary ferment: Birmingham, Liège, Saint-Étienne and Eibar, in their 
different ways, all took up the challenge of the century’s innovations. The lion’s 
share of these cases whose manufacturing systems hinged on small production units 
retaining strong links with the “disseminated factory” system (Braudel 1977, p. 
288) saw certain large firms getting the upper hand. With their ability to exploit 
economies of scale these latter put themselves forward as the principal partner for 
the state’s military contracts alongside the traditional craftsmanship and home-
based work world. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Italy’s small arms sector, 
concentrated in the modern-day province of Brescia1, implemented the crucial 
changes required to equip the newly formed Kingdom of Italy, regain the ground 
lost to foreign competitors during the period of Austrian domination and take up 
the innovation gauntlet referred to above. First and foremost, in order to take 
advantage of the Brescia area’s well-established armoring skills, the state began 
                                                          
1 The two main production zones were Gardone Val Trompia, a central Val Trompia town, and 
the city of Brescia itself (Montanari 1982). 
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with an enquiry to sound out the state of the local production fabric and immediately 
set to work to re-open and extend the arsenal hitherto closed by the Austrians. The 
re-opening of this latter, strongly stimulated also by local producers and institutions, 
brought considerable ferment in which three important firms came to the fore: 
Società Siderurgica Glisenti (Glisenti hereafter), Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta 
(FAPB hereafter) and Società Anonima Vincenzo Bernardelli (Bernardelli 
hereafter). 
The objective of this article is to examine the transformations which local 
Brescia-Gardone Val Trompia arms production underwent in the period between 
Italian Unification and the outbreak of World War One in the context of the wider 
framework of changes affecting similar European districts in the same period. In 
particular, great attention will be paid to the role which two players - the state and 
the large firms - played in prompting these changes with a view, also, to 
contributing to the wider academic debate on the role played by these in the 
development of the industrial districts. 
For the purposes of the objectives outlined above this study will make use of 
both the wide-ranging historical work on this subject and of primary sources. As 
far as the evolution of arms manufacturing techniques and the progressive 
dissemination of innovations in European production centers is concerned, the 
reference point used in this study will be the many contributions made by economic 
and technology historians in various countries. As far as events in Brescia are 
concerned, on the other hand, in addition to references to the work of important 
scholars such as Montanari, Onger and Paris, primary source material kept at the 
State Archives in Brescia and town archives in Gardone Val Trompia, Magno and 
Lumezzane Sant’Apollonio have been used. It should be noted that in 1927 Magno 
was grouped together with Inzino under Gardone Val Trompia becoming a district 
of the latter while Lumezzane Sant’Apollonio was grouped together with 
Lumezzane Pieve and Lumezzane San Sebastiano under Lumezzane on the same 
date. Today the documents from these towns have been incorporated into the Valle 
Trompia Archive System managed by the Comunità Montana di Valle Trompia 
since 1993 and made up of the 18 towns of the corresponding mountain zone in 
addition to Collebeato. 
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After this introduction this study is split into four sections set out as follows: the 
first section looks at currents of research to which the study intends to refer and 
illustrates the main transformations and innovations affecting armory production in 
the second half of the 19th century; the second studies the main European armory 
districts in depth and the consequences of the transformations set out for these; the 
third takes an in-depth look at the Italian case study; the last sets out the study’s 
conclusions with the intention of highlighting shared trajectories and divergences 




The State and large firms in the industrial districts 
 
The present study intends to dedicate great attention to the role of two specific 
players in industrial districts dynamics: the central state and the large firms. Both 
of these have been the object of numerous studies by economic historians. 
A great many studies have been devoted to the role played by national 
institutions and policies in the transformations which took place in local production 
systems in a number of countries such as Britain, Germany, France, the United 
States and Japan. As Zeitlin (2007, p. 228), has noted, however, «comparatively 
little attention, by contrast, has been devoted to the impact of national institutions 
and policies on the development of industrial districts in Italy. Insofar as Italian 
scholars have seen the national state as a causal factor in the rise of the industrial 
districts, it is generally in negative terms, emphasizing for example the failure of 
French-style efforts at rationalization and centralization of industrial policy and 
labor relations during the 1960s and 70s (Locke 1995). Other forms of state 
intervention such as the favorable legal regime for artisanal firms or subsidized loan 
schemes for small businesses are viewed as too generic to explain much about the 
territorially differentiated growth of industrial districts in certain regions but not 
others. Yet some recent research suggests that the nation state may have played a 
larger part in this story. Thus Giovanni Ferri (2006) makes a strong case for the 
negative impact on Italian industrial districts of the trade, industrial and financial 
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policies of the Fascist regime which were largely reversed after 1945. Ferri and 
Giuseppe Conti (Conti and Ferri 1997) have also underlined the positive 
contribution of the Bank of Italy’s post-war “via svizzera” strategy in supporting 
through its discount policies local and regional banks leading to small and medium-
sized district firms – another sharp point of contrast with the French situation during 
les trentes glorieuses»2. 
For the second of our two players here too – large firms – there is undoubtedly 
no shortage of studies on its role within these districts. The scholar who has 
contextualized the research of economic historians on this theme is Belfanti (2009, 
pp. 15-16) who argues that «artisans and pluriactive peasants – rather than proto-
industrial peasants – were the actors who created forms of local development based 
on small businesses, but in many cases the presence of a factory, even though 
limited to a certain phase of the history of the territory, had a decisive role. The 
centralized industrial settlement played a fundamental role in the acquisition of 
technical competence and professional ability on the part of the local workforce: 
such an apprenticeship constituted a vital passage in the history of local 
development (Brusco 1989a). […] In the districts of Sheffield and Birmingham […] 
(Berg 1993), in German Solingen (Boch 1997), in Italian Prato (Dei Ottati 1995) 
and even in the rural fortress of Morez in France (Olivier 2004) – to quote just a 
few examples3 – the evolution of the ID (industrial district), at least in some phase, 
crossed with, flanked, or lived with the factory, exploiting it as a source for the 
formation of skills that were then poured into the local production system. It is 
possible to imagine the factory as a factor able to generate positive output in terms 
of skills to the benefit of the ID». 
The firearms sector is a terrain of special interest for the study of the district-
state relationship. Its relationship with governments has, in fact, been a very close, 
to some extent privileged one, from the outset with rulers acting as primary buyers, 
often adopting ad hoc measures to enable it to survive and seeking to obtain a 
competitive advantage over foreign powers4. In other words it might be argued that 
                                                          
2 On the state as “substitution factor” in Italian industrial development see Amatori et al. (1999) 
and more specifically on the Lombard case, Amatori (2004). 
3 For Italian case studies, see Grandi (2007). 
4 A case in point is local Brescia and Val Trompia production. In the 17th and 18th centuries this 
was the object of concern by the Venetian Republic which adopted controversial mechanisms in this 
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the public authorities have always been crucial stakeholders in arms production 
regarding it as a strategic sector since the Early Modern period on what we might 
define grounds of security and defense. This importance is confirmed by the 
investments made by the authorities in it, such as arsenal building, for example. 
These latter were large structures managed by the military authorities which served 
to fit out armies either by means of internal production or by managing 
commissions to distribute across the area to private producers (Parker 1996; Degli 
Esposti 1997; 2009). 
It should also be noted that, above all in Europe, light firearms manufacturing 
had adopted the “disseminated factory” model right from its origins and throughout 
its history. This organizational framework was the outcome of the multiplicity of 
skills, and thus of professional craftsmen, required to make firearms5 and was, in 
many cases, reinforced during the Early Modern age as a result of an 
institutionalization process in the armory trades involving the creation of 
craftsmen’s guilds in the 17th and 18th centuries6. In the Old Continent, then, well 
defined geographical areas dense with small production units developed, 
workshops guided by artisans and home workers with merchant-entrepreneurs 
supervising them each of whom specialized in a specific phase of the production 
process7. Birmingham in England, Eibar in Spain, Liège in Belgium, Saint-Étienne 
in France and Brescia in Italy – i.e. those already referred to - are just some of the 
                                                          
regard. On one hand the Serenissima Republic sought to limit the ability of these producers to supply 
weaponry to other states. On the other, when these limitations prompted these same producers to 
emigrate signifying a risk of the industry folding, the Republic did not fail to come to its aid to 
encourage its recovery (Montanari 1982). 
5 For a description of the firearms trades chain, see Belfanti (1998).  
6 In relation to the setting up of guilds of specialised master craftsmen working in the various 
firearms working phases see, for example, Eibar (Larrañaga 1981) and Brescia (Belfanti 1998). 
7 This domination of the small arms market by the manual component of the workforce and 
craftsmen in Europe was also described by Samuel Colt (1852) in a paper to the Institution of Civil 
Engineers in 1851: «The manufacture of arms, both in Great Britain and on the Continent, is carried 
on almost entirely by manual labor, the various parts being forged, filed and ground into the requisite 
from by workmen in their own houses, the barrels alone being forged, bored, and ground in factories 
established for the purpose, and machinery being employed only for cutting out the stocks». The 
production units examined in this work have been mentioned and analysed within the debate on 
local production systems and industrial districts in a number of studies: Birmingham: Sabel and 
Zeitlin (1985), Behagg (1998); Eibar: Goñi Mendizabal (2010); Saint-Étienne: Sabel and Zeitlin 
(1985); Brescia: Tombola (2000), Del Barba (2008). As far as Liege is concerned no explicit 
references to this as an industrial district exist. However, as we will see in the course of this work, 
this Belgian town also showed the very same characteristics which have prompted scholars to use 
the district concept for other national cases. 
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possible examples. In these areas, as we will see, relationships with the authorities 
became even more exclusive with conflict sometimes growing out of the state 
ambitions to control the sector referred to above together with private producers’ 
attempts to exploit public commissions while at the same time retaining a proudly 
defended independence. 
A further aspect worth underlining, in a preliminary sense, is that the US 
authorities played a fundamentally important role in armory production innovation 
in the nineteenth century8. In the first half of the century the driving force behind 
the pioneering application of the emerging principles of the so-called American 
System of Manufacturing (ASM) was two-fold: precise and challenging 
requirements in American military contracts in terms of component 
interchangeability and unit production cost reduction together with direct 
involvement by the Army Ordnance Department in the development of 
technologies capable of satisfying the standards which the organization had itself 
imposed. The emergence of mass small arms production using machinery was the 
outcome of the vital contribution of federal arsenals such as Springfield and Harpers 
Ferry. These dragged the private firms working to military contracts into the future 
in terms both of the development of measuring systems guaranteeing full 
component uniformity and in the development of the tools required for a complete 
mechanization of the working processes involved in making rifle and pistol barrels 
and stocks. It was only from the mid-19th century onwards that private 
manufacturers such as Colt, E. Remington & Sons and Robins, Kendall & Lawrence 
began successfully to take up this challenge, making it profitable for the civilian 
arms markets too and thus for private sector models (Smith 1977; Smith 1985; 
Hounshell 1984; Rosenbloom 1993). By contrast, in Europe the introduction of 
ASM took place later and frequently encountered resistance from small producers 
whose strengths were flexibility and phase specialization. As we will see, it was 
only in the second half of the century, thanks to the intervention of the authorities 
                                                          
8 The nineteenth century was a period of extraordinary importance in terms of the improvements 
applied to small arms firing systems and solutions to technical problems which had to date remained 
unsolved. The success of the percussion cap together with the definitive consecration of breech-




and the stubbornness of certain producers pushing for growth in scale, that ASM 
made its way into the larger production centers of the Old Continent9.  
For the reasons set out above, a study of the small arms sector of some of the 
industrial districts which had been such a feature of European rifle and pistol 
production since the Early Modern age is of some importance. This study will focus 
on the 1850 to 1914 period whose technological innovations make it of special 
interest as do the significant changes which took place in these districts prior to 
World War One. The objective is to highlight shared trajectories in evolutionary 
trends in European armory districts and to study this significant phase in the twofold 
state-district and district-large firm relationships from close to. With this in mind 
the next section will examine the Birmingham, Liège, Saint-Étienne and Eibar case 






                                                          
9 Bohn and Jaikumar (2005, p. 7, 41-42) identify «six epochs of manufacturing process control 
[…], preceded by a pre-manufacturing epoch in which products were made but not manufactured. 
1) The Craft System (circa 1500); 2) The invention of machine tools and the English System of 
Manufacture (circa 1800); 3) Special purpose machine tools and interchangeability of components 
in the American System of Manufacture (circa 1830); 4) Scientific Management and the engineering 
of work in the Taylor System (circa 1900); 5) Statistical process control (SPC) in an increasingly 
dynamic manufacturing environment (circa 1950); 6) Information processing and the era of 
Numerical Control (NC, circa 1965); 7) Flexible manufacturing and Computer-Integrated 
Manufacturing (CIM/FMS, circa 1985)». A number of major manufacturing innovations originated 
in the gun making industry. «While the English were evolving a system of manufacture around the 
ethos of accuracy, a new system based on precision and interchangeability of parts was being 
developed in the United States. The difference occurred because in the English System mechanics 
and engineers made parts to fit (i.e., to mate with one another) as closely as possible, while 
interchangeability, by contrast, relies on the existence of clearance between parts. As “fit” was 
achieved by concentrating on the relationship between components, one made parts for each 
subassembly one at a time. The parts being assembled were then filed by hand until the mated 
surfaces fitted tightly. The result is that each part and each subassembly are unique. The greater the 
clearance between mating surfaces, the more likely it was that parts would be interchangeable. Thus, 
the objective of interchangeable manufacture was to move from perfection of fit towards the greatest 
possible clearance, as long as the clearance was not too large to lose the functionality of the product. 
[…] Clearances allowed for variance, and management of these variances was the hallmark of the 
American System of Manufacture. Interchangeable manufacture allowed for the separation not only 
of fabrication and assembly, but also of the different operations in fabrication from one another. 
Managing variances entailed prescribing limits and then achieving the precision imposed by these 
limits by developing (1) machinery that was constrained in its operation, and (2) a system of 
inspection based on gauges that would ensure that fabricated parts were, indeed, interchangeable». 
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Small arms districts in Europe 
 
As we saw above small arms production in Europe had been characterized since 
the Early modern period by a singular tendency to concentrate into specific 
geographical areas with favorable characteristics sometimes in terms of 
consolidated expertise in cold weapon working10. In these areas the development of 
the production fabric had taken place in accordance with the ‘disseminated factory’ 
framework and been powerfully influenced by wars and military commissions 
which had come with them from their respective state rulers. Such developments 
were always mainly a question of the culture and tradition of the individuals and 
places concerned as a result both of the details and multiple skills of the armory arts 
and of factors of an institutional nature11. 
 
Birmingham 
Birmingham village was becoming known as a manufacturing center by the 
middle of the sixteenth century. The exact date of the founding of the gun trade as 
a separate branch of manufacture is difficult to determine, one suggestion being that 
it was founded as early as 1603. Certainly, there is evidence implying that trade was 
already underway by the middle of the 17th century as the fact that a contract secured 
from the Ordnance Office in 1689 was executed without delay would seem to imply 
(Dunham 1955). 
As Behagg has argued (1998, pp. 5-6, 9, 13), «the craft system of production in 
Birmingham was able to adapt its structures to meet the increased demand, so 
obviating the need for fixed capital investment in an industry in which the market 
was extremely unstable. Innovation took place by a process of ‘re-drafting custom’ 
so that mass production could be achieved without the growth of the factory or the 
descent into sweating. Central to this process was the realignment of the 
relationship between the small business man and the craft-producer within the 
workshop. […] The Birmingham musket was a craft article and consisted of a 
                                                          
10 Brescia’s Val Trompia is a case in point. This area developed thanks to considerable supplies 
of iron minerals, water and timber which were crucial to the production of firearms and had already 
been famous for cold weapons (Simoni 2010). 
11 With reference to the debate on the relationship between industrial districts, local cultures and 
institutions, see the Institutions et valeurs section in Eck and Lescure’s work (2002). 
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number of parts, each manufactured by a different branch of the trade. From the 
early eighteenth century, gun barrels were produced in mills driven by water and, 
later, steam power. This element of the production process required large-scale 
capital investment and acted as a multiplier for the decentralized workshops that 
completed the remainder of the gun’s manufacture. The basic components of lock, 
stock and barrel went through a number of stages of production normally involving 
a movement between the workshops that made the different components. The end 
of the production process was the shop of the gun finisher, whose task it was to ‘set 
up’ the gun. […] The organization of the gun trade in Birmingham involved the 
interplay of three groups: the contractors, the small masters and the artisan-
workmen who coordinated teams of apprentices within the workplace. Perhaps the 
most significant feature of production was the way it operated through a network 
of continuous negotiation between the three groups. This was activated each time 
an order was taken by the contractor. First, the contractor would negotiate a price 
with the merchant or with the representative of the Board of Ordnance. The 
contractor, whose only fixed plant would be a warehouse, would then negotiate with 
the small masters for each component part of the gun. The small master would, in 
turn, negotiate prices with his artisans, who would also need to arrive at an 
agreement with their apprentices. […] The gun makers of Birmingham adopted four 
strategies to expand production to meet wartime demand: increasing the multiplier 
effect of gun barrel making by increased investment in large plant; establishment 
of a contractors' 'cartel'; re-negotiation of apprenticeship regulations, particularly 
where bottlenecks in production were identified; and the introduction of the 
‘bounty’ system into the workshop. […] Utilizing these four strategies, the gun 
trade was able to maintain high levels of production, without any high risk 
investment of capital». 
By the end of the 18th century Birmingham was the foremost producer of arms 
in the world, as the only large manufacturing center left to anti-Napoleonic forces. 
A comparison of manufacturing resources during the 1804-15 period shows that 
1,827,889 muskets and pistols were made for the Board of Ordnance in 
Birmingham as against 845,477 made in the government factories and by the 
London industry. These figures were generated in protest against the setting up of  
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Trigger boxers 20 
Oddwork makers 100 
Total 3,420 




Setters Up n. 
Machiners 
Prepare the front sight and the lump end of the barrel for the nipple 
50 
Jiggers, lump filers and break-off fitters 
Prepare the breech end of the barrel 
200 
Stockers 
Let in the barrel and locks and roughly shape the stock 
1,000 
Percussioners. 




Let in the furniture and all the remaining pins and screws 
1,000 
Strippers 
Prepare the gun for rifling and proof 
20 
Barrel borers 50 
Barrel riflers 50 
Sighters and sight adjusters 50 
Smoothers. Prepare the barrel for browning 50 
Finishers. 
Distribute the several parts to browner, polishers, maker off and barrel 
smoother, and when they are returned put the guns together and finally 
adjust the several parts 
1,000 
Makers off 
File the stock to give them their proper finish, glasspaper and oil them 
Polishers of lock and furniture 50 
Engravers (lock, etc.) 50 
Browners (barrel) 50 
Lock freers 
Finally adjust the working parts of the lock 
50 
Total 3,870 




a government factory in Birmingham in 1816 and the project was eventually 
dropped. The turn of the century saw also the perfecting of the flintlock as a weapon 
and by the middle of the 19th century gun factories in Birmingham were still the 
greatest source of arms in the world: a large proportion of the military firearms used 
in the Kaffir and Crimean Wars were made in the town12 (Dunham 1955). This 
success is confirmed by the figures provided by Jon D. Goodman (1866). He 
divided up the workers engaged in the gun trade in Birmingham in two groups: 
material makers and setters up with the former numbering 32 different specialists 
whereas the latter 16. In 1865 there were 3,420 material makers and 3,870 setters 
up (see Tables 6 and 7, pp. 115-116). 
Despite a large production capacity organized principally on a flexible basis, the 
relationship between the Birmingham armories and the Board of Ordnance was 
never an easy one. On their part the authorities frequently complained of low 
product quality and the industry’s inability to fulfil all its contractual obligations. 
On their part the private producers found the frequent complaints and intransigence 
of the authorities – which they did not encounter from their other clients - 
oppressive. In his doctoral thesis Lewiss (1996) goes as far as to hypothesize the 
direct responsibility of the Board of Ordnance for the difficulties encountered by 
the private armor sector in setting a modernization process in motion. Its reluctance 
to grant long-term supply contracts, refusal to supply product calibers and models 
to firms and the ultra-rigid product control standards it required were all elements 
which did not help private producers to overcome their production difficulties and 
shift from a labor intensive production model to a more capital intensive one. 
The turning point was the 1850s. By the mid-nineteenth century the British 
authorities were increasingly aware of the mechanization and interchangeability 
principle revolution which was by then consolidated practice in the United States. 
The 1851 Great Exhibition at which American companies such as Colt and 
Robinson & Lawrence exhibited their products and visits to the 1853 Exhibition of 
Industry in New York and to US arsenals by special commissions nominated by the 
British government led to a speeding up of the race to small arms production 
                                                          
12 The workshops were packed into the St Mary’s ‘gun quarter’ but gun locks were produced by 
workshops in the Black Country and then transported to Birmingham. On the evolution of the ‘gun 
quarter’, see Wise (1949). 
118 
 
managed according to the new principles of the so-called ASM. With the 
information gathered and the worsening of the impasse described above in the 
context of the Crimean War, the government decided to increase the manufacturing 
capacity of the Enfield arsenal by importing machinery from the US. In 1854 the 
royal arms factory began work using machinery, most of which was useful for stock 
working and by 1858, Enfield 1853 rifles could be made entirely with standardized 
components (Williams 2004). 
The success of the Enfield arsenal prompted the Board of Ordnance in the 
direction of even more selective parameters which were difficult to fulfil with 
artisan methods and thus Birmingham’s private producers soon realized that their 
quasi-monopoly of the sector had been broken. They were thus obliged to adopt a 
defensive strategy and a group of the most important local entrepreneurs decided to 
join forces to create a factory capable of taking up the standardization challenge. 
On this basis the Birmingham Small Arms (BSA) co. was set up in 1861 in the 
Small Heath area. After an initial period in which craftsmanship and mechanized 
working co-existed, the group increasingly adopted mechanized manufacture with 
significant results by the 1870s and was exclusively mechanized by the turn of the 
century (Fries 1975; Lumley 1989). 
The governmental role was crucial to the mechanization process undertaken by 
the BSA. Of the 2324 machines bought by the company in the 19th century less 
than 7% were foreign imports. The take-up of products made by companies such as 
Greenwood and Batley in Leeds was significant. This company was founded in 
1856 and acquired a solid position in both the UK and abroad in the field of machine 
tools for small arms production. This supplier's success was a direct outcome of the 
orders which the authorities had commissioned it for their own machinery at the 
Enfield Arsenal and the London Armory Company. In other words private 
companies could now count on suppliers who would have struggled to establish 
themselves without this initial public investment. And this was not all. The 
Birmingham producers also benefited from a new more conciliatory approach by 
the Board of Ordnance than in the past. Enfield and its employees were encouraged 
to help the BSA supplying it with calibers and product models and allowing its 
119 
 
technicians to visit the state factory to study its machinery (Lumley 1989; Lewis 
1996). 
Other companies such as National Arms and Ammunition Co. Ltd and Grenfell 
& Accles Ltd set mechanization processes in motion but a significant part of the 
sector retained artisan production methods. Though machinery was used for 
specific working processes here too, it was mainly sport firearms producers who 
maintained traditional production processes based predominantly on manual work. 
Thus at the turn of the nineteenth century there was a growing gulf in small arms 
production with totally mechanized military production founded on 
standardization, on one side, and civilian arms production which retained product 




Firearms production in Wallonia can be dated back to the late 14th century, on 
a continuum with an earlier cold weapons working tradition. After a hiatus during 
the Napoleonic period Liège made a rapid recovery during the first half of the 
nineteenth century and by 1860 it was being referred to as “the greatest arms 
manufacturing town in the world”. In the period covered by this study the Belgian 
state’s neutrality ensured its Wallonia based production concentration the 
opportunity to export both military and civilian products to a great many markets 
and develop a huge variety of models in the sport arms sector (Hertslet 1906).  
For legal reasons the Liège armory firms were usually private companies or 
partnerships. When World War One broke out, of 118 private companies working 
in this sector, 62 were trading companies or partnerships and only 14 joint stock 
companies. Stubbornly individualistic, local entrepreneurs never regarded limited 
liability companies favorably with the latter’s reduced personal responsibility and 
tendency to urge local entrepreneurs to find common ground. An example of this 
inclination in the local context took place in 1836 when, in an attempt to re-establish 
the monopoly enjoyed in the Dutch regime years, the government attempted to 
bring producers Hanquet and Ancion into a limited liability company to be accorded 
order exclusivity. This initiative triggered a wave of protests by local armorers who 
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saw this type of company, and accompanying state intervention, as a serious threat 
to their autonomy. 
A further example of the conflictual relationship between the local context and 
the state is the case of Fabrique National d’Armes de Guerre (FN). This anonymous 
company was set up with private capital but was only able practically to open up 
for business and begin work with a Belgian government loan.  This intervention 
was in fact crucial to its purchase of the machinery required for the production of a 
significant quantity of Mauser rifles for use by the national army. Hostility came to 
the surface once again when, in 1894, the suspension of the FN, which had just 
completed its contract with the Belgian War Ministry, was proposed. Most of its 
directors – as arms manufacturers – were disinclined to perpetuate an institution 
which they saw as a dangerous rival to their own firms and handed in their 
resignations. In so doing they allowed the German group L. Loewe und Co. to take 
control of the firm until 1919 (Gaier 1985; 1996). 
In the nineteenth century Liège’s production system was founded on home 
working using the putting-out system inherited from the pre-industrial era and still 
linked to the figure of the merchant entrepreneur rather than the industrialist. The 
extraordinary diffusion of this production framework is visible in the 1896 census 
data which shows that three quarters of the arms industry’s workforce (more than 
8000 people) were working from home. Generally speaking firearm components 
were made in city districts or the countryside while finishing and assembly were 
the task of city based workers. Piece work was crucial to this production process as 
it enabled many middlemen to intermediate between the large contractors and 
specialized labor. These middlemen, like the master barrel craftsmen of the Vesdre 
valley and the wholesalers of the Basse-Mause, usually controlled a specific phase 
of the production process and made use of the truck system (Ansiaux 1899). 
In a context such as this - extremely hostile to state intervention and with no 
private incentive to invest in manufacturing structures of an industrial nature - the 
lion’s share of innovations were imported from abroad especially those relating to 
raw materials supplies and metal working. A few hesitant steps forward took place 
in mechanization of the production process in which the figure of technical 
entrepreneur Falisse stands out as having put the final touches to a machine for 
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working both metal and wood components. It was Falisse who set up a company 
producing military firearms with mechanized factories in 1853 together with 
Trapmann. In 1854 Société pour les Armes de Guerre Ancion et Cie, Renkin Fres, 
Pirlot Fres et Auguste Francotte, also known as Société des Anglais for its 
relationship with the British Board of Ordnance, installed American machinery to 
fulfil orders for previously unheard of quantities however part of the work was still 
done manually at armorers’ homes. Mechanization began to make headway from 
1860 to 1890. By the end of this period all components, with the exception of 
damascus barrels, were generally machine made in crude form but only rarely took 
interchangeability criteria into account. Prior to 1914 only two firms were capable 
of manufacturing arms in their entirety within their factories and these were FN and 
Establishments Pieper. These used US and German machinery and sought 
standardization in both military and sporting arms. They were, above all, the first 
to urge local producers in the direction of the adoption of more avant-garde 
production methods incorporating a higher degree of mechanization. No radical 
changes occurred in civilian arms working. While workers making barrels, 
flintlocks and other components were unheard of in early nineteenth century Liège 
home production, workers specializing in breeches, barrel finishing and engraving 
were working in ways which were identical in every single way to their similars in 
1814 (Gaier 1985, pp. 117-126). 
 
Saint-Étienne 
In France, too, firearms production was structured according to the fabrique 
disséminée system shared by all four of the country’s main production centres: 
Saint-Étienne, Mutzig, Tulle and Châtellerault. In the modern day capital of the 
Loire, in 1861, production was scattered over an area measuring 10 km in length 
and 6 km in width. At Mutzig in 1864 the majority of employees were working 
from home. There were no workshops except for those making parts which required 
large scale movements or the use of mechanized engines. In Tulle all firearms 
components were made in the private workshops and shops of craftsmen who lived 
in this Corrèze valley town and the other eight production centers which revolved 
around it, some as far away as 40-60 km. Screws, bores and testing tools were made 
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in the capital; barrels were made in Estabournie and Souillac together with part of 
the bayonets, breeches, barrels and rods and the flintlocks were made in Treignac. 
Civilian and military arms production took place side by side in the various 
production centers but the presence of the state made itself felt in the latter, a 
presence which had attempted to distinguish between the two in past centuries in 
order to regulate those who, working on behalf of its Manufactures, were 
incorporated into the system set up for the supplying of the French armed forces. 
Legally speaking, the private sector was the norm in these production centers. The 
state owned buildings and machinery and awarded contracts to businessmen. These 
latter were charged by the state with fulfilling fixed price orders on which they 
earned a percentage. Entrepreneurs normally directly employed the workers they 
needed for production but cases in which work was subcontracted to local craftsmen 
were certainly not rare. The workforce was divided up into registered employees 
(master craftsmen, artisans and apprentices), free workers and military workers (in 
1852 there were 2801, 654 and 19 of these respectively). The former were bound 
to employment by a contract which guaranteed them a pension and the chance to 
become firearms controllers and workshop foremen, the second could leave their 
state employment on 3 months’ notice while the latter were temporarily removed 
from their regiments by ministerial order and, having returned to civilian life, 
frequently requested registered employee status. It was an extremely flexible 
system this which enabled the numbers of free and military workers to be increased 
in the event of an increased need for arms by the armed forces. The military 
category, in particular, had the great advantage of being made up of soldiers who 
could be returned to their regiments once orders lessened (Brun 2008). 
However the system also suffered from structural disadvantages of some 
significance. Worker dispersion and externalization practices made supervision of 
production by state appointed controllers almost impossible and wasted a great deal 
of energy and resources in transport and movements. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
moreover, the principal products were based on système 1842. These were made 
using well-established processes which were the result of an entirely craft type 
know-how and, whilst they responded to precise production standards, perfect 
interchangeability of parts could not be guaranteed. These were long standing 
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problems which the French government had already attempted to respond to in the 
first half of the century by introducing mechanization elements into production 
processes. The first experiments of this sort were the work of Honoré Blanc in the 
18th century. Fierce resistance by artisans and arms merchants who saw his ideas 
as a danger to their know-how and social status and the limited results obtained, 
however, prompted the French government to suspend the mechanization process. 
This was taken up once again in the 1850s when Napoleon III’s government, well 
aware of the race underway to improve army weaponry by other powers (especially 
the United States and England), decided to entrust the matter to Frédéric-Guillarme 
Kreutzberger, a Frenchman who had extensive experience as technical director of 
the US firm E. Remington & Sons. The latter’s working goal was clear: use the 
American system as a model for work mechanization and in making firearm parts 
interchangeable. On indications by the War Ministry, in 1857 experiments began at 
Châtellerault focusing both on the greater concentration of production which this 
center showed as compared with the others and its proximity to Paris. The same 
problems presented themselves: resistance by workers to new production methods 
and the absence of a global vision of the production process. The decision was thus 
taken to adopt a progressive approach which enabled workers to gain the necessary 
skills but also allowed Kreutzberger to study solutions to the many problems which 
emerged and to travel in America and England to visit local arsenals. In 1859, these 
experiments were extended to certain workshops in Tulle. However, in 1862, in the 
face of partial success and competition from other powers, the French government 
decided to put an end to the delays and focus on a large factory in which to 
concentrate modernization efforts - a new factory in Saint-Étienne (Brun 2012). 
Saint-Étienne was chosen for a great many reasons. First and foremost, by the 
end of the eighteenth century Saint-Étienne had established itself as an industrial 
center thanks to plentiful coal supplies and markedly dynamic metalworking and 
textile sectors - in 1859 it was supplying 55% of the country’s steel and was a center 
of armory innovation with no fewer than 80 private companies of which Petin et 
Gaudet stood out together with its production of both Lafaucheux revolvers, on 
contract to the navy, and certain experimental Chassepot rifles. There were also, 
however, two further grounds for the government's decision. The first of these was 
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that, in contrast to the other production centers, armory was not Saint-Étienne’s 
only significant industry and thus better conditions potentially existed for the 
recruitment of modern armory workers and that it avoided bringing soldiers into the 
production process. The second, on the other hand, was the bad conditions of the 
area’s production site. Despite good production levels, in fact, neither Chavanelle 
nor Rives seemed capable of guaranteeing future development prospects as a result 
of structural limitations above all in energy supplies. 
For this long series of reasons, in October 1862 an agreement was signed 
between the War Ministry and Saint-Étienne town council. This identified the area 
best suited to the requirements of a large scale factory capable of manufacturing 
120,000 firearms per year in accordance with the most cutting-edge production 
methods, the Champ-de-Manœuvre area. In addition to the availability of a dozen 
hectares, the area had level ground, plentiful water and good road and rail access in 
its favor. The agreement set out that the town council should buy up the land and 
sell it on to the state for 350,000 francs and then, after further enquiries into the 
potential of a further area, an agreement was signed on 24th January 1863. The 
original project involved funds totaling 2,800,000 francs but on May 16, 1864 a law 
passed through parliament allowing the state a loan of 5,800,000 gold francs for the 
building and fitting out of the site. The main buildings were completed in 1867 and 
the new factory was five times bigger than Rives and Chavanelle put together. 
1500 machines were installed in the new factory but, as the time was not yet 
ripe to supply a standard model for all firearms parts to American and English 
producers of machine tools, it was decided that these would be brought in gradually 
in synergy with French companies. The shift to a totally mechanized production 
was not, then, immediate. It was also slowed down by an increase in the quantity of 
arms required by the authorities (from 120,000 to 150,000 and then 200,000) which 
meant, for a few more years, that filers across the area had still to be used bringing 
to the fore a number of interchangeability issues linked to differences which were 
emerging between the various national production centers. In any event, the new 
Saint-Étienne factory was a great success in the French arms scenario. The 
disseminated factory model gradually disappeared with small workshop production 
remaining a preserve of the civilian market and a new relationship between state 
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production and private enterprise emerged. In 1870-1 this Loire city earned itself 
the title of French war economy center laying the foundation for its later key role 
in arming the French armed forces in World War One (Bacher et al. 2014; Bacher 
2008; Forissier 2005). 
 
Eibar 
Eibar is a large town in Guipuzkoa, a province in the autonomous Basque 
country community in northern Spain. Armory production in this province dates 
back to the late 15th century and it retained strong links to the state orders of the 
Real Fábrica of Placencia de las Armas for the whole of the Early Modern age. The 
Real Fabrica acted as administrative center assigning commissions to private 
contractors, corporations which then redistributed the work amongst the various 
specialized workshops scattered across the area and checked that the resulting 
products respected the standards required in the contracts. 
This situation began to change at the close of the 18th century when the crown 
decided to build a new arsenal in Oviedo. This latter was increasingly favored in 
the complex market interplay and this led to the progressive marginalization of the 
Fábrica of Placencia de las Armas. On June 2, 1860 a royal decree liberalized 
armaments production, freeing it from intermediary bodies and obliged the Fábrica 
to act as testing ground for the arms emerging from the new fabric of private 
producers with whom the state was increasingly doing direct business. Five years 
later the arsenal was definitively closed (Goñi Mendizabal 2007). 
Whilst for some years state production retained a certain importance in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms, the Fábrica’s closure brought significant changes 
to the local armory industry. Production was henceforth primarily civilian firearms, 
and short arms in particular, as these latter were less common in the armed forces 
than long arms. Despite pistol and revolver making’s greater vocation for mass 
production, Guipuzkoa remained characterized by a total absence of large, 
mechanized firms. The structure of the area’s production fabric remained 
unchanged but in this new phase the contracting role was performed by a number 
of companies most of which were still based in Eibar. With their patents and brands 
these firms out-sourced production of specific phases of production to the area’s 
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workshops and then carried out end assembly processes internally. This production 
organization, and a trajectory which was in some ways unique in the European 
production center panorama, meant that it was precisely at this time that this 
industrial district was at its most successful with a period of growth which would 
be interrupted seriously only by the 1914 crisis (Goñi Mendizabal 2010). 
On more than one especially difficult occasion the local armory industry 
demanded the building of a state factory in Eibar to ensure stable quantities year 
round and lay the foundations for the development of mechanized production. Local 
people looked to Liège, in particular, as an example and the FN model was 
presented to central government both to encourage the development of a private 
armory sector and, at the same time, develop a production center of a size capable 
of managing war time demands. All these demands fell on deaf ears, however, and 
other initiatives with similar objectives always failed in the face of a lack of the 
necessary capital. Thus as far as the production system was concerned there was no 
alternative for the zone but to focus even further on the disseminated factory 
framework relying on other factors for its development: replacing hydraulic power 
with electricity, increases in the town’s population, improvements in the road 
system which allowed the sector to integrate further into international markets 
(Goñi Mendizabal 2007). 
The internationalization aspect turned out to be of exceptional importance: local 
firms adopted a strategy which was well suited to their limited size and 
mechanization levels and enabled them to overcome the saturation of the local small 
arms market internationally. These Basque firms focused on keeping prices low 
even at the cost of sacrificing quality. This strategy involved both supplying clients 
with imitations of foreign models and using exotically named brands to conceal the 
discredited Spanish origin of their products. This specific export orientation also 
benefited from the support of the only public body still present in the district - Eibar 
town council. Not only did the council become an important network hub between 
agents with an interest in the production system but it also played a center-stage 
role in sourcing information on foreign competitors and resolving a thorny 
diplomatic-trading issue with the Ottoman Empire which blocked Spanish arms at 
the customs posts (Goñi Mendizabal 2008; 2009a). 
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Within the Guipuzkoa context a firm worthy of mention is the J. Esperanza y P. 
Unceta company founded in Eibar in 1908 with the objective of focusing on 
mechanized production of the components required by other producers in the same 
town. The company’s special claim to fame from 1911 onwards was the Victoria 
pistol inspired by American John Moses Browning’s patents and whose popularity 
on foreign markets is paradigmatic of the strategy adopted by these Basque 
armories. It is important to remember that Esperanza y Unceta was a company 
which, like a great many others in the area, worked only in product assembly. In 
particular it outsourced components production to Belgian, French, English and 
German firms13 and relied for sales on Eduardo Schilling of Barcelona for the 
Spanish, French and German markets and Thieme & Edeler of Liège for Belgium 
and Austria. Furthermore, like other Basque firms, it took advantage of the absence 
of the testing obligation in Spain14 and, relying on its foreign trading agents, it 
exported its pistols to a country, Belgium, where it could obtain hallmarks from the 
local testing authority without much difficulty15 and then sell its products on this 
market under special names without its clients realizing where they were actually 
made (Goñi Mendizabal 2009b). 
 
 
The Italian job 
 
Foreign domination 
As we have seen above, in Italy too small arms production dated back to the 
Early Modern era in accordance with the disseminated factory system. Firearms 
working was, just like today, concentrated in the Brescia area with its main centers 
                                                          
13 In contrast to other Basque firms Esperanza y Unceta focused on quality products and this was 
the basis for its decision to use foreign firms for raw material supplies and outsource the production 
of firearm parts. 
14 It was only with a royal decree of 31st January 1915, after heated debate within the district 
between pros and cons in which Eibar’s mayor and town council took part that the idea of a testing 
body began to take shape. After World War One related delays, the project came to fruition in 1923 
when an institution for testing civilian arms effectively started work (Goñi Mendizabal 2010). 
15 Arms brought into Belgium without obligatory testing had to pass minimum functioning tests 
which the Basque arms generally passed despite their low quality. It was a very different matter for 
locally produced arms which were subjected to intermediate checks which Eibar-made goods would 
have had great difficulty passing. 
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in Gardone Val Trompia and Brescia city itself. Throughout the 17th and 18th 
centuries the firearms production cycle resembled a long chain rooted along the 
Mella river and in the city of Brescia. In this production chain «each craftsman held 
a specific task16, although some phases of the manufacture required more 
sophisticated techniques and more complex tools than others. At the apex of the 
craft hierarchy there were the masters who forged the gun barrel, who in general 
owned a forge able to exploit water power. […] While the various phases of gun 
barrel production were exclusively located in Gardone Val Trompia (the forges, the 
plants and the workshops being distributed in fact over the territory of that small 
town) the manufacture of the firing mechanism was, instead, the prerogative of 
other villages in the valley. For example, a large number of the inhabitants of 
Marcheno, Sarezzo and Lumezzane were employed in the construction of gunlocks 
to be mounted on firearms. […] In other places along the valley, scattered forges 
and cottage industry, organized under a putting-out system, produced bayonets, 
firing rods, powder horn, munitions and other accessories for firearms. Finally, in 
the city itself, there were the craft workshops whose principal task was to serve the 
“good taste” of wealthy clients: it was in fact thanks to the artistic ability and to the 
loving attention to detail paid by engravers and etchers that butts and gun barrels 
were made more precious for these civilian clients» (Belfanti 1998, pp. 269-270). 
Following on from the bitter struggles between guild master craftsmen and 
merchant-entrepreneurs which marred the 18th century firearms sector, a new phase 
began in 1797 with the proclamation of the Repubblica Bresciana and its annexation 
to the Cisalpine Republic. Production passed into Napoleon’s hands and soon 
became a branch of France’s military organization. On December 29, 1806 Viceroy 
Eugenio Beauharnais visited the Brescia area and decided to open a royal arsenal 
there at the provincial capital with a base in Gardone too. The objective was to 
                                                          
16 This long chain of artisans is described in full detail by Gaibi (1964a, 1964c) and Belfanti 
(1998). 1) bollitori: the masters of the barrels based in Gardone, these were the apex of the chain as 
they took care of the forging, the most important part of the manufacturing process; 2) trivellatori: 
these smoothed down the inside of the barrels; 3) livellatori: in charge of grinding down the inside 
with drills and files; 4) fondellieri: these applied an ‘end’ in the form of large screws to close the 
breech; 5) molatori: took care of the external surfaces of the barrels; 6) brunitori: in charge of the 
burnishing; 7) fornitori: applied the sights and the firing mechanism appliances; 8) azzalinieri: made 
the locks, especially flint gunlocks; 9) incassatori: in charge of the creation of the wooden blocks; 
10) ferradori: produced the iron parts to fix the butt to the other gun components; 10) lissadori: 
inlaid and polished the wood 11) camuzzadori: engravers of the metal parts. 
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consolidate the position of the local specialized industry within a system of 
government contracts thus overcoming the backwardness of the local system 
resulting from the fierce clashes between those involved in production and, in recent 
years, in difficulty with the Serenissima (Montanari 1982; 1999; Bohn and 
Jaikumar 2005, pp. 35-37). 
However the situation changed once again in 1815 after Napoleon’s defeat at 
Waterloo when Brescia was annexed to Austria. With the end of hostilities and the 
beginning of the Restoration, the situation deteriorated. As a result of a stagnation 
in demand due to a clear contraction in wartime supplies, in the 1815-16 two year 
period the Brescia valleys had to deal with the progressive downsizing of the iron 
working sector. This obliged the whole local metalworking sector to face up to a 
wide ranging redefinition of its production framework. This re-organization 
triggered a workshop selection process which culminated in the ejection from the 
mining-metalworking sector of the less competitive firms (Rosa 1977). 
Once the economic crisis in the Lombard-Veneto area in the initial phase of the 
Restoration was over the government decided to reorganize the firearms 
manufacturing industry. In the last few months of 1818 a number of measures were 
adopted which had a powerfully negative impact on the Val Trompia district’s 
production fabric. Of these, three measures were the most important: 1) the 
suspension of production at the Gardone Fabbrica Erariale which was downgraded 
to simple store room; 2) the closure of the Brescia artillery headquarters; 3) the 
handing over of war supplies contracts to three merchant-entrepreneurs, namely 
Crescenzo Paris, Giuseppe Franzini and Antonio Beretta. The protests of the 
Gardone craftsmen - worried by the closure of an institutional body capable of 
ensuring them important contracts on an ongoing basis and by the increased 
contractual power of their historic rivals - were not slow in coming. The Austrian 
authorities stood their ground, however, and it was only in the 1820s that the 
government decided to bring the armorers back into contracting and the playing 
field was partially levelled once again. But the situation which local producers were 
about to face was an extremely delicate one: harboring their contracts and keeping 
back exports, the Austrian authorities decided on a rigid strategy controlling a 
strategic sector situated in a geographical area which it feared was less secure than 
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its other production centers. In the central years of Austrian domination, then, 
despite attempts to compensate for these difficulties in the hunting arms market, the 
pre-conditions for production specialization degenerated significantly. Not only did 
the Brescia metalworking sector experience innovation delays but it also had to deal 
with the less than excellent quality of the raw materials arriving from Dongo and 
the natural disasters which struck Val Trompia in this period (one of the worst of 
these was the Mella river bursting its banks in 185017). Controls by the government 
authorities became even more pressing following on from the Austrian victory in 
the First War of Independence in 1848. In the decade which followed military 
contracts were maintained at subsistence levels in both Brescia and Gardone and 
activities ceased altogether in 1857 (Marchesi 2003; Cominazzi 1861). 
 
The Italian Kingdom: a new beginning 
In 1859, the Second War of Independence ended very differently from the first: 
Brescia was finally freed of foreign occupation and annexed to the Kingdom of 
Sardinia which conquered Central and Southern Italy two years later and became 
the Kingdom of Italy. In an 18th August decree King Vittorio Emanuele II re-
opened the Arsenal, naming it Fabbrica Erariale di Brescia18 and a year later (Royal 
decree 17th June 1860) the Italian army was formed with the artillery arm 
encompassing the Fabbrica itself together with the Turin and Torre Annunziata 
                                                          
17 The flood hit all the municipalities of the province crossed by the river, not only those in Val 
Trompia, and an ad hoc commission was established to oversee the management of the resources 
for the reconstruction. In July 1860, when the province was still struggling to recover from the 
damages, the money given to the towns and villages totally amounted to L. 303,386.17. An important 
share of the aid came from other Lombard provinces and other regions: from the cities and provinces 
of Brescia L. 538.55, Milan L. 2,851.78, Mantua L. 1,272.54, Como L. 91.27; from Piedmont and 
Sardinia L. 72,317.45; from Tuscany L. 275.97; from the Austrian Empire L. 1563.18 (more 
precisely from Istria and Illyria L. 1,259.00, Wien L. 5.20, Hungary L. 103.76, Bohemia L. 64.63, 
Galicia and Lodomeria 7.65, Styria and Carinthia L. 122.94). The municipalities of the valley 
received: Carcina L. 1,118.32, Concesio L. 13,065.00, Gardone L. 3,200.00, Inzino L. 2,700.00, 
Lumezzane L. 2,312.03, Marcheno L. 200.00, Pezzaze L. 530.00, Sarezzo L. 4,117.12, S. Vigilio L. 
600.00, Villa L. 2,970.00. Among the other share of aid distributed by the commission there were 
also: L. 3,000.00 for interventions to the stretch of the river between the bridges of Zanano and 
Pregno; L. 32,217.00 to Commissione Figliale di Soccorso in Gardone which, in its turn, gave L. 
25,000.00 for various interventions in Inzino, L. 1,000.00 for a road in Fontanelle, L. 6,000.00 for 
reopening 25 forges located in Lumezzane Pieve, Lumezzane S. Apollonio and Sarezzo, L. 217.00 
for various urgent interventions in Villa, S. Vigilio, Carcina and Sarezzo. See: Archivio Storico del 
Comune di Magno (ASCM), b. 28, ff. 1-15, “Supplemento al Giornale La Sentinella Bresciana n. 
36: Prospetto Generale Riassuntivo”. 
18 Also called Reale Fabbrica d’Armi. Giornale Militare, 1859, p. 605. 
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arsenals. Norms, responsibilities and organizational instructions were established 
for these19. In particular it was specified that: 
1) after the necessary restoration work by the Directorate, all workers in the new 
arms making workshop are to be supplied with the following from the R. 
Fabbrica: workbench, press, clamp, bellows, forge anvil, weights and gauges 
required for firearms working. 
2) arms finishers are to be supplied with bolts and corresponding screws;  
3) workers are to purchase all other tools required at their own expense; 
4) the necessary oil and grease are to be supplied from the royal warehouses to the 
finishing master craftsmen and the barrel levelers and finishing master 
craftsmen working in the testing room (and the same applies to the grease used 
for the press and clamp screw grease for the various workshops); 
5) all other workers, including the steel tempering foremen, are to supply their own 
oil, grease, vinegar, charcoal and anything else they need; 
6) flintlock finishers are to be supplied with the parts required to substitute those 
which break during tempering for forge working; 
7) all firearms parts, except flintlocks, revealed as unusable during working are to 
be substituted with others supplied by the royal warehouses (on these workers 
are to work to fixed pay); 
8) workers are to be liable for no supplies replacements or housing which is 
defective and thus unusable on condition that these are given back, whilst 
workers are liable - by means of sums kept back from their pay - for parts they 
themselves have broken. 
The government also fixed tariffs for each small arm working activity for a total 
cost per firearm of 5.35 Lire (L. hereafter)20: 
1) Piercing and countersinking the tail of a breech screw: L. 0.03. 
2) Adjusting the bayonet on a barrel: L. 0.04. 
3) Making a nut and countersinking the holes for the two long screws in the side 
plate: L. 0.03. 
                                                          
19 Giornale Militare, 1860, p. 145. 
20 Ibidem, p. 146. 
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4) Making a nut and countersinking the hole in the breech screw in the trigger 
guard: L. 0.25. 
5) Assembling the firearm, i.e. working the housing and all firearm parts: L. 2.55. 
6) Aligning the hammer head to the frizzen and finishing it off: L. 0.10. 
7) Adjusting the wood screws: L. 0.10. 
8) Dismantling a firearm and flintlock and separating the parts out: L. 0.04. 
9) Readjusting the mounts after making the stock: L. 0.02. 
10) Readjusting the trigger guard nut and its screw: L. 0.01. 
11) Making the imprint for the flintlock side plate. L. 0.04. 
12) Powdercharge tempering and re-tempering those parts which need it: L. 0.25. 
13) Cleaning and marking the stock: L. 0.07. 
14) Hand cleaning all the parts of the flintlock and those which have been tempered: 
L. 0.57. 
15) Hand cleaning all non-tempered parts of the mount, the bayonet and the rod: L. 
0.57. 
16) Cleaning the barrel externally: L. 0.25. 
17) Separating the parts of the flintlock in its housing, adjusting the screws in their 
holes and reassembling them: L. 0.05. 
18) Readjusting the flintlock before and after tempering: L. 0.18. 
19) Reassembling the firearm, readjusting it and readying it for use: L. 0.20. 
The new government’s intention was to breathe new life into the Brescia 
firearms industry not simply by re-opening the state arsenal in accordance with 
similar norms to those regulating the Turin arsenal but also bringing the private 
sector into the market with a piecework system. In fact Camillo Cavour expressed 
himself thus in a contribution dating to 29th September 1860 which appeared in 
that year’s Giornale Militare21: «This new factory was not slow in taking off 
satisfactorily and prospering as far as could be expected given the deplorable state 
into which the firearms industry had fallen, abandoned and harassed as it was by 
the former government. Nevertheless as production has not yet managed to produce 
the surplus which current needs require, those demands which have yet to be 
                                                          
21 Ibidem, p. 1036. 
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fulfilled, as defects to be repaired, have been provided for and it has emerged that 
the problem was due to delays in barrel supplies. The government has provided to 
supply the various producers with all the means available to it. […] Special barrel 
workshops will be set up in Gardone which will be considered subsidiaries of the 
Brescia factory and subordinate to it. A representative of the Brescia directorate 
will be stationed there and will be subordinate and answer to the former. The 
directorate will seek out two or three workshops to let in the town, come to an 
agreement with their owners and send the contracts to the Ministry for approval. 
The prices of these goods will be fixed annually by the factory directorate and 
approved by the Ministry. Forge workers will be required to supply their own 
charcoal and in making barrels they will have to roll forge but hammer weld. 
Grindstone working will have to be replaced by the wheel. In order to avoid a lack 
of work between one contract and another, as a result of a momentary pause, 
infantry rifles for repair will be sent from the Brescia armory to Gardone». 
In other words it might be argued that Brescia and Gardone, the two traditional 
armory working centers, were soon subject to the Kingdom of Italy’s interest: 
together with the Turin factory they were seen as important cogs in the wheel which 
was to fit out the army responsible for unifying the peninsula22. This interest by the 
new authorities is also demonstrated by a full-blown dossier which the kingdom 
had drawn up by the Val Trompia councils on the subject of the sector’s activities. 
This valuable source provides us with a very detailed account of the state of affairs 
in the private sector at the end of the period of Austrian domination as well as an 
idea of the attempts made by the production fabric to re-organize to satisfy the new 
state’s demands. 
All the buildings used to make barrels were located in Gardone Val Trompia in 
addition to all workshops for grinding, boring and levelling normally let out with 
the obligation that they were to remain available for the owner’s requirements. 
More specifically there were 10 forges powered by the waters of the Mella river 
which were either exclusively owned or co-owned by the firms who ran them and 
bore the names of their merchant class family owners. There were also workshops 
                                                          
22 To support Garibaldi’s thousand man expedition Gardone town council sent him 1000 rifles 
and organised a collection of funds involving selling off a forest; see Archivio Storico del Comune 
di Gardone Val Trompia (ASCG), b. 183, f. 1. 
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in the town - in this case too generally owned by tradesmen and more rarely by self-
employed workers - and smithies, i.e. bellow worked barrel workshops. 
Each tradesman worked commercial arms independently while those of the 
Erario were produced by a firm made up of all the owners of the various buildings 
with the exception of F.lli Franzini and F.lli Girolamo Bertarini, the former because 
it manufactured for the Erario on its own and the latter because it was not a barrel 
manufacturer. Zambonardi Simone, on the other hand, was part of the collective 
firm despite the fact that he did not own any of the buildings. Approximately 50 
barrels per day were manufactured for the Erario: 40 by the firm and 10 by F.lli 
Franzini. These are figures which, to judge by the dossier, could have increased if 
production for the National Guards had been brought to an end and if the levelers 
had mastered the art of shadow levelling, a practice which had been neglected 
because it was of use only for the Erario’s firearms. 
All these craftsmen were pieceworkers and there were around 190 of them. 
There were 42 bollitori, 24 trivellatori, 23 livellatori, 22 molatori, 20 fondellieri, 
impanatori and mirinai, 49 finishers and 10 checkers who checked barrels 
contracted by the government and civilians. In addition to these 190, lastly, there 
were also a great many apprentice bollitori and finishers who were not counted in 
the dossier as they had not yet learnt their craft23. 
A year later the information regarding Gardone Val Trompia alone was 
supplemented by an overview of the barrel manufacturing figures of the various 
companies, the machinery these had at their disposal, workforce numbers and 
salaries and, lastly, observations relating to the forges present in the town area24. 
There were 15 companies working and trading barrels and these were 
supplemented by “various small producers” whose exact number was not specified. 
The tools used were mainly hand tools: 49 drills for barrel boring and grinding, 7 
Sarnico grindstones, 12 rolling mills, 25 forges powered by hydraulic bellows, 7 
forges powered by bellows. The sole elements of mechanization in the production 
                                                          
23 Ibidem, b. 69, f. 1, “Prospetto della Fabbrica d’Armi da Fuoco in Gardone”. See Appendix 6 
(p. 257) for the summarizing tables of the dossier. 
24 Ibidem, b. 180, f. 1, “Prospetto di Statistica della Industria Manifatturiera nell’Anno 1861 nel 
Comune di Gardone, Mandamento di Gardone, Provincia e Circondario di Brescia. Statistica da 
Diversi Fabbricanti Gardonesi per le sole Canne”. See Appendix 7 (p. 263) for the entire 
transcription of the report. 
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process were two turns and three machines for rifling the barrels which were 
government owned. 
In addition to the private sector the Regio Erario had also begun production, 
having identified the forges to let in the town area on instructions by the War 
Ministry referred to above. The government let: 1) the Fornace forge owned by 
Bertarini; 2) the Rampinelli forge owned by Moretta; 3) the Mulino forge owned 
by Ditta Crescenzio Paris. 
In 1861 40, 581 barrels were made of which: 30,796 were for war rifles (of 
which 8000 were state made), 2326 were for various double barrelled firearms, 
6789 for various single barrelled rifles (and thus 9115 for civilian use, mainly for 
hunting) and lastly 670 pistol barrels. The total value of these was 542,165 L. and 
they were made using 41 hydraulic engines, 7 wind mills and others which were 
animal-powered with a workforce of 6. The barrels made for the National Guard 
and private clients were made with cast iron from the Val Trompia (worked by the 
Glisenti firm) and iron mined in the same valley, respectively, while those to be 
used for government rifle orders were made using iron mined in the Aosta valley. 
In all, 1814 hundredweights of Italian iron were used. The fuel used was charcoal 
(7385 hundredweights) and this too was produced locally. 
The total workforce increased to 287 including: 50 bollitori, 50 trapanatori, 50 
livellatori, 8 tornitori, 14 molatori, 70 limatori, 25 tra vitonieri, bombardieri and 
others and, lastly, 20 pulitori. All armory workers were men with the exception of 
the pulitura trade. They were all piece workers and those who earned the most - the 
bollitori - were paid a daily rate which ranged from a minimum of 2 L. to a 
maximum of 6 while those who earned the least, the pulitrici, were paid a maximum 
of 2 L. and a minimum of 0.75 L. per day. Total yearly workforce expenses added 
up to 240,000 L.. 
The people of the nearby towns of Magno and Inzino also worked in firearms 
production. There were 8 workshops for flintlock making in Magno. These were 
small and frequently located in the homes of their owners employing a total 
workforce of 2025. In Inzino, on the other hand, there were a further 6 forges 
                                                          
25 Ibidem, b. 69, f. 1, “Prospetto degli individui addetti al lavoro d’armi nella qualità di acciarinai 
sì di monizione che mercantili del Comune di Magno”; ASCM, b. 28, ff. 1-15, “Prospetto degli 
operaj addetti alla fabbrica d’armi del Comune di Magno”. 
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employing 30 people on flintlock and cold weapon making in addition to nails and 
farming tools26. In Lumezzane Sant’Apollonio there were 8 workshops making 
military rifle finishings (rods and nosecap for the royal arsenal), strips for the same 
type of product and cold weapons (daggers, sabres and bayonets). 55 workers were 
employed in these forges or at their own homes for these same forges27. There were 
12 buildings - forges, workshops and small forges - and 19 shops (most of which 
were in private homes) in Lumezzane Pieve. The workforce employed in the 
firearms sector amounted to 235 individuals making cold weapons and a great many 
firearm parts: trigger guards, flintlocks, screws28. The town of Marcheno, lastly, 
was home to a further 13 workshops all for flintlock working employing 40 workers 
who also frequently worked from home29. 
The fact that the action of the new authorities had kick-started a production 
system which had experienced difficult times in recent years is confirmed by the 
writings of a well-known craftsman of the day: Marco Cominazzi (1861). While 
not sparing in his criticism of the new government for a recent arms contract 
commissioned to foreign producers, the latter wrote thus on Gardone’s situation: 
«Three of the largest [forges] and two of the smallest have been let by the state and 
have eight furnaces, each powered by a trompe. The others produce as free private 
workers. […] The work done by the firearms factories is around 50 finished barrels 
per day and the same quantity in the private forges. These latter sell the best barrels, 
not yet rifled, to the government for 16 L. each while externally different prices are 
agreed and furthermore today a grand total of 20 hunting twist barrels and more 
elaborate ones called Damascus barrels are traded. Our ardent hope is that this barrel 
making work will increase as the need of a great nation like ours for arms is 
supreme, one which has only recently risen to its feet and shaken off centuries of 
servitude to take the place which is rightfully ours. Great and eager is our will to 
                                                          
26 ASCG, b. 69, f. 1, “Prospetto degli Edifici a Fucina esistenti in questo Comune atti a convertirsi 
ad uso lavoriero d’armi”. 
27 Ibidem, “Prospetto riassuntivo delle Notizie sul numero delle officine per lavoro d’armi 
esistenti nel Comune di Lumezzane Sant’Apollonio”. 
28 Ibidem, “Prospetto delle Officine, degli Operaj ed Applicati per lavoro d’Armi in Lumezzane 
Pieve”. The prospectus indicates that, in addition to the workshops and shops shown, a similar 
number of workshops operated in the town exclusively on civilian arms but could, if needed, have 
been used for weapons making. 
29 Ibidem, “Prospetto nominativo di tutte le officine pel lavoro d’armi esistenti nel Comune di 
Marcheno e nome e cognome degli operai in esse occupati”. 
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make these devices which will see our industry return to the greatness of our fathers’ 
day. For this reason few of us can entirely forgive the government for having 
recently made a large purchase of low quality, untested foreign arms for the 
National Guard’s weaponry when it could have had them made perfectly at home». 
In 1863 a long process was set in motion which is of especial importance for an 
analysis of state intervention in the industrial districts specializing in small arms 
and to highlight the dynamics characteristic of the Gardone district. The process 
concerned is that relating to the transformation of the state warehouse into a full-
blown factory. This was a long, complex process but shows once again the strong 
bond between small arms production and the local population, a bond which is 
confirmed by the great energy invested in it by the Gardone town council for a 
positive outcome30. 
It was 30th November 1863 when the Gardone Val Trompia town council 
deliberated sending the first of a long series of petitions to the War Ministry 
requesting the building of a state owned manufacturing plant for war armaments 
production. This building was to be of use to Gardone and the rest of the valley31 in 
obtaining greater guarantees of continuity in military contracts and greater 
independence from Brescia32. This petition was probably dictated by the council’s 
intention to maintain a high degree of state attention on the negotiations underway 
for some months by the Regia Direzione d’Artiglieria for the purchase of the 
Bertarini forge33, called Fornace, precisely to give further impetus to the local 
                                                          
30 On the subject of the important role played by the local government within these district 
dynamics see Grandi (2007). 
31 For an understanding of the importance of the military contracts and building of a state factory 
in Gardone for the whole valley see the petitions sent by the Lumezzane Pieve, Lumezzane S. 
Apollonio and Carcina town councils in 1864. ASCG, b. 180, f. 2, “Missiva del Municipio di 
Lumezzane Pieve, 12 giugno 1864”; Ibidem, “Missiva del Comune di Carcina, 12 giugno 1864”; 
Ibidem, “Missiva del Municipio di Lumezzane S. Apollonio, 14 giugno 1864”. 
32 Ibidem, f.1, “Verbale di deliberazione, 30 novembre 1863”. On the subject of the great 
importance of the firearms trade to the local people the resolution reads as follows: «There has been 
an arms industry in this town since the dawn of time and it is the only occupation of these craftsmen 
for whom it might be said that it is innate and rooted in their very natures». 
33 We learn from a report drawn up by the Giunta Comunitativa di Statistica on manufacturing 
industry in Gardone and the Brescia district that the Bertarini forge, let to the government at the 
time, was equipped with «12 machines operated by an ancient six motor animal pulled form» in 
1861. By 1863, by contrast, «with the same motors 24 bores, 2 rolling mills, a grindstone, a wheel 
and 6 fires were powered. The new form bores worth 600 L. each came partly from Turin and partly 
from the Glisenti foundry in Carcina and the wheel worth 600 L. from Turin were all purchases 
made by the Erario and now a further 24 bores are being introduced. One of these will be powered 
by a single engine. For these, in addition to the remaining one engine with which other machines 
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military firearms manufacturing industry. A month later, moreover, the council 
approved a further resolution in which it undertook to purchase, and then cede to 
the government free of charge, the land around this forge required to redevelop it 
and build a structure suitable to military production demands34. This effort was also 
supported by local craftsmen who undertook to contribute a fixed sum monthly and 
individually for a year. Every month the sum of the individual amounts paid into 
the local Cassa di Risparmio for this land purchase was 274.75 L.35. 
In 1864, the kingdom’s parliament and senate approved the Bertarini workshop 
purchase authorising the sum of 32,500 L. in accordance with the agreement drawn 
up between the military authorities and the owners of the forge36. However, a 
positive, short term conclusion was still a long way off and a whole series of 
technical and bureaucratic problems cropped up which slowed down the buying 
process and prompted the military administration to assess the potential for 
transferring the project elsewhere37. It was only in the second half of 1869 that a 
                                                          
will be powered, a further 40 bores will be brought in than there were in 1861. Additional machines, 
both for rifling and for plating the barrels with iron, work every day at government expense». The 
report then concluded as follows: «If, when machines did not exist and no improvements were made 
in manufacturing, a significant number of barrels were made and these arms won awards at the Paris, 
Munich, London and Florence exhibitions, how much better might they be in these current times 
and in the future». Ibidem, f. 2, “Relazione della Giunta Comunitativa di Statistica – doc. 29”. These 
repeated references to the mechanisation of the manufacturing process were probably deliberate in 
the light of the fact that on the occasion of the participation of an Italian delegation at the London 
international exhibition, the provincial delegation sent businessmen, factory managers and 
technicians to England. The Brescia delegation, under the leadership of Angelo Monà, assisted in 
the iron and steel sector by Giuseppe Ragazzoni, did not miss the chance to visit London, 
Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield as well. Aware of the pressing changes taking place in the 
most important European production centres and the delay accumulated in the local iron and steel 
sector, various exponents of Brescia’s provincial arms industry were present: G. Michelon (firearms 
factory manager), C. Premoli (firearms factory manager), G. Glisenti (owner). On the subject of the 
London exhibition see Bolchini (1986) and Gregorini (1993); on the issue of the participation of the 
Brescia delegation at the 1800-1915 period industrial exhibitions see Onger (2010). As far as the 
difficulties encountered by Brescia metalworking in the early years of unification is concerned see 
Marchesi (2003, pp. 275-284). 
34 Ibidem, “Verbale di deliberazione, 26 dicembre 1863 – doc. 15”; Ibidem, f. 2, “Alla onorevole 
Direzione della Regia Fabbrica d’Armi in Brescia – doc. 19”. 
35 Ibidem, f. 1, “Onorevole Giunta municipale di Gardone – doc. 13”. 
36 Giornale Militare, 1865, p. 414. 
37 In February 1869, an Italian armed forces commission was sent to Sarezzo for a series of 
surveys of the area in which the historic cannon foundry owned by the Bailo family had stood, 
causing concern in the Gardone town council. This latter, together with famous armourer Marco 
Cominazzi wrote to Giuseppe Zanardelli to head off any such event. On 25th March 1869 the 
manager of the Brescia arms factory wrote to the mayor of Gardone on the subject: «I should not 
conceal, however, that towards the end of last year I received orders from the Ministry to give the 
local offices of the armed forces all the indications the latter needed for the study of a potential 
project whose purpose was the choice of a new location for a branch workshop to this armoury 
factory and this in view of the difficulties which arose in negotiations with Mr Bertarini who is 
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breakthrough was made: from July to November 1869, all the thorny questions 
which had slowed the project down were resolved and a specific agreement between 
the Gardone Val Trompia town council and the War Ministry was drawn up. All 
the undertakings which the council agreed to take on set out in this agreement in 
order to enable the Fabbrica Erariale to be built can be summarized as follows38: 
1) buying the forge called Fornace at its own expense and cede this to the 
government in order for the latter to build the factory on it39; 
2) ensuring that the sum requested by Bertarini’s owners to cede it was reduced by 
7000 L. (from 32,500 to 25,500 L.). 
3) removing the existing servants at the Bertarini forge; 
4) guaranteeing the water required for the functioning of the Fabbrica Erariale; 
5) offering 15,000 in cash to be paid within a year of the start of work40. 
                                                          
unable to guarantee water rights». See: Archivio di Stato di Brescia (ASBS), «Fondo Zanardelli», 
b. 46, “Lettere della Giunta municipale di Gardone Valtrompia e di Marco Cominazzi a Zanardelli, 
Gardone 28 febbraio 1869”; ASCG, b. 180, f. 5, “Missiva della Direzione d’Artiglieria della 
Fabbrica d’Armi in Brescia al sindaco di Gardone, 25 marzo 1869”. In addition to problems relating 
to water supplies for the Bertarini forge problems also arose linked to the notarial deed whose 
purpose was to certify ownership of this. It had, in the 1850-8 period, in fact, changed hands many 
times; see Ibidem, f. 4, “Certificazione di proprietà immobiliare della fucina Fornace”. 
38 Ibidem, f. 5, “Verbale di deliberazione, 22 agosto 1869 – doc. 66, 68”; Ibidem, “Regia 
Prefettura della Provincia di Brescia – doc. 69”; Ibidem, “Verbale di deliberazione, 26 novembre 
1869 – doc. 70”. 
39 The estate was the property of Moretti Bonaventura, Moretti Giovanni and Moretti Giacinto. 
The former owned 5.72 perticas of land earning 44.14 L. while the other two owned 0.49 perticas 
earning 3.77 L.. The estate was thus worth 6.69 perticas equivalent to 2.055 Brescia piòs. The value 
of the estate was estimated at 2,086.50 L. per Brescia piò. However, considering that the sale of the 
estate led to the break-up of the neighbouring estate owned by Mr Moretti and involved moving his 
entrance, it was agreed that the Gardone town council should pay a third more than the estimate 
value. Thus the sale price was fixed at 2.782 L. per Brescia piò adding up to 5,343 L. of which 4,952 
was owed to Mr Bonaventura and 391 to brothers Giovanni and Giacinto. Ibidem, b. 382, f. 9.1, 
“Relazione di Stima del fondo detto Fornace”; Ibidem, “Processo verbale di presa di possesso dei 
fondi”. 
40 This offer was put forward by the town council to favour the government’s purchase of a 
further forge, referred to as Rampinelli or Moretta with the adjoining Paris-Abeni mill. These 
negotiations, too, were lengthy and complex but in contrast to those for the Bertarini workshop they 
did not lead to agreement. It is likely that part of the government’s purpose in buying these buildings 
related to fact that they were above the Bertarini forge and shared a canal with it and such a purchase 
would have headed off water supply problems (this issue appears in the quote in note 29). However 
on 19th August 1869, in a meeting with the mayor of Gardone and a captain of the armed forces, 
designed to renegotiate the value of the two properties, the owners of the workshop (the Moretta 
brothers) declared themselves against the sale (in contrast to Abeni who had already agreed to lower 
the price of the mill he owned). It is likely that it was for this reason that, as we have already seen, 
the state took the precaution of requiring explicit guarantees from the town council on the subject of 
water supply from the canals. Whilst the purchase of the two buildings fell through, it is evident that 
the town council did not feel able to decline the offer of 15,000 L. in cash. On the subject of the 
water supply see also: Ibidem, “Estratto del progetto di convenzione”. In reference to the purchase 
of the Rampinelli-Moretta forge and the Paris-Abeni mill see: Ibidem, b. 180, f. 5, “Missiva della 
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Thanks to the efforts of a local context capable of convincing the state to invest 
in provincial manufacturing centers, the government buildings located there 
acquired a precise role within the composite framework of public contracts and 
played a crucial part in the development of manufacturing specialization. The two 
plants split the work up between them: «In Gardone they bore, rifle and smooth the 
barrels, make the breech blocks, the mobile breeches and the tails, in Brescia they 
finish off the job with burnishing and fire coloring, the housing is worked together 
with the rifle mounts, the sabre bayonet guards and rifles are assembled by joining 
the various parts together before testing. For the rotating-barrel pistols almost all 
the parts are made in Gardone but like the rifles they are assembled in Brescia» 
(Bonardi 1889, p. 57). As mentioned above, moreover, the state factories played an 
extremely important role in distributing contracts across the area between local 
entrepreneurs above all in the highest production phases. For example, in addition 
to the private Gardone forges the military directorate also made use of the 
Lumezzane master craftsmen from this town in Val Gobbia41, entrusting them, in 
particular, with work on sabre blades, mounts, finishings and rifle accessories. This 
external working was of a certain importance if it is considered that it accounted for 
between a third and a quarter of total workforce value42. 
From 1876 onwards the armory production of the Fabbriche Erariali increased 
continually reaching a peak of 40,000 pieces in 1883. This increase was linked to 
both technical-manufacturing reasons and political dynamics. In 1876, in fact, the 
governmental phase led by men from the so-called historical right came to an end. 
                                                          
Direzione d’Artiglieria della Fabbrica d’Armi in Brescia al sindaco di Gardone, 12 luglio 1869 – 
doc. 61bis”; Ibidem, “Gardone V.T. nell’Ufficio Municipale lì 19 Agosto 1869”. 
41 A side valley of Val Trompia. 
42 To give some concrete examples of the outsourcing strategy we can mention the auction 
notices published by the Arsenal for the production of daggers, sabers and various firearm parts: 
Archivio Storico del Comune di Lumezzane Sant’Apollonio (ASCL), b. 43, ff. 1-3, “Avviso d’asta 
4 ottobre 1867”; Ibidem, “Avviso d’asta: 6 ottobre 1867”; Ibidem, “Avviso d’asta: 14 ottobre 1867”; 
Ibidem, “Avviso d’asta: 14 novembre 1867”; Ibidem, “Avviso d’asta: 16 novembre 1867”.  The 
importance of the arsenal for the firms of the province, especially the forges located in Val Gobbia, 
is underlined also in a defense submitted to the Italian Prime Minister and to the Italian Ministry of 
War regarding the decision of subordinating the Brescia state armories to the Arsenal of Terni. The 
document was written by Girolamo Orefici (mayor of Brescia), Giovanni Corridori (council member 
delegated by the mayor of Gardone Val Trompia), Polotti Giacomo (mayor of Lumezzane Pieve), 
Marcello Stanchino (representative of Lega dei Lavoratori dello Stato) and Carlo Bonardi (writer). 
See Aa. Vv. Memoriale in Difesa della R. Fabbrica di Brescia-Gardone, Apollonio, 1911 in ASCL, 
b. 171, f. 3. 
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This change in the political context in favor of the left sanctioned industrial capital’s 
rise to power. Accelerated manufacturing expansion, the result of significant 
investments in equipment, paid off in a more marked ministerial manufacturing 
orientation and related approval of a new tariff standard in 1878.  
Brescia’s industrialists, including those in the armory sector, showed a 
willingness to take advantage of these new dynamics. The new managerial class’s 
favorable attitude to the mechanics industry, especially the Brescia industry, as a 
result of Zanardelli’s increased prestige within the left, was especially advantageous 
for the Fabbrica Erariale. This culminated in a long cycle of manufacturing growth 
which peaked in the mid-1880s with plans to enlarge the Gardone factory with 
related modernization of its machinery and an increase in indispensable energy 
generation. In the second half of the 1880s production contracted considerably with 
a low point in the 1890-1 two year period. The causes of this were manifold and 
concurrent as the Brescia military armories underwent a long period of stagnation 
from which they emerged only thanks to Giolitti’s colonial policies in Libya and 
World War One (Montanari 2002)43. 
 
Entrepreneurial dynamism 
An important feature of industrial districts is a great entrepreneurial ferment in 
addition to flexibility and the ability to adapt of the individuals taking part in this 
ferment. It was in many ways the state intervention described thus far which sparked 
off the return of private enterprise in the sector after the wretched Austrian 
parenthesis in Brescia. A case in point is the Vincenzo Bernardelli firm; Del Barba 
(2008, pp. 29, 32, 34) states that: «in 1865, after hearing of the issue of a tender by 
the arsenal - then re-organizing and seeking specialized craftsmen - Vincenzo 
Bernardelli decided to take the opportunity and try his luck. He left the Franzini 
firm and unexpectedly, instead of joining the Fabbrica Erariale, decided to set up 
his own workshop and work for the arsenal externally. […] In a context of a rapid 
modernization drive in the organization of manufacturing processes […] Vincenzo 
Bernardelli took his first steps in the world of Gardone entrepreneurship and, 
encouraged by continual demand from the arsenal (enthusiastically undertaking 
                                                          
43 Regarding the military policy in Liberal Italy see Degli Esposti (2006). 
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redistribution and organization of the area’s work), he bought some rooms near his 
home-workshop in the early 1870s in order to attach them to a building he owned 
and extend the company’s size». Very soon, «in the presence of ongoing demand 
for semi-worked goods triggered by the requirements of the Italian army and at a 
favorable moment in the hunting rifle trade, Vincenzo Bernardelli realized that the 
time was ripe to take a second leap forward in size terms: in 1883 he bought part of 
a workshop called “in Capo a Gardone” from Crescenzio Paris where he specialized 
in barrel making inaugurating», in his older workshops, «firing mechanism design 
with the objective of finally being capable of making whole rifles, i.e. firearms 
made by the firm in their entirety. He achieved this aim in around 1890 when the 
fourth of his sons, Giulio, joined the company having just left the local design 
school». 
However his was not the only entrepreneurship story which stands out in the 
Val Trompia manufacturing fabric of those years. Bernardelli was, in fact, 
following in the footsteps of two other firms who had integrated all the various 
phases to produce complete firearms: Glisenti and Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta 
(FAPB or Beretta hereafter). These two companies established themselves as 
market leaders in those years with diverse strategies and took on the skill incubation 
role which was being undertaken in other districts by medium-large firms. 
Glisenti was the first integrated steel group in the history of the province and 
was based in Villa Carcina. Its fortunes were the work of its founder, Francesco 
Glisenti, and his family on the basis of strong ties with the political authorities and 
impressive process and product innovation skills.  
By means of this type of strategy and on the basis of a strong relationship with 
Giuseppe Zanardelli, Glisenti was able to carve out an important role for itself in 
the government contracts sector and become the standard bearer for a great many 
forges scattered across Val Trompia and along the Mella river (Montanari 1983; 
Marchesi 2004; Onger and Varini 2005). 
In 1884, with an estimated social capital of 2.5 million L., the industry employed 
a total workforce of 880 and had horse power of around 600. Taking account of the 
various working phases the factories were spread out along the course of the Mella 
river following a downward transformation path and setting a complete and fully 
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integrated production cycle in motion. Further up, in Bovegno, was the mine from 
which 2000 tons of spatic magnesiferous iron was extracted which was fired in three 
continuous shaft furnaces with 50 workers engaged in extraction and firing. The 
mineral then passed to the Tavernole furnace, 50 kilometres further down the 
valley, where it was transformed into 1500 tons of cast iron using charcoal from the 
Valsabbia and Trentino. The Tavernole plant, with its 80 workers for six-seven 
months a year and a charcoal blast furnace with a 24 cubic meter capacity and two 
Siemens puddling furnaces, made Glisenti independent of the Pisogne blast furnace 
on which it had depended for cast iron supplies until then. The firm thus achieved 
production levels of 2000 tons of its own iron bars and puddled iron. Eleven 
kilometers further down the valley, in Zanano, there were two furnaces for forge 
welding and hammer rifling with a total of eight hydraulic hammers and related 
reverberatory blown furnaces with trompes for forge welding and reheating. Here 
the iron and steel bars from Tavernole were worked together with the steel produced 
in Carcina and scrap metal. A workforce of 90 worked 10,000 hundredweights of 
iron and steel every year. In Villa Cogozzo, a short distance from Carcina town, 
there was a plant made up of two buildings with a workforce of 100. The smallest 
was equipped with 25 operating machines used for rifle barrel boring and turning. 
The largest, by contrast, was equipped with one of the first Martin-Siemens 
furnaces in Italy44 and three steam hammers one of which weighed 10 tons, built by 
Glisenti itself, and was capable of forging blocks weighing approximately 60 tons. 
This workshop was used for steel making with the partial used of scrap metal. Bar 
metals were produced here for the manufacturing of locomotives and carriage and 
locomotive axles for the Società delle Ferrovie dell’Alto Italia in addition to blocks 
of medium carbon steel for 120 mm canons for the Turin arsenal and 150 mm 
canons for the Navy. Lastly there was the most important of the plants, the Carcina 
plant referred to above, made up of three buildings used, respectively, for iron and 
steel production, mechanical construction and firearms manufacturing. The iron and 
steel building was equipped with two gas furnaces for carburized steel, a Siemens 
furnace with twelve crucibles assisted by four Sefström furnaces for the production 
                                                          
44 Designed in 1883 on plans by a French expert it began work in January of the following year, 
with four gasogenes, crane and reverberatory furnaces capable of producing 150 hundredweights of 
molten steel per day on a continuous cycle. 
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of molten cast steel without blow molding and for malleable cast iron fusion. There 
were also two foundries, one for malleable cast iron and the other for second fusion 
cast iron. With a 150 strong workforce the mechanical building workshop was fitted 
out for both machine manufacturing for third parties and the construction and 
maintenance of the company’s machinery. Lastly there was an armory factory 
which, whilst it had a 100 rifle a day capacity, made 4000 military and hunting 
weapons per year. Here barrel working was completed with rifling and screw 
tightening, the mechanism parts were made and all housing and assembling 
processes took place (Onger 2009, pp. 63-65). 
The case of FAPB is extremely interesting because it is an opportunity to 
highlight the extent to which the civilian arms market and local entrepreneurship 
played a complementary role to that of the state and military weaponry. It is true, 
as has been underlined on several occasions, that state contracts played a crucial 
role in reactivating a virtuous cycle within the local context. However, it is 
undeniable that the contract game tended to favor Piedmont and later the Terni 
arsenal45. Beretta certainly benefited from public contracts which emerged as of 
determinant importance for the growth of the firm but military production was 
accompanied right from the start by civilian contracts and, in particular, by arms 
for sports such as hunting, target shooting and skeet shooting (Onger and Paris 
2012). 
In the wake of Italian unification, FAPB set in motion an industrial 
concentration process in relation to its manufacturing activity in Gardone Val 
Trompia while at the same time maintaining its own control over a series of forges 
scattered throughout the valley. After having achieved a leading role in the local 
community of barrel manufacturers and traders in the first half of the 19th century, 
this historic family business began to concentrate in the Manenti forge all the 
various production phases to the extent of encompassing all finished firearm 
processes for both the military and hunting markets (Simoni 2010, pp. 55). The 
firm’s production grew from 300 pieces in 1850 to 7000 in the early 1880s. The 
forge referred to above had a workforce of one hundred and a further 80 workers in 
                                                          
45 Once again on this point we can recall the decision of subordinating Brescia to Terni in 1910. 
See: Aa. Vv., Memoriale in Difesa della R. Fabbrica di Brescia-Gardone, Apollonio, 1911 in 
ASCL, b. 171, f. 3. 
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its various scattered workshops. Around half its production was exported to 
European and non-European markets (above all the Levant and northern Africa) 
and achieved new levels of excellence in both quantitative and qualitative terms in 
around 1880 thanks to new workshops equipped with modern machinery in a single, 
around 1000 square meter building in the center of Gardone town (Morin and Held 
1980, p. 205; Bonetti 2004, p. 85). In other words, Giuseppe Antonio, the Beretta 
family member leading the company at the time, consolidated FAPB’s passage from 
craft workshop to industrial factory not by making innovative process or product 
contributions but by assimilating the period’s most avant-garde technology. It was 
precisely at this time, in fact, that the company invested in the ASM adopting 
specialized machine tools for mass production with interchangeable parts made by 
American Pratt & Whitney. Swimming against the tide of the generally negative 
reputation of Gardone armories which had taken root at the end of Venetian 
domination, FAPB opted for this system at more or less the same time as its main 
European competitors (Bohn and Jaikumar 2005, p. 54; Onger and Paris 2012, pp. 
36-39). 
To sum up, then, it might be said that the Beretta of the period considered here 
stood out for a far-sighted approach which took concrete form in two respects: on 
one hand its shrewd decision to ensure an alternative to military contracts with a 
marked focus on hunting shotguns, on the other the building of a factory of modern 
size and an organizational structure such as to exploit new economies of scale and 
potential diversification economies. The reasons for the diverse fates of the two 
sector leaders referred to above are in all likelihood to be traced to this far-
sightedness. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Glisenti encountered growing 
difficulties which did not enable it to survive the generational transfer from 
Francesco to his son Alfredo Glisenti. In the iron and steel sector it suffered in the 
general Lombard steel crisis from competition from Ligurian and Tuscan rivals and 
Società degli Alti Forni, Fonderie e Acciaierie di Terni. In the armory sector, it fell 
victim to the volatility of government contracts. For its part Beretta used the 
strategic choices illustrated to manage the generational transfer between Giuseppe 
Antonio and Pietro Beretta smoothly. It proved capable of managing and taking a 
leading role in the process separating the local iron and steel sector from the armory 
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industry and laid the foundations for a consolidated position in the decades to come 
as a full-blown national and international leader in the small arms sector (Onger 
2009, pp. 70-73; Roffia 1997). 
In the first decade of the 20th century, Beretta’s importance within district 
dynamics was increasingly growing on the social plane too. Pietro Beretta presented 
his company as an example as far as the management of local industrial relations 
was concerned, founded as it was on labor agreements between liberals and 
socialists shored up by Zanardelli-inspired paternalism. Furthermore, in response 
to Glisenti’s progressive decline, another Gardone firm referred to earlier, 
Bernardelli, came to the fore. As a matter of fact, while pursuing a growth in size 
through the concentration of work at a single location and a management strategy 
hinging on family relationships, Pietro Bernardelli stood out as primary exponent 
of Catholic associationalism presenting himself and his company as an alternative 
to the liberal world represented by the Beretta family (Del Barba 2008, pp. 53-66). 
An industrial census of 1910 underlined that the majority of private armory 
firms in the province were concentrated in Brescia, Gardone, Inzino and 
Lumezzane. All those based in the former two towns worked firearm and revolver 
parts for the two sections of the Fabbrica Erariale in addition to their own hunting 
weapon ranges. The Gardone and Brescia firms were larger on average than those 
of the Gobbia valley which worked principally for third parties and on cold weapons 
continuing for the most part to use outdated working and technological 





This study has retraced the key moments and events in the history of five of the 
most important industrial districts specializing in small arms making in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Its objective was to observe the run up to World War 
One in Birmingham, Liège, Saint-Étienne Eibar and Brescia-Gardone Val Trompia 
                                                          
46 See Appendix 8 (p. 267) for all the data and information of the census regarding the provincial 
gun making industry. 
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to facilitate comparison. To this end special attention has been paid to the role 
played by the public authorities, a crucial player in a sector as strategic as arms 
production, and the innovations ushered in by the second industrial revolution. In 
particular, this analysis was prompted by two already well-consolidated study 
currents in economic and science and technology history studies. The former has 
retraced the crucial role played by the US government in the dissemination of ASM 
in its arsenals and from there in the private sector while the latter has underlined the 
importance, its limited time frame notwithstanding, of the factory system in district-
based areas. 
Whilst generalization is complicated by the diverse institutional and economic 
contexts of the states of which these districts formed part, several similarities and 
differences between these case studies can be highlighted. A first fact which is well 
known but merits further emphasis is the general delay in introducing a 
manufacturing system based on component interchangeability and oriented to mass 
production as compared to the US. In all cases, moreover, a conflictual relationship 
between local system players and the central authorities emerges clearly. A marked 
desire to maintain their autonomy on the part of private producers is evident in 
relation to the state’s military requirements and monopolistic ambitions. 
This conflictual relationship notwithstanding, in the period observed the 
authorities continued to exert a significant influence on the transformations taking 
place in European small arms districts. Public intervention took various forms, both 
direct and specific external action. The former of these encompasses English 
investments in the Enfield arsenal, French investment in the Manufacture d’armes 
de Saint-Étienne and Italian attempts to re-open the two sections of the Fabbrica 
Erariale di Brescia e Gardone. Examples of specific external action, on the other 
hand, are the granting of a loan by the Belgian government for the purchase of 
avant-garde machinery but also technology and skill transfers from the public to the 
private spheres in England. 
In this way war ministries and governments played a role of some significance 
in the emergence of larger than average production units in these districts and, as 
had occurred in the United States, in introducing mass production techniques. 
Whilst in Enfield the Board of Ordnance decided to act as competitor to the private 
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producers with significant investments outside Birmingham, the decision served to 
prompt Warwickshire entrepreneurs both to join forces to found famous BSA and 
also to adopt a more co-operative approach to the central government. Whilst the 
Liège armories opted not to continue after their first FN contract with the Belgian 
government, the firm’s technological facilities attracted capital from L. Loewe and 
Co. which made it a standard bearer for the local manufacturing system and 
internationally. Whilst in France the modernization of manufacturing processes 
clashed at length with armorers’ resistance to change, the government’s well-
thought out strategy focusing on extremely large investments in the new Saint-
Étienne factory and progressive mechanization emulating Anglo-Saxon examples 
but seeking the co-operation of the country’s mechanical sector firms, succeeded in 
breaking through the obstacles it encountered in the first half of the nineteenth 
century on the road to the standardization of military arms. 
It was precisely thanks, or in response, to the state intervention referred to above 
that certain private sector firms whose size meant that they could capitalize on the 
challenges posed by the second industrial revolution emerged in the European small 
arms market. The private sector contribution was especially significant in the 
Brescia and Gardone Italian manufacturing center. Here, as we have seen, recent 
unification served to bring in military contracts and revitalize the entrepreneurship 
fabric but it was above all the private firms and their investment in the civilian 
firearms sector, and hunting in particular, which enabled the sector to compete with 
its northern European rivals. A case in point is FAPB which was emulated by other 
sector operators and emerged as district sector leader. 
In the light of this study’s reconstruction, it would seem to be possible to argue 
that Europe’s firearms production systems underwent a crucial transformation 
process in the second half of the 19th century which culminated in two important 
changes. First and foremost, a sort of dual trajectory emerged: on one hand 
traditional craft-type production systems persisted and continued to play a 
significant role in the production of hunting shotguns and, on the other, a more 
mechanized system developed which served above all to fulfil the military contract 
requirements of the various national governments. Secondly, the importance of the 
disseminated factory model inherited from the Early Modern period diminished. 
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Small workshops and forges did not disappear but rather specialized in high end 
civilian arms production or made parts for larger government factories capable of 
capitalizing on mechanization for both military and civilian production. In this way 
local small arms production systems also took part in the convergence process 
taking place in the structure of the armaments industries across Europe. Alongside 
state factories and arsenals which generally focused on supplying materials and 
technical testing, a network of private sector firms working mainly, but not 
exclusively for the military, was consolidated. Furthermore, specialized companies 
worked together with other firms making civilian arms for the most part but 
contributing, frequently significantly, to semi-worked or highly specialized goods 
supplies such as, for example, artillery components and chemical mixtures for 
gunpowder (Segreto 1997, p. 23).   
Of the districts analyzed the only one in which the state was completely absent 
was the Spanish district. In Eibar, an area considered delicate from a geo-political 
perspective, the government decided to withdraw and invest elsewhere. The 
response of the district, after frequent complaints, was to focus on its traditional 
strengths: small size, flexibility and production specialization. In so doing, 
however, whilst it did specialize in making pistols and revolvers better suited to 
standardization, this Basque town did not succeed in the production process 
modernization which other districts had successfully completed. Quite the contrary. 
Its local producers were obliged to fall back on a strategy which focused on low 







The Italian Production of Civilian Firearms (1920-2009) 




• Pagani, M. and Camarlinghi, C. (2010), Cento Anni di Prove. One Hundred 
Years of Proofing, Banco Nazionale di Prova per le Armi da Fuoco Portatili e 
per le Munizioni Commerciali, Gardone Val Trompia. 
• Bernardelli, C. (1990), Gardone Valtrompia e le sue Armi. Un po’ di Storia sul 
Banco di Prova e i suoi Fabbricanti d’Armi. 
• Bontempi, G. (1970), Aspetti Aziendali dell'Industria Armiera nel Bresciano, 
Università degli Studi di Padova. Facoltà di Economia e Commercio. Sezione 




1. For the period 1950-1964 the data concerning over-under, side-by-side and 
semiautomatic shotguns in Pagani and Camarlinghi (2010) and Bernardelli 
(1990) were integrated with data from Bontempi (1970). 
2. The category “Other single shotguns” includes rifles, carbines and floberts. 
3. The category “Muzzle loading rifle replicas” includes single or double barrel 
pistols. 






































1920 - - 1,734 - - - - 19 1,753 3,573 - - 3,573 5,326 - 
1921 - - 14,730 - - - - 234 14,964 19,441 - - 19,441 34,405 - 
1922 - - 20,432 - - - - 1,803 22,235 4,843 - - 4,843 27,078 - 
1923 - - 23,411 - - - - 4,857 28,268 12,658 - - 12,658 40,926 - 
1924 - - 21,006 - - - - 6,142 27,148 19,031 - - 19,031 46,179 - 
1925 - - 40,266 - - - - 12,784 53,050 18,585 - - 18,585 71,635 - 
1926 - - 33,897 - - - - 11,438 45,335 23,976 - - 23,976 69,311 - 
1927 - - 20,545 - - - - 9,117 29,662 6,368 - - 6,368 36,030 - 
1928 - - 16,261 - - - - 8,104 24,365 7,602 - - 7,602 31,967 - 
1929 - - 20,322 - - - - 6,877 27,199 8,326 - - 8,326 35,525 - 
1930 - - 10,861 - - - - 4,197 15,058 8,691 - - 8,691 23,749 - 
1931 - - 9,902 - - - - 2,339 12,241 6,708 - - 6,708 18,949 - 
1932 - - 6,571 - - - - 1,822 8,393 6,339 - - 6,339 14,732 - 
1933 - - 5,346 - - - - 2,207 7,553 6,898 - - 6,898 14,451 - 
1934 - - 5,601 - - - - 2,126 7,727 5,176 - - 5,176 12,903 - 
1935 - - 4,632 - - - - 855 5,487 639 - - 639 6,126 - 
1936 - - 4,478 - - - - 903 5,381 4,874 - - 4,874 10,255 - 
1937 - - 8,087 - - - - 2,875 10,962 11,656 - - 11,656 22,618 - 
1938 - - 13,447 - - - - 4,055 17,502 10,154 - - 10,154 27,656 - 
1939 - - 13,353 - - - - 3,803 17,156 11,708 - - 11,708 28,864 - 
1940 - - 9,716 - - - - 1,507 11,223 26,945 - - 26,945 38,168 - 
1941 - - 7,741 - - - - 1,378 9,119 28,616 - - 28,616 37,735 - 
1942 - - 6,855 - - - - 1,619 8,474 20,993 - - 20,993 29,467 - 
1943 - - 4,850 - - - - 1,063 5,913 10,643 - - 10,643 16,556 - 
1944 - - 1,313 - - - - 187 1,500 
 
- - - 1,500 - 
1945 - - 4,704 - - - - 1,069 5,773 288 - - 288 6,061 - 
1946 - - 19,287 - - - - 8,704 27,991 15,573 - - 15,573 43,564 - 
1947 - - 31,156 - - - - 14,457 45,613 30,191 - - 30,191 75,804 - 
1948 - - 32,088 - - - - 15,364 47,452 28,814 - - 28,814 76,266 - 
1949 - - 42,142 - - - - 21,060 63,202 29,038 - - 29,038 92,240 - 
1950 2,198 41,215 43,413 - - 1,775 - 19,786 63,199 33,897 - - 33,897 97,096 - 
1951 2,198 54,084 56,282 - - 4,124 - 20,861 77,143 58,150 - - 58,150 135,293 - 






































1953 1,833 60,936 62,769 - - 5,462 - 36,618 99,387 88,446 - - 88,446 187,833 - 
1954 1,957 66,724 68,681 - - 7,563 - 34,458 103,139 54,918 - - 54,918 158,057 - 
1955 5,869 53,796 59,665 - - 9,717 - 38,957 98,622 63,250 - - 63,250 161,872 - 
1956 2,876 52,672 55,548 - - 10,636 - 40,308 95,856 89,918 - - 89,918 185,774 - 
1957 6,902 42,352 49,254 - - 18,974 - 43,298 92,552 92,297 - - 92,297 184,849 - 
1958 11,952 44,220 56,172 - - 19,871 - 57,411 113,583 86,977 - - 86,977 200,560 - 
1959 19,439 56,616 76,055 - - 23,261 - 69,947 146,002 104,351 - - 104,351 250,353 - 
1960 27,230 68,019 95,249 - - 34,865 - 92,463 187,712 11,223 - - 11,223 198,935 - 
1961 32,803 69,031 101,834 - - 21,452 - 81,098 182,932 80,250 - - 80,250 263,182 12,234 
1962 41,449 59,815 101,264 - - 34,562 - 78,686 179,950 62,474 - - 62,474 242,424 22,786 
1963 49,298 56,167 105,465 40,103 49,241 - 89,344 194,809 74,412 - - 74,412 269,221 35,211 
1964 49,552 62,269 111,821 51,095 63,257 - 114,352 226,173 65,287 - - 65,287 291,460 35,161 
1965 69,927 65,578 135,505 63,718 67,020 - 130,738 266,243 97,003 - - 97,003 363,246 46,596 
1966 72,375 59,243 131,618 60,182 67,699 - 127,881 259,499 122,459 12,000 - 134,459 393,958 44,133 
1967 98,352 57,324 155,676 47,663 16,135 74,712 1,000 139,510 295,186 185,351 44,954 - 230,305 525,491 44,954 
1968 124,440 46,572 171,012 30,782 42,198 76,242 6,000 155,222 326,234 232,703 22,000 - 254,703 580,937 55,204 
1969 105,359 32,838 138,197 26,739 33,965 77,478 6,000 144,182 282,379 94,601 57,000 - 151,601 433,980 80,356 
1970 108,114 29,586 137,700 34,592 36,669 90,726 26,000 187,987 325,687 76,297 90,000 - 166,297 491,984 118,680 
1971 102,929 28,094 131,023 35,628 26,496 119,400 16,262 197,786 328,809 68,049 79,000 - 147,049 475,858 115,024 
1972 118,520 25,823 144,343 33,100 27,504 129,275 20,473 210,352 354,695 77,898 89,000 - 166,898 521,593 129,577 
1973 133,319 23,009 156,328 33,943 30,427 137,522 30,631 232,523 388,851 67,654 92,981 - 160,635 549,486 38,471 
1974 160,018 23,961 183,979 35,982 37,647 147,831 35,504 256,964 440,943 85,143 109,664 - 194,807 635,750 68,119 
1975 157,653 25,947 183,600 39,976 36,497 144,569 36,693 257,735 441,335 99,733 126,131 - 225,864 667,199 89,683 
1976 142,790 32,392 175,182 41,684 29,057 152,383 51,312 274,436 449,618 109,342 126,688 - 236,030 685,648 74,189 
1977 144,345 32,179 176,524 51,083 39,030 146,468 62,339 298,920 475,444 128,878 135,387 - 264,265 739,709 79,573 
1978 129,285 29,000 158,285 48,544 45,169 108,768 59,959 262,440 420,725 184,860 139,391 - 324,251 744,976 81,240 
1979 129,806 29,950 159,756 51,513 49,014 72,749 51,742 225,018 384,774 205,252 122,518 - 327,770 712,544 89,052 
1980 143,049 22,697 165,746 50,763 54,281 83,358 50,754 239,156 404,902 160,612 132,873 - 293,485 698,387 104,588 
1981 126,640 31,019 157,659 52,133 40,527 119,860 38,632 251,152 408,811 160,227 102,534 - 262,761 671,572 102,797 
1982 131,791 33,005 164,796 63,827 50,865 175,317 19,608 309,617 474,413 183,187 59,662 54,790 297,639 772,052 10,544 
1983 131,250 22,454 153,704 72,277 50,167 163,180 19,079 304,703 458,407 71,214 60,506 33,729 165,449 623,856 91,260 
1984 138,650 24,630 163,280 66,765 35,479 115,557 32,876 250,677 413,957 54,974 63,443 48,565 166,982 580,939 128,603 






































1986 120,299 21,403 141,702 60,822 39,072 123,400 38,459 261,753 403,455 88,174 56,785 32,559 177,518 580,973 111,985 
1987 100,156 17,721 117,877 63,021 31,072 126,635 27,464 248,192 366,069 100,570 48,973 38,367 187,910 553,979 118,638 
1988 96,180 14,686 110,866 32,744 27,663 104,471 25,078 189,956 300,822 109,292 46,145 43,637 199,074 499,896 153,353 
1989 104,925 15,072 119,997 16,103 29,475 114,453 30,941 190,972 310,969 171,419 44,226 13,942 229,587 540,556 145,715 
1990 117,233 17,676 134,909 15,264 28,390 107,518 29,715 180,887 315,796 139,911 46,590 19,264 205,765 521,561 131,002 
1991 116,707 22,059 138,766 17,355 40,422 125,083 35,722 218,582 357,348 113,315 58,146 19,908 191,369 548,717 138,428 
1992 89,547 13,733 103,280 9,466 32,139 108,893 34,990 185,488 288,768 138,802 68,437 26,601 233,840 522,608 157,524 
1993 88,451 10,547 98,998 10,872 27,310 134,357 32,753 205,292 304,290 102,291 64,076 30,730 197,097 501,387 392,588 
1994 97,640 12,488 110,128 11,891 25,322 150,597 43,138 230,948 341,076 141,297 85,040 28,457 254,794 595,870 300,121 
1995 98,364 13,312 111,676 11,535 27,180 158,096 43,938 240,749 352,425 145,171 102,257 26,900 274,328 626,753 196,089 
1996 104,306 13,579 117,885 12,509 28,616 163,046 46,931 251,102 368,987 143,651 69,180 24,080 236,911 605,898 308,522 
1997 112,629 13,434 126,063 10,568 26,622 150,400 24,309 211,899 337,962 85,510 46,789 17,529 149,828 487,790 212,752 
1998 94,063 11,934 105,997 12,325 23,446 147,697 35,102 218,570 324,567 94,217 43,267 12,785 150,269 474,836 119,917 
1999 83,775 10,404 94,179 8,279 23,884 178,287 30,097 240,547 334,726 82,069 42,587 13,447 138,103 472,829 108,120 
2000 94,661 4,650 99,311 8,060 32,114 228,197 34,611 302,982 402,293 69,304 47,156 15,259 131,719 534,012 110,633 
2001 106,929 5,269 112,198 6,776 28,204 250,135 36,712 321,827 434,025 102,456 55,422 20,024 177,902 611,927 113,774 
2002 125,145 6,163 131,308 9,731 30,263 228,176 33,204 301,374 432,682 115,044 54,808 26,618 196,470 629,152 107,171 
2003 118,265 5,791 124,056 8,412 52,255 256,084 27,411 344,162 468,218 89,939 43,366 22,198 155,503 623,721 96,442 
2004 113,103 5,486 118,589 5,783 64,490 239,581 26,061 335,915 454,504 118,707 40,299 28,108 187,114 641,618 94,071 
2005 114,507 5,573 120,080 5,821 46,191 233,565 23,300 308,877 428,957 85,483 37,935 26,262 149,680 578,637 81,395 
2006 111,715 5,208 116,923 4,607 44,783 213,567 19,858 282,815 399,738 96,436 32,620 30,223 159,279 559,017 100,378 
2007 113,854 5,658 119,512 5,208 54,475 244,251 22,061 325,995 445,507 137,006 32,498 31,273 200,777 646,284 104,642 
2008 99,013 4,751 103,764 4,089 48,759 224,700 16,743 294,291 398,055 163,438 32,503 28,064 224,005 622,060 102,959 





































































































































































































































Proofed O/Us and S/Ss (1939-1991)




































































































































































































































Proofed single and semiautomatic shotguns and replicas (1939-1991)
Single shotguns Others single shotguns (included rifles, carbines and floberts)
Semiautomatic shotguns and pump-action guns Muzzle loading rifles replicas (included single or double barrel pistols)

































































































































































































































Proofed pistols and revolvers (1939-1991)



































































































































































































































Proofed long guns and handguns (1939-1991)





Workforce in the Firearms Industry 
(Province of Brescia, 1951-1981) 




• Industry and services census by Istat, 1951. 
• Industry and services census by Istat, 1961. 
• Industry and services census by Istat, 1971. 
• Industry and services census by Istat, 1981. 
• Archivio Storico della Camera di Commercio di Brescia, Carteggio 1943-1963 
– Categorie XXII-XXXII, boxes 867-868, 902-911, 913-914, 919, 928, 934, 
938, 940, 944, 947, 949, 954-955, 958-959, 963, 969, 973, 980, 989. 
 
N.B.: 
This appendix includes a database with data regarding the workforce and firms in 
the firearms industry, as well as the manufacturing and mechanical engineering 
sectors in the province of Brescia. The data were employed to calculate the indices 
of geographical concentration and production specialization in firearms 
manufacturing for each municipality in the province. 
The geographical concentration index provides information about the percentage 
and relative importance of each municipality on the regional workforce1 in the 
sector. This is obtained by dividing the number of the employed workforce in the 
gun industry in a given municipality by the number of the employed workforce in 
the same industry in the entire region. 
                                                          
1 In this case the broader region chosen corresponds to the provincial territory since most or a 
large share (depending on the year) of the national firearms industry workforce is located there as 
can be inferred by comparing provincial and national data. 
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The production specialization index shows the degree of specialization of a given 
area with respect to an industry that has significant relevance in the economic 
activities of the same area. In other words, it is possible to identify areas 
characterized by the prevalence of a specific type of production. This index (IPS) 
is calculated as follows: 










Where: 𝐴𝑖𝑗= number of employees in the i-th municipality in the j-th sector; 𝐴𝑖𝑣= 
number of employees in the i-th municipality in the manufacturing industry; 𝐴𝑣𝑗= 
number of employees in the region in the j-th sector; 𝐴∞= number of employees in 
the region in the manufacturing sector. 
Given the nature of its structure, the index has a lower bound equal to zero, but no 
upper bound. Despite some distortions, this index represents a simple method for 
the analysis of the sectorial specialization of a given territory compared to the 
average of the much wider area around it. A value of over 1 indicates specialization 
in the sector in question. In order to obtain more comparability for the data they are 
normalized by creating a range of values between -1 and +1 as follows: 




Data regarding manufacturing and the mechanical engineering sectors were taken 
from official statistics. Those for the firearms industry were found in the archives 
for the years 1951 and 1961 and taken from official statistics for 1971 and 1981. 
For 1951 summarizing tables of the census were available, for 1961 it was necessary 
to go through all the questionnaires filled in by each firm of all the municipalities 
in the province. For the first two censuses (1951, 1961) original documents had to 
be used because the official statistics produced by Istat do not provide such refined 
data. 
Two charts regarding the local units and the workforce employed in the firearms 
industry of three central Val Trompia municipalities (Gardone Val Trompia, 




Table 2.1 - Indices of Concentration and Specialization of the gun industry in the municipalities in the province of Brescia in 1951. Source: data processed by the author 
Municipalities 
Workers per sector Indices on a regional basis Gun making 












Gardone V.T. 3,057 2,501 2,254 68.93% 0.90 73.73% 90.12% 92 
Brescia 2,3738 12,639 934 28.56% 0.01 3.93% 7.39% 33 
Sulzano 105 30 26 0.80% 0.73 24.76% 86.67% 1 
Lumezzane 3,770 3,021 25 0.76% -0.70 0.66% 0.83% 4 
Collebeato 39 16 14 0.43% 0.81 35.90% 87.50% 2 
Sarezzo 701 125 4 0.12% -0.74 0.57% 3.20% 3 
Angolo 20 2 2 0.06% 0.45 10.00% 100.00% 1 
Marcheno 60 5 2 0.06% -0.07 3.33% 40.00% 1 
Nave 620 81 2 0.06% -0.84 0.32% 2.47% 2 
Ospitaletto 1,547 26 2 0.06% -0.93 0.13% 7.69% 1 
Villa Carcina 3,038 670 2 0.06% -0.97 0.07% 0.30% 1 
Castenedolo 128 22 1 0.03% -0.66 0.78% 4.55% 1 
Manerbio 2,148 59 1 0.03% -0.98 0.05% 1.69% 1 
Rezzato 1,297 207 1 0.03% -0.96 0.08% 0.48% 1 
BS (province) 85,349 25,790 3,270 100.00% 0.00 3.83% 12.68% 144 




Table 2.2 - Indices of Concentration and Specialization of the gun industry in the municipalities in the province of Brescia in 1961. Source: data processed by the author 
Municipalities 
Workers per sector Indices on a regional basis Gun making 













Gardone V.T. 3,941 3,033 2,477 57.43% 0.89 62.85% 81.67% 143 
Brescia 37,730 22,240 1,483 34.38% 0.01 3.93% 6.67% 38 
Ghedi 549 164 115 2.67% 0.69 20.95% 70.12% 1 
Lumezzane 7,154 6,051 75 1.74% -0.57 1.05% 1.24% 7 
Collebeato 283 188 58 1.34% 0.69 20.49% 30.85% 1 
Sarezzo 1,073 505 54 1.25% 0.14 5.03% 10.69% 15 
Marcheno 225 170 29 0.67% 0.56 12.89% 17.06% 10 
Manerbio 2,759 169 8 0.19% -0.86 0.29% 4.73% 3 
Castenedolo 200 34 4 0.09% -0.31 2.00% 11.76% 1 
Nuvolera 149 11 2 0.05% -0.48 1.34% 18.18% 1 
Pezzaze 31 9 2 0.05% 0.26 6.45% 0.00% 1 
Prevalle 286 215 2 0.05% -0.69 0.70% 0.93% 1 
Bovezzo 146 99 1 0.02% -0.70 0.68% 0.00% 1 
Concesio 686 189 1 0.02% -0.93 0.15% 0.53% 1 
Erbusco 338 59 1 0.02% -0.86 0.30% 1.69% 1 
Mazzano 257 98 1 0.02% -0.82 0.39% 1.02% 1 
BS 112,621 47,132 4,313 100,00% 0.00 3.83% 9.15% 226 





Table 2.3 - Indices of Concentration and Specialization of the gun industry in the municipalities in the province of Brescia in 1971. Source: data processed by the author 
Municipalities 
Workers per sector Indices on a regional basis Gun making 













Gardone V.T. 4,244 3,350 2,535 52.2% 0.90 59.7% 75.7% 107 
Brescia 41,114 23,948 1,698 35.0% 0.11 4.1% 7.1% 22 
Sarezzo 1,996 1,448 203 4.2% 0.51 10.2% 14.0% 10 
Marcheno 557 302 156 3.2% 0.79 28.0% 51.7% 16 
San Paolo 398 63 47 1.0% 0.56 11.8% 74.6% 1 
Calcinato 1,774 489 40 0.8% -0.19 2.3% 8.2% 1 
Collebeato 641 559 33 0.7% 0.22 5.1% 5.9% 2 
Lumezzane 8,220 6,843 33 0.7% -0.78 0.4% 0.5% 5 
Rezzato 2,759 843 19 0.4% -0.65 0.7% 2.3% 1 
Concesio 1,325 623 15 0.3% -0.49 1.1% 2.4% 2 
Gussago 1,393 568 15 0.3% -0.51 1.1% 2.6% 1 
Manerbio 2,462 448 14 0.3% -0.71 0.6% 3.1% 2 
Lodrino 77 67 13 0.3% 0.67 16.9% 19.4% 6 
Bovegno 106 26 9 0.2% 0.44 8.5% 34.6% 1 
Tavernole s/M. 144 55 8 0.2% 0.26 5.6% 14.5% 4 
Prevalle 579 405 4 0.1% -0.65 0.7% 1.0% 2 
Gottolengo 723 155 3 0.1% -0.78 0.4% 1.9% 1 
Castenedolo 1,139 367 2 0.04% -0.90 0.2% 0.5% 2 
Polaveno 30 18 1 0.02% 0.01 3.3% 5.6% 1 
Nuvolera 147 21 1 0.02% -0.66 0.7% 4.8% 1 
Mazzano 543 231 1 0.02% -0.89 0.2% 0.4% 1 
Iseo 596 190 1 0.02% -0.90 0.2% 0.5% 1 
Nave 2,248 344 1 0.02% -0.97 0.04% 0.3% 1 
Villa Carcina 2,371 1,013 1 0.02% -0.97 0.04% 0.1% 1 
BS 147,182 65,068 4,853 100.00% 0.00 3.3% 7.5% 192 
Italy 5,308,587 2,904,059 9,504 - - 0.1% 0.3% 296 
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Table 2.4 - Indices of Concentration and Specialization of the gun industry in the municipalities in the province of Brescia in 1981. Source: data processed by the author 
Municipalities 
Workers per sector Indices on a regional basis Gun making 













Gardone V.T. 4,433 3,517 2,408 45.2% 0.90 54.3% 68.5% 138 
Brescia 38,164 23,419 1,952 36.6% 0.27 5.1% 8.3% 26 
Marcheno 1,000 754 249 4.7% 0.79 24.9% 33.0% 31 
Sarezzo 3,192 2,463 237 4.4% 0.44 7.4% 9.6% 27 
Cologne 1,960 1,121 84 1.6% 0.19 4.3% 7.5% 2 
Gussago 1,985 1,147 48 0.9% -0.09 2.4% 4.2% 4 
San Paolo 768 94 31 0.6% 0.16 4.0% 33.0% 1 
Lodrino 213 182 26 0.5% 0.61 12.2% 14.3% 13 
Collio 93 81 22 0.4% 0.78 23.7% 27.2% 2 
Manerbio 2,665 763 21 0.4% -0.57 0.8% 2.8% 3 
Caino 241 32 20 0.4% 0.48 8.3% 62.5% 2 
Concesio 1,757 1,098 20 0.4% -0.44 1.1% 1.8% 4 
Calcinato 2,495 1,209 20 0.4% -0.57 0.8% 1.7% 2 
Tavernole s/M. 288 153 19 0.4% 0.39 6.6% 12.4% 7 
Collebeato 586 410 19 0.4% 0.05 3.2% 4.6% 1 
Lumezzane 9,202 8,570 19 0.4% -0.87 0.2% 0.2% 6 
Desenzano d/G. 2,106 1,318 18 0.3% -0.55 0.9% 1.4% 1 
Montichiari 2,367 965 13 0.2% -0.68 0.5% 1.3% 1 
Villa Carcina 2,352 1,435 12 0.2% -0.70 0.5% 0.8% 4 
Polaveno 226 177 9 0.2% 0.16 4.0% 5.1% 3 
Pezzazze 100 73 7 0.1% 0.41 7.0% 9.6% 2 
Roè Volciano 700 215 6 0.1% -0.55 0.9% 2.8% 1 
Vestone 1,170 795 6 0.1% -0.70 0.5% 0.8% 1 
Lonato 1,893 624 5 0.1% -0.83 0.3% 0.8% 1 
Marmentino 35 34 4 0.1% 0.59 11.4% 11.8% 3 
Bovegno 64 45 4 0.1% 0.36 6.3% 8.9% 3 
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Continues from the previous page 
Municipalities 
Workers per sector Indices on a regional basis Gun making 













Ceto 517 78 4 0.1% -0.58 0.8% 5.1% 1 
Nuvolera 423 116 4 0.1% -0.51 0.9% 3.4% 2 
San Zeno N. 744 225 4 0.1% -0.69 0.5% 1.8% 1 
Mairano 200 103 3 0.1% -0.32 1.5% 2.9% 2 
Marone 375 127 3 0.1% -0.57 0.8% 2.4% 2 
Iseo 696 222 3 0.1% -0.74 0.4% 1.4% 1 
Travagliato 920 366 3 0.1% -0.80 0.3% 0.8% 2 
Flero 1,239 874 3 0.1% -0.85 0.2% 0.3% 1 
Vallio Terme 125 44 2 0.04% -0.29 1.6% 4.5% 1 
Verolavecchia 430 135 2 0.04% -0.72 0.5% 1.5% 1 
Cellatica 568 364 2 0.04% -0.78 0.4% 0.5% 1 
Castel Mella 618 256 2 0.04% -0.80 0.3% 0.8% 1 
Prevalle 759 369 2 0.04% -0.83 0.3% 0.5% 1 
Gottolengo 891 346 2 0.04% -0.86 0.2% 0.6% 2 
Coccaglio 988 599 2 0.04% -0.87 0.2% 0.3% 1 
Roncadelle 1,479 723 2 0.04% -0.91 0.1% 0.3% 1 
Rezzato 2,669 1,155 2 0.04% -0.95 0.1% 0.2% 1 
Bovezzo 624 167 1 0.02% -0.90 0.2% 0.6% 1 
Mazzano 1,037 588 1 0.02% -0.94 0.1% 0.2% 1 
Rovato 2,414 1,374 1 0.02% -0.97 0.04% 0.1% 1 
Verolanuova 3,081 1,071 1 0.02% -0.98 0.03% 0.1% 1 
BS 182,985 92,713 5,328 100.0% 0.00 2.9% 5.7% 315 
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Firms of the Industrial District (Gardone-Marcheno-Sarezzo, 1961) 




• Archivio Storico della Camera di Commercio di Brescia, Carteggio 1943-1963 
– Categorie XXII-XXXI, boxes 947, 959 and 980. 
 
Notes: 
This appendix includes the database of firms in Gardone Val Trompia, Marcheno 
and Sarezzo active in the local gun industry.   
For each enterprise, the information included is as follows: 
• business name; 
• municipality where the firm is seated; 
• legal form; 
• year of foundation; 
• primary activity; 
• workforce; 
• participation of the owner in the production (continuous, occasional, absent); 
• order system (on customer order, with and without pre-order, without pre-
order); 
• level of mechanization (fully mechanized, partially mechanized, 
unmechanized); 
• production site (suitable premises, home); 
• participation of members of the owner’s family in the activities of the firm. 
Where no information is available it is specified by n.a. (not available). 
Several tables and charts to represent the data are included.
 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Ricetti Domenico e 
figlio 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1950 Burnishing and 
polishing 
8 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Mularoni Domenica Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Burnishing and 
polishing 
2 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Mazzoldi Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1955 Burnishing and 
polishing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Galvanicolor di Berardi 
Mario 
Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1930 Burnishing and 
polishing 
3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Belleri Elisabetta Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Engraving 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Bertasi Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Tempini Giulio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Lucimec Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship n.a. Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Guerini Stefano Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Revera Vasco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Facchini Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Camossi Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Engraving 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Morbini Zefferino Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 n.a. n.a. Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Belleri Giovan Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Engraving 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Gallia Bruno Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Partially 
mechanized 
Home No 
Marocchi Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Engraving 4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bertocchi Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Muffolini Rosina Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 n.a. n.a. Unmechanized Home No 
Fontana Angelo  Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Giudicati Mario Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Bravi Federico Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Engraving 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Tagliabue Claudio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Darini Davide Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Piotti Amore Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Turrini Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Romelli Firmo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Tolotti Giampietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Facchini Vincenzo  Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Gamba Arturo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Engraving 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Bonsi Matilde Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Engraving 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Mazzaroli Aldo Incisore Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1957 Engraving 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Soardi Rosa Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Tavana Antonio & C. Gardone V.T. Limited partnership 1958 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Poli Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Passeri Silvio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bonomi Giov. Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1942 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
8 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pederetti Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1954 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Partially 
mechanized 
Home No 
Cristinelli Domenico Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
6 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zadra Vittorio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1940 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pintossi Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1951 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zaboni Massimiliano Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Pini Santo - officina 
meccanica 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1942 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Zambonardi Aldo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Bentivoglio Paolo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Rapetti Cesare Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1924 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
10 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home Yes 
Martinelli Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1957 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Galliani Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Tanfoglio Ugo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous On customer order Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Soc. d. f. Ma-Zo di 
Mazzelli & Zoli 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1951 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Gardone V.T. Limited partnership 1957 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
26 Absent With and without 
pre-order 
Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
F.I.A.S. frat. Sabatti Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1961 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Gamba Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1948 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
9 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Novali Emanuele Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Fausti Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1956 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Bonomi Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1942 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Tanfoglio Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Moroni Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Speranza Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1936 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Ditta Casari Rinaldo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Lombardi Santo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Saleri Aquilino Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Ardesi Ernesto Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Marcheno De facto corporation 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
n.a. 
Bontempi Mario Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1960 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Occasional On customer order Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Berna Giuseppe Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Antonini Battista Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Guerini Giovanni Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 





Minini Ernesto Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Tanfoglio Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ghizzardi Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1956 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Marocchi Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Spezzapria Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ambrogi Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Aguzzi Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Botti Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous n.a. Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zoli Vafiro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Mino Arturo di Mino 
Andrea 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1926 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bolognini Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Manenti Franco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Tanfoglio Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1951 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Unmechanized Home No 
F.lli Di Maggio Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Ferlib di Ferraglio 
Libero 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pedersoli Davide Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
10 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Daffini Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1947 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







I.M.A.C. di Guerini 
Pietro 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
12 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Gasparini Bortolo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Unmechanized Home Yes 
Ghizzardi Silverio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship n.a. Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Pedretti Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1957 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Peli Cesare Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bonsi Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1951 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
4 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Calzoni Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Ditta Maffi Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1954 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Lancelotti Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1946 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Italarm di Arini Angelo 
Battista e Bertagna 
Pietro 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1951 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Ghitti Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Gregorelli Vittorio e C. Gardone V.T. Limited partnership 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Fabriani Ernesto Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Benetti Andrea Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1954 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Moretti Pierino Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pintossi Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Timpini Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Entrata Ivo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1956 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Marchi Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1942 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Unmechanized Home Yes 
Officina San Marco di 
Buffoli Angelo 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bolis M. Alberto Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Ditta Guerini Pintossi A. Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1947 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Unmechanized Home No 
Mutti Domenica Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
2 Occasional Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Zanotti Fabio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Belleri Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1946 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Rubagotti Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Unmechanized Home No 
Pintossi Pedretti Ongaro Gardone V.T. General partnership 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Zanardini Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1933 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





F.lli Tanfoglio fu 
Domenico 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1953 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Gnali Graziano Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1953 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Cotelli Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1920 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 








Armi di Salvinelli 
Enrico 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Castellani Bruno Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1954 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Guerini Maddalena Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Ambrogi Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Marocchi Stefano e figli Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1947 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
9 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Cucinotta Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Granini Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1957 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Boniotti Emilio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bernardelli Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1952 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bignotti Giovanni e 
figlio di Marco 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Armeria S. Giorgio di 
Pirlo Giuseppe 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Pelizzari Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Daffini Annibale Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home Yes 
Tavana Antonio & C. 
S.A.S. 
Gardone V.T. Limited partnership 1958 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Gottardi G. Battista e C. 
(Fabbrica Armi di 
Ardesi - Bentivoglio - 
Gottardi - Galliani) 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Uberti Francesco  Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bolognini Bruno Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Zoli Antonio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Spada Ciro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Gitti Umberto e C. Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1911 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Abbiatico Renato Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Pedersoli Pietro di 
Sabatti Teodora 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1957 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bernardelli Leonida Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1947 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





F.lli Sabatti di Sabatti 
Giovanni 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Spada G. Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1947 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Le Armerie Italiane dei 
frat. Gamba 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bertuzzi Nicola Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





M.A.V.I. di S. Salvinelli Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Zanoletti Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1954 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Angelo Zoli e figli Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1958 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
13 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Gamba Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Giovanelli Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Fratelli Piotti Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Cotelli Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Gitti Pierino Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Bragadini Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Giacomelli Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1951 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home Yes 
Sabatti Attilio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
4 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Zoli & Rizzini F.lli Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Sabatti Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
4 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Gitti Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1946 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Contessa Mario Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Caem Giulio Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1956 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Fausti Davide e F.lli Marcheno De facto corporation 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Fausti Giovanni e F.lli Marcheno General partnership 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Zubani  Marino e F.lli 
Armi 
Marcheno De facto corporation 1961 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Fausti Albano - 
armaiolo 
Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1960 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Varini Giuliano Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1953 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
3 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ditta O.S.C.A.R. di F.lli 
Belleri 
Sarezzo De facto corporation 1954 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Lancelotti Angelo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Guerini Pierino Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1945 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 





Belleri Antonio Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1949 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Amitalia di Lucchini 
Stefano 
Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1948 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 







Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Borghesi Girolamo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1955 Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
6 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Rizzini Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bonsi Giacomo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Losio Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Civini Bortolo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Mozzoni Davide Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Cristinelli Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Cristinelli Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Sabatti Pasquino Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Mensi Giovanni Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Lechi Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Sabatti Angelo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Sabatti Guido Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Sabatti Ettore Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Inletting 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Rizzinelli Giovanni Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1957 Inletting 3 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Belleri Ezelindo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1961 Inletting 1 Occasional On customer order Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Rota Luciano Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Inletting 2 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home Yes 
Belleri Matilde Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Checkering 1 Continuous n.a. n.a. Home No 
Revera Silvana Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Checkering 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Saleri Irma Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship n.a. Checkering 1 Continuous n.a. n.a. Home No 
Riviera Maddalena Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Checkering 1 Continuous n.a. n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Adorni Carolina Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship n.a. Checkering 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Omodei Anna Maria Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Checkering 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Setti Annunciata Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Checkering 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pedretti Rosa Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Checkering 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Bonomi Silvana Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Checkering 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Gatta Pierina Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Checkering 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
FIAP - Fabbrica Italiana 
Attrezzi Parrucchiere 











FAMA di Gardoncini 
Teresa 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
2 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Defendini Gardone V.T. General partnership 1961 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Livmar Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Pasinelli Andrea Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1957 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zubani e Belleri Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zanetti Giuseppe Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Coccoli Mario Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bertarini Domenico Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
4 n.a. n.a. n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Temponi Silvio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1961 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





MIVAL Gardone V.T. Joint stock company 1948 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





Marianini Alessio Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1954 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Giacomelli e Faustinoni Sarezzo De facto corporation 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
D'Anna Armando Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
1 Continuous On customer order Partially 
mechanized 
Home No 
Reboni Carlo Sarezzo General partnership 1947 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Sanzogni Battista e figli 
snc 
Sarezzo General partnership 1952 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





Corti Giuseppe Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1958 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
5 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 









Pasotti Angelo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1960 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





Montini Angelo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1949 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
10 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Dabrazzi & Bettezza Sarezzo De facto corporation 1959 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Guerini e Bertoli Sarezzo De facto corporation 1958 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
7 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Guali Marino Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1958 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bertoli F.lli Sarezzo De facto corporation 1961 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





Cinelli Dante Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1961 Mechanical 
manufacturing 





Facoletti F.lli Sarezzo De facto corporation 1958 Mechanical 
manufacturing 
4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Zanetti Stefano Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1956 Mechanical 
manufacturing 




Zanagnolo & Botti 
Sarezzo De facto corporation 1957 Mechanical 
manufacturing 




OMUC di Ugolini 
Cotelli 
Sarezzo De facto corporation 1959 Mechanical 
manufacturing 














Gardone V.T. Joint stock company 1936 Production of 
firearms 







S.p.A. P. Beretta Gardone V.T. Joint stock company 1680 Production of 
firearms 







Brignoli Silvio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Rizzini Guido Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Pedrazzini Eugenio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1950 Repairing and 
assembling 
3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ermete Varischi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1930 Repairing and 
assembling 







Vezzola Walter Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Telò Renato Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 
2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Bettoni Luigi Giacomo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Rampini Luigi Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 





Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Guerini Franco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Zanardini Giuseppe 
Luigi 
Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Home No 
Peli Battista Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Rizzini Aurelio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 
1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Contessa Guido Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Repairing and 
assembling 





Zatti Pietro Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship n.a. Smoothing 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Artigiana Pulitori di 
Tiboni & Peli 
Gardone V.T. De facto corporation 1959 Smoothing 4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Firmo Franco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Smoothing 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Arini Eugenio Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Smoothing 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ditta Artigiana Ardesi 
Giuseppe 





Marcheno Sole proprietorship 1955 Smoothing 2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Ravarini Mario Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Smoothing 1 Occasional On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Bombesi Pietro Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1955 Smoothing 4 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Ghidini Angelo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1961 Smoothing 2 Continuous On customer order Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 

















Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1958 Stock polishing 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Maboni Santa Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1960 Stock polishing 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Lancelotti Giacomo Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1959 Stock polishing 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Home No 
Tiboni Francesco Gardone V.T. Sole proprietorship 1924 Woodworking 2 Continuous Without pre-order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Firms Municipality Legal form Year of 
foundation 
Primary activity Workforce Participation of 
the owner in the 
production 
Orders Mechanization Production 
site 
Family 
Fracassi Giovanni Marcheno Sole propretorship 1945 Woodworking 6 Continuous n.a. Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Ceresoli Francesco Marcheno Sole propretorship 1961 Woodworking 1 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 
Almici Bortolo Marcheno Sole propretorship 1946 Woodworking 1 Continuous On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
No 










Guarneri Ernesto Marcheno Sole propretorship 1936 Woodworking 2 Absent On customer order n.a. Suitable 
premises 
Yes 
Pintossi Raffaele Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1959 Woodworking 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Faleghi Giuseppe Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1961 Woodworking 1 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Benini Francesco Sarezzo Sole proprietorship n.a. Woodworking 3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 





Bonera Angelo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1923 Woodworking 3 Continuous With and without 
pre-order 
Fully mechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Cinelli Giacomo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1954 Woodworking 2 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
No 
Taghetti Giacomo Sarezzo Sole proprietorship 1950 Woodworking 3 Continuous On customer order Unmechanized Suitable 
premises 
Yes 






Type of activity Firms Workforce Production site Presence of relatives in the firm 
Suitable 
premises 
Home Yes No n.a. 
Civilian firearms manufacturing 101 593 91 10 33 67 0 
Firearms production 2 1777 2 0 2 0 0 
Firearm parts manufacturing 38 197 33 5 9 28 1 
Repairing and assembling 13 25 7 6 2 11 0 
Burnishing and polishing 4 18 4 0 3 1 0 
Engraving 28 31 9 19 1 27 0 
Inletting 16 19 4 12 1 15 0 
Checkering 10 10 4 6 0 10 0 
Smoothing 9 24 9 0 2 6 1 
Stocks manufacturing 6 11 3 3 2 4 0 
Mechanical engineering 30 365 28 2 2 28 0 
Woodworking 15 38 15 0 3 12 0 
Total 272 3108 209 63 61 209 2 




Type of activity Mechanization of the 
productive process 
Orders Participation of the owner in the 
production 










n.a. Continuous Occasional Absent n.a. 
Civilian firearms 
manufacturing 
79 18 4 28 68 4 1 87 11 3 0 
Firearms 
production 
0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Firearm parts 
manufacturing 
30 6 2 25 10 2 1 27 9 1 1 
Repairing and 
assembling 
9 2 2 9 2 0 2 10 1 0 2 
Burnishing and 
polishing 
4 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
Engraving 24 1 3 23 0 0 5 20 3 0 5 
Inletting 14 1 1 16 0 0 0 14 2 0 0 
Checkering 6 0 4 6 0 0 4 7 2 0 1 
Smoothing 6 1 2 8 0 0 1 7 1 0 1 
Stocks 
manufacturing 
4 2 0 4 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 
Mechanical 
engineering 
23 6 1 24 5 0 1 26 1 2 1 
Woodworking 8 4 3 11 2 1 1 13 1 1 0 
Total 207 43 22 158 91 7 16 218 34 9 11 
Table 3.2 - Source: data processed by the author 
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Type of activity Firms per size class 
1 2-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-50 51-100 101-200 201-300 301-500 501-1000 1001-1500 Total 
Civilian firearms mfg. 32 38 22 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 101 
Firearms production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Firearm parts manufacturing 12 13 10 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 
Repairing and assembling 9 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Burning and polishing 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Engraving 27 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
Inletting 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 
Checkering 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Smoothing 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Stocks manufacturing 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Mechanical engineering 4 17 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 30 
Woodworking 5 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Total 120 94 40 7 6 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 272 




Type of activity Workforce per size class 
1 2-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-50 51-100 101-200 201-300 301-500 501-1000 1001-1500 Total 
Civilian firearms mfg. 32 125 177 65 73 49 72 0 0 0 0 0 593 
Firearms production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 379 0 1398 1777 
Firearm parts manufacturing 12 38 78 0 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 197 
Repairing and assembling 9 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Burning and polishing 0 10 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
Engraving 27 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
Inletting 14 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Checkering 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Smoothing 3 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Stocks manufacturing 4 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Mechanical engineering 4 57 38 53 0 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 365 
Woodworking 5 27 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 
Total 120 302 315 118 142 49 72 0 213 379 0 1398 3108 































































































































PRESENCE OF RELATIVES IN THE FIRMS





































































FIRMS PER TYPE OF ORDER SYSTEM










FIRMS PER TYPE OF PARTICIPATION








Data and Information regarding the Capacities of Plants: 




• Archivio Storico della Camera di Commercio di Brescia, Carteggio 1943-1963 
– Categorie X-XXI, box 261, files 4 and 5. 
 
N.B.: 
This appendix includes ten questionnaires collected in 1952. The subject of the 
survey was the capacity of the largest firearms and ammunition plants in the 
province of Brescia. The questionnaires were filled in by the Brescia Chamber of 
Commerce in collaboration with the local industrial association (Associazione 
Industriale Bresciana) at the request of the Italian Ministry of Defense. The main 
aspects investigated were: products, size of the plant, power sources, energy supply, 
raw materials, labor force. 
Since the appendix contains the transcription of an original source, the original 
language (Italian) was maintained.
196 
 
1 luglio 1952 
On. MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA 
Ufficio Centrale Approvvigionamenti     
e Produzioni Militari 
Raccomandata 
Riservata         = ROMA = 
 R.491  2       37 19.4.1952 
          44 30.4.1952 
  Fabbriche d’armi      56   6.5.1952 
          77   8.5.1952 
          85 12.5.1952 
Alleg. 10 
 
Con la presente nota si ha il pregio di riscontrare le richieste di codesto On. Ministero di cui 
alle note successivamente pervenute alla scrivente ed indicate a riferimento. 
I dati e le notizie che interessano sono stati raccolti da questa camera con la collaborazione 
riservata della locale Associazione Industriale che solo ora ha fornito gli elementi necessari per dare 
risposta alle richieste anzidette. 
Dall’elenco delle aziende, indicato in un primo tempo, abbiamo raccolto le notizie solo delle 
Ditte maggiori, ripotate in allegato: per le altre non è stato ritenuto possibile, almeno in questa 
occasione, perché si tratta di Ditte di struttura ben diversa dalle prime, e non di entità tale da poter 
assumere notevoli lavori in proprio: inoltre l’indagine, qualora dovesse riferirsi anche a entità di 
queste dimensioni e caratteristiche, sarebbe da farsi anche per molte altre, qui non nominate, del tutto 
simili: ciò a tacere del fatto che alcune, come ad esempio la Soc. Castelli, la Soc.A. Armi 
Automatiche, hanno da tempo cessato ogni attività produttiva. 
Queste aziende fanno parte di quella struttura minore industriale, interessantissima e importante 
assai, che fa corona alle maggiori aziende industriali della provincia, per le quali hanno sempre 
lavorato in subcommesse, per la produzione di attrezzamento o di parti, formando insieme un 
complesso produttivo bene articolato. Pensiamo che anche nel presente e per il futuro la loro funzione 
non sarà dissimile da quella avuta nel passato, tanto più se si tiene conto dei criteri, che si stanno 
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Naturalmente si rimane a disposizione di codesto On. Ministero qualora ritenga di chiedere 
ulteriori dati, o comunque di ottenere quelli relativi all’ultima categoria, nel qual caso peraltro si 
ritiene necessario allargare notevolmente il campo di indagine. 
 
Questa Camera tuttavia ritiene opportuno fornire elementi complessivi di massima idonei a 
rappresentare un quadro generale in merito alla importanza complessiva e alle caratteristiche della 
produzione di armi nella Provincia. 
A questo fine è da segnalare l’esistenza di una decina di minori officine specializzate per la 
fabbricazione di armi, la cui occupazione operai va da 10 a 50 dipendenti, che sarebbero in grado di 
raddoppiare e, in qualche caso, di triplicare la loro attuale occupazione. 
Esiste poi un numeroso gruppo di officine a carattere artigianale, una cinquantina in tutto, che 
possono eseguire, non la fabbricazione dell’arma completa, ma soltanto talune operazioni del ciclo 
per la produzione di armi; officine, queste, che occupano ciascuna un piccolo numero di operai e 
svolgono attività di carattere pressoché artigianale. 
Infine, nei periodi di più intensa attività del ramo di produzione di cui trattasi, ad esso concorre 
anche una notevole parte del numeroso stuolo di medi e piccoli stabilimenti di meccanica generica 
che sogliono assumere subcommesse, anche notevoli, dagli stabilimenti maggiori, per la produzione 
di parti d’armi e di munizionamento. 
Con questo fenomeno nei periodi di punta viene interessato e coinvolto nella produzione 
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Per maggiore precisazione di può tener presente che le fabbriche maggiori attualmente occupani 
circa 3.350 dipendenti per la produzione di armi, nel 1943 ne occupavano circa 28.400 (vedi specchio 
allegato). Complessivamente, l’intero settore dedicato alla produzione di armi nell’anno 1943 di 
punta massima giungeva a 45-50 mila addetti, oggi ridotti a 5.000. 
Tali cifre imponenti documentano non solo l’importanza e la potenzialità – ben note a codesto 
Ministero – che il settore armiero bresciano ha assunto nel quadro nazionale ma anche la gravità della 
crisi che lo ha colpito in questo dopoguerra, succeduto ad un decennio di continua ed eccezionale 
espansione, crisi che ha trascinato e mantiene tuttora l’intera vita economica della nostra provincia in 
condizioni eccezionalmente difficili per le quali il fenomeno della disoccupazione raggiunge le 
massime punte nazionali (tasso provinciale di disoccupazione 8,42% abitanti presenti; di fronte ad un 
tasso nazionale del 4,07%). 
In relazione a quanto sopra ed a delucidazione dei dati allegati devesi infine osservare che 
alcune delle maggiori fabbriche hanno sospeso ogni produzione d’armi arrestando i relativi reparti e 
limitando o cercando di orientare le direttive aziendali verso altre produzioni, sempre e nel complesso 
tuttavia con radicali riduzioni nel numero degli operai occupati. 
Con osservanza 
 
     IL PRESIDENTE 
IL SEGRETARIO GENERALE      (Dr. Giulio Bruno Togni) 
 (Pietro Rovetta)  
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Allegato alla nota prot. R.491 – 1.7.1952 
 
 











BREDA MECCANICA BRESCIANA – 
Brescia 
5.800 0 710 0 
S.p.A. METALLURGICA 
BRESCIANA GIÀ TEMPINI – Brescia 
4.500 1.500 0 1.300 
S.p.A. OM – Brescia 
1.500 2.500 0 3.300 
S.A. FABBRICA NAZIONALE 
D’ARMI – Brescia 
2.650 0 470 0 
ARMERIE GNUTTI -Lumezzane 
(S.p.A. Serafino e Andrea Eredi Gnutti) 
3.000 0 0 500 
FABBRICA ARMI ESERCITO (ora 
Metalmeccanica Italiana V.T.) – 
Gardone V.T. 
2.500 0 0 300 
S.A. BERNARDELLI VINCENZO – 
Gardone V.T. 
700 0 500 0 
S.A. Fabbrica d’Armi PIETRO 
BERETTA – Gardone V.T. 
3.000 0 1,625 0 
S.A. LUIGI Franchi – Brescia 
300 0 100 0 
F.LLI MARZOLI & C. – Palazzolo s/O 
2.000 1.000 0 2.100 
S.A. Officine CARLO GNUTTI & Figli 
– Lumezzane 
1.800 0 0 430 
S.p.A. Officine Meccaniche SALERI – 
Lumezzane 




FABBRICA D’ARMI PIETRO BERETTA – GARDONE V.T. 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento e relativa capacità di produzione sia con l’attuale numero di 
maestranze che con il massimo delle maestranze impiegabili: 
Armi da caccia – pistole autom. – armi da difesa e da tiro – mitragliatori e mitragliatrici. 
b) Superficie totale: 
mq. 24.000 
c) Superficie coperta: 
mq. 20.000 
d) Potenza di motori installati: 
HP 1.300 
e) Consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica: 
800 Kw. 
f) Consumo medio giornaliero: 
14.000 Kwh. 
g) Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica: 
propria e società Elettrica Bresciana 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile: 
Kw. 1.200 
i) Energia meccanica autoproducibile: 
n.n. 
j) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: 
nafta Q.li 5 – carbone Q.li 10 
k) Capacità dei depositi di combustibile: 
per nafta mc. 227 – per carbone Q.li 3.000 
l) Quantitativo giornaliero (8 ore lavorative) di materiali che possono essere lavorati o trasformati: 
possono essere lavorati o trasformati: Q.li 20 di acciaio 
m) Principali Enti sub-fornitori di materie prime e semilavorati: 
le principali acciaierie nazionali ed estere 
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n) Personale normalmente impiegato: 
impiegati 125 – operai 1500 
o) Massimo personale che può essere impiegato con le attuali attrezzature: 




BREDA MECCANICA BRESCIANA 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento e relativa capacità di produzione sia con l’attuale numero di 
maestranze che con il massimo delle maestranze impiegabili: 
fucili automatici da caccia – telai Cotton – attrezzamenti vari per ditte italiane ed estere – pezzi 
d’arma da guerra e lavorazioni meccaniche varie. La capacità di produzione con l’attuale numero 
di maestranza non può essere genericamente indicata trattandosi di lavorazioni variabilissime 
b) La superficie totale dello stabilimento è di mq. 127.250. 
c) La superficie coperta è di mq. 30.000 circa. 
d) La potenza dei motori installati è di circa Kw 2.000 (in essa sono esclusi forni-saldatrici-vasche-
ecc.) 
e) Il consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica è: 
gennaio 1952 Kwh 900 
maggio 1952 Kwh 750 
media gen. maggio Kwh 800 
f) Il consumo medio giornaliero di energia elettrica è: 
gennaio 1952 Kwh 11.500 
maggio 1952 Kwh 8.000 
media genn.-maggio Kwh 9.750 
g) L’Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica è la Soc. Elettrica Bresciana. 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile: (n. 5 gruppi elettrogeni con alternatore da 55 KVA cad. – totale 
KVA 275). 
i) Energia meccanica autoproducibile (niente) 
j) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: 
carbone: da novembre a marzo media ql. 70 
nafta per forni: da aprile ad ottobre media ql. 50 
k) Capacità dei depositi di combustibile: 
n. 3 serbatoi della capacità complessiva di mc. 48 
di riserva n. 1 serbatoio usufruibile in caso di emergenza di mc. 20. 
l) Quantitativo giornaliero (8 ore lavorative) di materiali che possono essere lavorati o trasformati: 
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non può essere genericamente indicato trattandosi di lavorazioni variabilissime. 
m) Il principale Ente sub-fornitore di materie prime e semilavorate è la S.p.A. Breda Siderurgica di 
Sesto S. Giovanni. 
n) Personale normalmente impiegato: attualmente n. 739 persone fra dirigenti-impiegati-operai 





FABBRICA NAZIONALE D’ARMI – Brescia 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Armi da guerra – armi civili, munizionamento (solo parti meccaniche) 
motori, gruppi elettrogeni (escluso parte elettrica), gruppi e parti per autocarro e moto scooters – 
lavori vari di meccanica (media e piccola) attrezzature. 
Forza attuale operai 383 – Capienza massima 2.800 circa. 
La capacità produttiva può quindi essere dedotta in ore data la notevole varietà delle produzioni 
possibili e la dovuta cumulabilità dei vari tipi. 
b) mq. 24.319 
c) mq. 17.408 
d) Motori per circa 850 macchine utensili medie 
e) 400 Kwh (medio) 
f) 4.000 Kwh 
g) S.E.B. 
h) Attualmente zero 
i) Attualmente zero 
j) I combustibili vengono consumati soltanto per riscaldamento invernale (carbone – nafta). Per uso 
industriale vengono impiegati quasi esclusivamente forni elettrici. 
k) Notevole per l’eventuale deposito di carbone e in relazione a quanto detto al punto j) 
l) La domanda non ha significato nel nostro caso trattandosi di industria per lavorazioni meccaniche 
e non siderurgiche. 
m) S.I.A.U. – Falck – Cogne – Sisma – Breda ed altre primarie acciaierie. 
n) Vedi punto a). 





VINCENZO BERNARDELLI S.A. – GARDONE VAL TROMPIA (Brescia) 
 
a) PRODUZIONE E MANO D’OPERA 
1. Le lavorazioni principali in atto sono: fucili da caccia, pistole, automatiche nei cal. 6,35-7, 65-
9 corto, fucile mitragliatore calibro 9 lungo. 
2. Si possono eseguire le seguenti eventuali lavorazioni: spolette di tipo meccanico di ogni 
qualità, sono già attrezzate e di immediata lavorazione le spolette di tipo 1.0.40 e I.R. 81; armi 
portatili diverse, sono di immediata lavorazione parti diverse di moschetto 91, parti diverse di 
mitragliatrici, parti di motori Alfa Rome 126-128. 
3. L’attuale produzione nell’orario nomale di lavoro (8 ore giornaliere) è di 20 fucili da caccia, 
60 pistole automatiche, 5 fucili mitragliatori. 
4. La produzione con orario continuativo di turni con attività di 24 ore potrebbe passare da 20 
fucili da caccia, 250 pistole automatiche, 25 fucili mitragliatori e dopo un periodo di 
addestramento tali quantitativi potranno essere aumentati. La lavorazione delle spolette nei 
già attrezzati tipi 1.0.40 e I.R. 81 potrà raggiungere e superare dopo un necessario periodo di 
preparazione le 1.000 spolette giornaliere, raggiungendo successivamente le 2.000 
giornaliere. 
b) SUPERFICIE TOTALE: 
La ditta dispone di area fabbricabile per mq. 12.650 
cortili per     mq. 2.050. 
c) SUPERFICIE COPERTA: 
Area costruita ad un piano mq. 1.400 
area costruita a due piani   mq. 2.320 
      mq. 3.720 
   Totale superficie mq. 18.420 
d) POTENZA DI MOTORI INSTALLATI: 
La potenza complessiva dei motori installati sulle varie macchine è di complessivi H.P. 675. 
e) CONSUMO ORARIO MASSIMO DI ENERGIA ELETTRICA: 
L’attuale consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica è di 200 Kwh. In caso di intensificazione 
produttiva tale consumo si aumenterà indubbiamente in proporzione dei macchinari installati e 
potrà raggiungere 300/400 Kwh a seconda le necessità. 
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f) CONSUMO MEDIO GIORNALIERO: 
L’attuale consumo medio giornaliero di Kwh 2.000 in caso di intensificazione si sposterà 
proporzionalmente ai maggiori impianti. 
g) FORNITURA E PRODUZIONE DI ENERGIA ELETTRICA: 
Forza motrice impiegata: 
Autroprodotta in fabbrica HP 30 
Ritirata da: Unione Elettrice Gardone-Inzino (Società del Gruppo Bernardelli) HP 100 
Società Elettrica Bresciana HP 200 
h) ENERGIA MECCANICA AUTOPRODUCIBILE: 
Non abbiamo impianti del genere. 
i) CONSUMO GIORNALIERO DI COMBUSTIBILE: 
Attualmente il consumo è limitato, ma in relazione allo sviluppo produttivo si rendono necessari 
consumi adeguati. 
j) CAPACITÀ DEI DEPOSITI DI COMBUSTIBILE: 
Per combustibili solidi abbiamo possibilità di depositi vasti proporzionati all’area libera adiacente 
allo stabilimento. Per i combustibili liquidi i nostri depositi sono limitati, ma essendo di 
imminente arrivo la tubazione del metano si rendono inutili depositi prestabiliti. 
k) MATERIALI CHE POSSONO ESSERE TRASFORMATI: 
I consumi e trasformazioni di materiale sono limitati nel campo armi mentre sono più complessi 
per le spolette e risultano proporzionati ai programmi di lavoro. 
l) PRINCIPALI SUB-FORNITORI DI MATERIE PRIME E SEMILAVORATI: 
Le materie prime principali sono di produzione italiana, il ferro e l’acciaio vengono forniti dalle 
Acciaierie Cogne e Breda, i trafilati ed i profilati di ferro sono prodotti dalle acciaierie-ferriere 
Redaelli e F.I.A.V. Mazzacchera, l’alluminio è prodotto dai diversi stabilimenti dipendenti della 
Montecatini. Dall’Estero vengono normalmente ritirati invece gli acciai rapidi ed il rame ed altri 
metalli da lega, lo stesso dicasi per il carbone e l’olio combustibile. 
m) PERSONALE ATTUALMENTE IMPIEGATO E DI POSSIBILE IMPIEGO 
Attualmente sono impiegati con lavoro ad orario normale (ore giornaliere): operai n. 467, 
impiegati n. 32, con lavoro ad orario continuativo di 24 ore giornaliere il personale può essere 
aumentato anche a 1.000 persone ed oltre. 
Non è possibile precisare il rapporto tra uomini e donne perché questo dipende dalla natura del 
lavoro da eseguire. 
207 
 
Trattandosi di lavorazione di armi portatili le donne possono servire parzialmente alla lavorazione 
di macchine mentre gli uomini sono indispensabili oltre che per una parte delle operazioni di 
macchine anche per il montaggio e collaudo; trattandosi invece d lavorazioni di spolette anche il 
montaggio può essere fatto dalle donne provette. 
AVVERTENZA 
Nella eventualità di dover assumere personale per lavori bellici è indispensabile, per chiare ragioni, 
lasciare alla ditta la libertà di assumere il personale che dia fiducia ed affidamento, con la possibilità 
di licenziarlo senza ostacoli alla fine del lavoro. 
PARTECIPAZIONE A GARE 
Il Ministero della Difesa per i tre rami: Guerra, Aviazione, Marina ha fatto eseguire rigidi controlli e 
sopraluoghi presso le ditte prima di inscriverle nell’albo dei fornitori. 
Invece alle diverse gare indette dagli Enti militari vengono invitate ditte artigiane non attrezzate e 




Soc. LUIGI FRANCHI – Brescia 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) La Soc. Luigi Franchi produce attualmente fucili da caccia ad una o due canne nei vari calibri, 
nonché fucili automatici a 4-5 colpi cal. 12 costruiti con concetti di serie. Ha attualmente in forza 
un centinaio di operai coi quali produce circa 3.000 fucili all’anno di cui 1.800 automatici. 
Potrebbe impiegare da 250-300 operai, triplicando tale produzione. 
b) Lo Stabilimento occupa un’area di 920 mq. area interamente coperta. 
c) La superficie coperta risulta di 920 mq. a pianterreno e 892 mq. al primo paino. Un totale quindi 
di 1.812 mq. 
d) Ha installato n. 82 macchine di produzione e n. 18 macchine per attrezzature e calibri. Ha una 
potenza installata di circa 400 Kw. 
La Ditta è autosufficiente per produrre completamente tutte le parti di un fucile da caccia o di 
un’arma da guerra automatica o a ripetizione, relativi calibri e attrezzature. 
e) Il consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica è attualmente di 500 Kwh mentre ovviamente se 
tutte le macchine fossero in funzione il consumo sarebbe proporzionato ai Kw installati. 
f) Il consumo medio giornaliero è di energia motrice Kwh 450 – energia luce 45-50 Kwh. 
g) L’energia elettrica è fornita dai Servizi Municipalizzati di Brescia. 
h) È installato nell’interno dello stabilimento un gruppo elettrogeno con motore monocilindrico 
“Modag” della potenza di 18 Kw che nei periodi di scarsità di energia elettrica ha sempre 
funzionato come integrazione alla energia fornita dai Servizi Municipalizzati. Essendo lo 
stabilimento in condizioni di essere tra breve collegato alla rete del Metano verrà attuata la 
trasformazione di tale motore per il funzionamento a metano. 
i) Non si produce energia meccanica in quanto il motore sopra citato è direttamente accoppiato ad 
un generatore di energia trifase. 
j) Il consumo giornaliero di combustibile è di q.li 3-4 nella stagione invernale per il riscaldamento 
e normalmente si ha un piccolo consumo di carbone per le fucine. Si ha un considerevole consumo 
di gas illuminante per i bagni di brunitura, anche per i quali sarà operata la trasformazione a 
metano. 
k) Nessuna possibilità di depositi di combustibili liquidi, mentre si ha un deposito per il carbone 




l) Non si può rispondere a questa domanda perché in una produzione così varia e così frazionata 
come quella delle armi è impossibile prevedere il consumo giornaliero di materie prime. 
m) I principali fornitori di materie prime sono: 
Acciaierie Cogne – Milano 
Trafilerie Mazzacchera – Milano 
English Steel Corporation – Sheffield (Inghilterra) 
Acciaierie Gebruder Boehler e Kapfenberg. 
n) Il personale oggi impiegato è costituito da:  
n. 3 dirigenti 
n. 11 impiegati 
n. 101 operai. 






S.p.A. LUIGI FRANCHI – Brescia 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
1) In passato la nostra azienda ebbe ad eseguire grosse commesse di sciabole, baionette di tipo 
pieghevole, culatte per fucili Mod. 91 e otturatori per Mitra Beretta. 
Le produzioni massime furono di: 
 n. 500 baionette al giorno 
 n. 800 culatte al giorno 
 n. 250 otturatori per mitra Beretta al giorno 
2) Dopo la guerra nonostante ogni ns. sforzo non è stato possibile finora ottenere alcuna commessa 
di armi o parti di armi belliche. 
3) È necessità assoluta per l’azienda realizzare al più presto possibile lavorazioni di armi o parti di 
armi per la difesa, onde integrare il diagramma della fatturazione che oggi è del tutto stagionale 
per i fucili da caccia, cosa che porta alla necessità di immobilizzare ingentissimi capitali per 
parecchi mesi all’anno in attesa della stagione di vendita. 
4) La Soc. ha in questi anni compiuto ogni sforzo per rimodernare ed integrare il macchinario onde 
essere pronta ad eseguire lavorazioni di carattere bellico di serie secondo la più accurata 
precisione nella produzione di serie. Si rammenta a questo proposito: Torni Minganti a Revolver, 






S. & A. EREDI GNUTTI – LUMEZZANE S. S. (BRESCIA) 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) 1) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento: barre, fili, nastri, tubi, profilati e stampati di rame e di 
ottone, e alluminio. 
2) Capacità di produzione con l’attuale numero di maestranze: tonn. 1.000 mensili. 
3) Capacità di produzione con il massimo delle maestranze impiegate: tonn. 1.600 mensili. 
b) Superficie totale occupata: mq. 76.954 
c) Superficie coperta: mq. 17.912 
d) Potenza dei motori installati: HP 5.860 
e) Consumo orario massimo d’energia elettrica: Kwh 6.000 
f) Consumo medio giornaliero d’energia elettrica: Kwh 40.000 
g) Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica: Società Elettrica Bresciana 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile: nulla 
i) Energia meccanica autoproducibile: nulla 
j) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: tonn. 4 di olio combustibile, tonn. 1 di carbone 
k) Capacità dei depositi di combustibile: tonn. 250 
l) Quantitativo giornaliero di materiali che possono essere lavorati o trasformati (8 ore lavorative): 
1) tonn. 15 di barra trafilata di rame e ottone in misure diverse 
2) tonn. 5 di filo di rame e ottone nei diametri da mm. 0,10 a mm. 9 
3) tonn. 10 di nastro e piatto di rame e ottone negli spessori da mm. 0,12 a mm. 25 
4) tonn. 5 di tubo fi rame e ottone nei diametri fino a mm. 180 
5) tonn. 5 di stampati a caldo di rame e ottone diversi da barra 
m) Principali enti sub-fornitori di materie prime: 
1) per il rame: Ditte diverse estere 
2) per l’alluminio: S.A. Alluminio – S.A.V.A. 
3) per lo zinco: Soc. Montevecchio – AMMI – Milano 
n) Personale normalmente impiegato: Operai n. 440 – Impiegati n. 50 
o) Massimo personale che può essere impiegato con le attuali attrezzature: n. 800 
p) N.N.  
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DITTA FRATELLI MARZOLI & C. – PALAZZOLO S/O (Brescia) 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento e relativa capacità di produzione sia con l’attuale numero 
di maestranze che con il massimo delle maestranze impiegabili: Macchinario per l’industria 
tessile 
b) Superficie totale: mq. 55.820 
c) Superficie coperta: mq. 39.800 
d) Potenza di motori installati: Kw. 1.000 
e) Consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica: Kwh 1.100 
f) Consumo medio giornaliero: Kwh 8.000 
g) Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica: Centrali idroelettriche proprie di Urago d’Oglio e Palosco 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile e meccanica: Kw. 200 prodotti in caso di emergenza da due 
gruppi elettrogeni accoppiati con alternatori 
i) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: N.N. 
j) Capacità dei depositi combustibili: N.N. 
k) Quantitativo giornaliero di materiali che possono essere lavorati o trasformati: Non si può 
precisare data la grande varietà di macchinario tessile in lavorazione 
l) Principali Enti sub-fornitori di materie prime e semilavorati: N.N. 
m) Personale normalmente impiegato: Operai n. 1973 – Impiegati 142 
n) Massimo personale che può essere impiegato con le attuali attrezzature: Quello indicato alla 
precedente lettera m) 





S.p.A. O.M. – Brescia – Via Fiume, n. 25 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento e relativa capacità di produzione: autocarri (da 25 a 35 
unità), trattori agricoli (3/4 unità), motori Diesel vari. 
b) Superficie totale: 224.730 mq. 
c) Superficie coperta: 106.469 mq. 
d) Potenza di motori installati: circa 9.000 KW 
e) Consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica: circa 4.000 KWO 
f) Consumo medio giornaliero: circa 60.000 KWO 
g) Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica: Soc. Elettrica Bresciana 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile: 0 
i) Energia meccanica autoproducibile: 0 
j) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: media di 100 q.li nafta; prossima entrata in esercizio del 
metano per circa 9.000 mc/giorno 
k) Capacità dei depositi di combustibile: 630 mc. 
l) Quantitativo giornaliero (8 ore lavorative) di materiali che possono essere lavorati o trasformati: 
circa 90 tonn. 
m) Principali Enti sub-fornitori di materie prime e semilavorati: Fiat – Ferriere, Cogne, SIAU, 
Magona, Pirelli, S.A. Alluminio, RIV, VIS, Magneti Marelli, Fonderie varie 
n) Personale normalmente impiegato: 3.300 unità 
o) Massimo personale che può essere impiegato con le attuali attrezzature: circa 4.000 unità 






METALLURGICA BRESCIANA (GIÀ TEMPINI) – BRESCIA 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA PRODUZIONE DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
SEZIONE METALLURGICA 
Lamiere: di ottone comune e speciale (per stampaggio ecc.) 
Nastri, Bandelle, Piattine: di rame (per conduttori, avvolgimenti, ecc.), di ottone e di bronzo comuni 
e speciali (per stampaggio minuterie, ecc.) 
Tubi, Barre, Sagomati, Profilati: di rame (per caldaie, condensatori, bollitori, conduttori), di ottone e 
di bronzo comuni e speciali (per décolletage radiatori inneschi, nipples, minuterie ecc.), di alluminio 
(per ornamenti ecc.) 
Fili, Fili Capillari, Corde: di rame (per conduttori, avvolgimenti, trolley ecc.), di ottone e di bronzo 
comuni e speciali (per linee telefoniche reti metalliche ecc.) 
 
SEZIONE SIDERURGICA 
Lamiere: di acciaio speciale (per stampaggio ecc), di acciaio inossidabile (resistente alla corrosione 
e al calore), di acciaio semirapido-rapido e superrapido (per utensili) 
Bordione, Vergella, Filo Trafilato, Barrette: di acciaio speciale (per elettrodi rivestiti, per saldature 
ecc.) 
Barre, Dischi fucinati, Barre sottili rettificate, Barre trattate e rettificate: di acciaio semirapido-rapido 
e superrapido (per utensili) 
Moietta: di acciaio speciale dolce (per stampaggio ecc.) 
Seghe, Dischi, Segmenti: di acciaio rapido e superrapido (per taglio a freddo metalli)  
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METALLURGICA BRESCIANA (già TEMPINI) – Brescia 
DATI RELATIVI ALLA POTENZIALITÀ DELLO STABILIMENTO 
 
a) Principali prodotti dello stabilimento 
1) Semilavorati di acciai speciali 
Lamiere di acciaio speciale, di acciaio inossidabile e di acciaio semirapido, rapido e 
superrapido. 
Bordione, vergella, filo trafilato e barrette di acciaio speciale. 
Barre, dischi fucinati, barre rettificate e barrette trattate e rettificate di acciaio semirapido, 
rapido e superrapido. 
Moietta di acciaio speciale dolce. 
2) Semilavorati di rame e sue leghe 
Nastri, bandelle, piattine, tubi, barre, sagomati, profilati, fili, corde ecc. nonché lamierini in 
ottone. 
A complemento di quanto sopra si allega uno specchio da cui risultino tutti i prodotti di nostra 
fabbricazione. 
3) Produzione mensile 
di semilavorati di rame e sue leghe: attuale ton. 550/650, massimo realiz. ton 800/1000 
di semilavorati di acciai speciali; attuale ton. 1000/1200, massimo realiz. ton. 1400/1600 
4) Personale attualmente a carico 
Operai n. 1198, Impiegati n. 159 
Non si ritiene di indicare il personale occorrente per realizzare le produzioni massime, essendo tale 
dato variabile in relazione al tipo di semilavorati da produrre. 
b) Superficie totale: mq. 123.340 
c) Superficie coperta: mq. 80.000 circa 
d) Potenza di motori installati: Kw. 13.000 
e) Consumo orario massimo di energia elettrica: Kwh. 8.000 
f) Consumo medio giornaliero: Kwh. 125.000 
g) Ente fornitore dell’energia elettrica: Soc. Elettrica Bresciana 
h) Energia elettrica autoproducibile: ------- 
i) Energia meccanica autoproducibile: ------- 
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j) Consumo giornaliero di combustibile: Metano mc. 12.000, Nafta ton. 2 
k) Capacità dei depositi di combustibile: mc. 940 (serbatoi nafta) 
l) Le materie prime per i semilavorati di rame e sue leghe vengono acquistate direttamente da noi 
in Italia od all’Estero o forniti dai nostri clienti in conto trasformazione. 
Per gli acciai, impieghiamo rottami di provenienza nazionale ed estera assegnataci dal 
C.A.M.P.S.I.D.E.R. 






Interviews with Entrepreneurs of the Industrial District: 




This Appendix gives the transcriptions of four interviews of entrepreneurs in the 
industrial districts of Gardone Val Trompia. The major objectives behind these 
interviews were: 
1. verify the reliability of the written sources where no authoritative background 
was provided; 
2. gather information regarding specific aspects of the history of the local 
production system which are poorly reported on in the existing literature; 
3. grasp intangible aspects of the culture and social life of the community under 
investigation; 
4. collect feedback on partial results while the research was in progress. 
In order to accomplish these goals, interviews with a semi-structured approach were 
conducted (Miller and Glassner 1997; Sala 2010). The topics were carefully 
selected in advance taking the cue from the literature on industrial districts, the 
history of Val Trompia and the information available on the interviewees. The 
conversations were built on open-end questions to enable Abbiatico, Pedersoli, 
Pirlo and Zanardini to freely reconstruct events and anecdotes of their lives in the 
community of Gardone Val Trompia and the local gun trade. 
Each transcription is preceded by a short introduction where general information 
regarding the interviewee is provided to explain their role in the local production 
system and to highlight the most salient aspects of their contribution to the research. 
All the interviews were carried out during the Ph.D. research program [US], 
precisely as follows:  
• the interview with Pierangelo Pedersoli took place in Gardone Val Trompia on 
February 23, 2016; 
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• the interview with Cristina Abbiatico took place in Gardone Val Trompia on 
August 17, 2016; 
• the interview with Giuseppe Pirlo took place in Gardone Val Trompia on 
October 6, 2016; 
• the interview with Luigi Zanardini took place in Marcheno on October 12, 2016. 
In order not to lose significant shades of meaning and to avoid any semantic 




5.1 Interview with Pierangelo Pedersoli 




Pierangelo Pedersoli is chief executive officer and owner of the family business 
Davide Pedersoli & C.  specialists in the production of historical firearm replicas. 
The company, founded in 1957 by Davide Pedersoli, father of Pierangelo, started 
with the manufacture of hunting shotguns, over-and-under shotguns featuring a 
specific patent and side-by-side shotguns. In 1960 the firm started the production 
of muzzle loading guns, which, after ten years, took over as the predominant 
product of the company. In 1973, the production of traditional hunting shotguns 
was discontinued to concentrate on the manufacture of historical muzzle-loading 
guns and accessories as well as expanding powder flask production which started 
in 1960, at the beginning of the muzzle-loading era. 
Today, the company retains its family character and firearms production ranges 
from dueling pistols to revolvers, from target guns to infantry muskets from various 
European countries, as well as famous American icons in the evolution of firearms 
from flintlock to the first use of metallic cartridges. 
Mr. Pedersoli also holds several important institutional positions in the Italian 
firearms world. He has been President of the Consorzio Armaioli Italiani since 
1988, a member of the Consultative Committee on Firearms (for the Italian Ministry 
of Interior) since 1989, a member of the Board of Directors of the Italian National 
Testing Body, President of the gun making section of the Confederation of Craft 
Industry since 2000 and a member of the scientific committee of the firearms 
museum in Gardone Val Trompia since 2011. 
Pierangelo was born in Gardone Val Trompia and in 1975, after a period of military 
service, he started work for the family business. His long experience and important 
successes in the firearms industry make him a very interesting and reliable witness 
of the life of the local system of production of Gardone. Thanks to Pedersoli’s 
holistic vision of the small arms industry and his proud local roots, this interview 
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gives a comprehensive description of the development of both the gun sector and 




Innanzitutto le chiedo di presentarsi. 
Sono Pierangelo Pedersoli, amministratore della Davide Pedersoli; sono laureato in 
economia e commercio e prima della laurea in economia ho frequentato l’Istituto 
Tecnico Meccanico. Sono anche Presidente del Consorzio Armaioli Italiani, prima 
Consorzio Armaioli Bresciani. 
La Davide Pedersoli è un’azienda del settore armiero, nata nel 1957, che all’inizio 
era specializzata nella produzione di fucili tradizionali, cioè di fucili da caccia 
sovrapposti. Dagli anni ’60 inizia anche una nuova linea di produzione che consiste 
nella costruzione di riproduzioni funzionanti di armi del Settecento e 
dell’Ottocento; questo avviene in concomitanza con il 100º anniversario della 
Guerra Civile americana che prevedeva appunto di presentare sul mercato 
internazionale, soprattutto sul mercato americano, delle riproduzioni di armi di quel 
periodo storico. Io sono entrato in azienda nel 1975, dopo un periodo di servizio 
militare da ufficiale, e ho preso le redini dell’azienda scegliendo di abbandonare la 
produzione del fucile da caccia sovrapposto, che fino ad allora era stata parallela a 
quella di armi ad avancarica, per concentrarmi completamente sulla costruzione 
delle riproduzioni di armi storiche. 
Oggi abbiamo un’azienda di oltre 40 dipendenti che produce repliche di armi che 
vanno dai primi del Settecento al 1880, esportate per il 90% nel mondo intero. I 
nostri mercati principali sono soprattutto negli Stati Uniti, verso i quali va più o 
meno il 50% della produzione. Ad ogni modo in tutti i Paesi occidentali, quindi 
anche Europei, siamo abbastanza presenti, sempre sotto il brand Pedersoli che oggi 
è molto conosciuto. Abbiamo avuto anche recentemente una tesi di laurea 
universitaria che si è basata sulla risposta da parte della clientela in merito al grado 
di soddisfazione dei nostri prodotti da cui sono emersi risultati molto soddisfacenti. 
Il 98,3% dei contattati riacquisterebbe un prodotto Pedersoli: credo che sia un dato 
decisamente importante considerato che sono state inviate, tutte negli Sati Uniti, 
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più di 6000 e-mail di contatto alle quali hanno risposto in più di 2000. Il brand 
Pedersoli oggi è associato per l’85% a un concetto di qualità e in altre percentuali 
alla precisione del tiro, etc., però nel concetto di qualità sono incluse tutte le 
caratteristiche positive dei nostri prodotti. 
Come dicevo poc’anzi, sono Presidente del Consorzio Armaioli dal 1988, 
costantemente rieletto con elezioni ogni quattro anni. Da quando sono diventato 
presidente abbiamo aumentato notevolmente il numero degli associati passando da 
14/15 associati ai circa 110 attuali. Il CONARMI, che prima aveva una valenza 
soprattutto locale, oggi invece è un’associazione che ha una sua importanza anche 
a livello internazionale. Svolgiamo, con altre associazioni, un’attività sindacale a 
favore del settore armiero soprattutto per quanto concerne le normative sia nazionali 
che internazionali, in modo particolare europee, che direttamente ci coinvolgono. 
Per quanto concerne, invece, l’ambito locale promuoviamo attività di sviluppo del 
nostro settore, per esempio abbiamo riattivato il Corso Armaioli presso l’Istituto 
d’Istruzione Superiore Carlo Beretta: dico riattivato in quanto era stato chiuso dopo 
il 1975, periodo degli anni di piombo, in cui parlare di produzione di armi era molto 
difficile. Oggi le cose non sono cambiate molto e riteniamo che ci sia molta 
ignoranza in materia, soprattutto da parte dell’opinione pubblica e dei media (i 
media non di settore) che per demagogia non ci sostengono assolutamente. Tutto 
ciò nonostante i nostri continui sforzi volti a dimostrare come il nostro sia di fatto 
un settore venatorio, un settore sportivo, un settore collezionistico e, in casi come 
quelli della Pedersoli, addirittura un settore che può rientrare nelle attività culturali: 
moltissime delle nostre armi, per esempio, sono state utilizzate in ambito 
cinematografico per film molto importanti: l’ultimo in ordine temporale è stato 
Revenant. 
 
Tornando alla sua azienda, chi la fondò? 
L’azienda venne fondata da mio papà, Davide Pedersoli, ex dipendente della ditta 
Beretta, dove lavorava in un reparto molto specializzato: quello deputato alla 
realizzazione di calibri per la misurazione e il controllo dei semilavorati. Era un 
grande lavoratore e appassionato di armi, brevettò un fucile sovrapposto con 
percussioni parallele e decise di iniziarne la produzione da solo. Pertanto uscì dalla 
222 
 
Beretta e iniziò una sua piccola produzione molto artigianale ma fortunatamente, 
stante il fatto che era un importante meccanico (le scuole tecniche Zanardelli e 
l’esperienza in Beretta gli avevano dato una grande conoscenza sia della meccanica 
che della manualità), quasi immediatamente si rese conto che con le sole mani era 
difficile fare grandi produzioni. Decise quindi di acquistare le prime macchine 
(fresatrici, torni) e iniziò una produzione un poco più avanzata di quella 
tradizionale. Da subito iniziò a lavorare per il mercato sebbene mio papà non fosse 
un grande venditore. Questa era una condizione comune a tutte le aziende bresciane, 
e gardonesi in modo particolare: avevamo gente molto brava a lavorare, con delle 
ottime conoscenze delle dinamiche di un’arma, ma dal punto di vista commerciale 
eravamo proprio a quota zero. Io ricordo mio papà che mi raccontava di quando con 
mia mamma girava l’Italia in macchina per andare a vendere i suoi primi fucili 
presso le armerie: il risultato tuttavia era che, invece di vendere i fucili, 
immancabilmente finiva per comprare alcune cartucce. Ad ogni modo quelli erano 
tempi d’oro per cui, fortunatamente, erano più i clienti che cercavano le aziende che 
viceversa. Cominciarono i primi contatti con Francia e Australia e, sicuramente, 
mio papà già allora esportava la maggior parte della sua produzione, nonostante 
qualcosa andasse anche in Italia. Anche quando siamo entrati nel campo della 
riproduzione di armi antiche erano gli stranieri che venivano a proporci cosa fare e, 
più o meno, questa era la storia di tutti: qui c’erano dei grandi lavoratori che 
conoscevano alcune tipologie di armi, poi arrivavano il francese di Saint-Étienne, 
l’inglese di Birmingham o il belga di Liegi (che nel frattempo avevano dismesso la 
produzione di armi) che, attratti dai bassi costi di produzione, decidevano di 
commissionare lavori ai locali. Per certi versi ciò fu anche alla base di un processo 
di trasferimento di conoscenze e tecnologie che dal secondo dopoguerra permise 
all’Italia di tornare in auge nella produzione di armi leggere. 
Negli anni ’50-’60 il fucile sovrapposto era soprattutto l’arma della grande azienda, 
la Beretta, oppure di qualche estroso, come poteva essere mio papà, mentre gli altri 
producevano soprattutto doppiette. La differenza stava nel fatto che il sovrapposto 
era un prodotto più industrializzato della doppietta; quindi veniva fabbricato nella 
grande azienda dove l'industrializzazione era un dato di fatto, costante e 
continuativo, mentre nella piccola azienda ciò avveniva raramente. Poteva fare 
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questo tipo di fucile una persona come mio papà che aveva le capacità e le 
conoscenze tecniche, mentre gli altri continuavano il vecchio sistema produttivo 
dalla doppietta perché era estremamente artigianale. In seguito la situazione mutò, 
quasi tutte le aziende del settore cominciarono a produrre fucili sovrapposti 
abbandonando la doppietta: secondo un fenomeno di imitazione delle aziende a loro 
vicine e più “avanzate”, sostanzialmente tutti i produttori si adeguarono ai tempi 
implementando le loro tecnologie con nuove macchine. Gardone Val Trompia 
divenne così un centro importantissimo per la produzione di questi fucili che 
venivano e vengono esportati in tutto il mondo. 
 
Questo passaggio al fucile sovrapposto con l’intenzione di non essere secondi 
ai concorrenti quando lo collocherebbe? 
Io direi negli anni ’60, in particolare tra il 1964 e il 1965: un periodo di grandi 
cambiamenti e possibilità. Faccio questo ragionamento: mio papà uscì dalla Beretta 
nel 1957 quando io avevo 7 anni, aprì una società con un amico, che durò per 4 o 5 
anni, e iniziò lavorando alla morsa. Solo otto anni più tardi mio papà aveva 
un’officina con 8 macchine utensili e concludeva il trasferimento in una nuova sede 
che è poi una parte embrionale di quella attuale. Pertanto in pochi anni realizzò 
moltissimo e sicuramente guadagnò anche. Non solo, iniziò anche l’attività di 
riproduzione delle armi che certamente gli diede una spinta importante visto che, in 
quel momento, non erano tantissimi quelli che si dedicavano a questo mercato. 
 
Come lei ha già detto a Gardone c'è una grande concentrazione di aziende che 
si dedicano alla lavorazione delle armi, ma tutta la provincia di Brescia è 
conosciuta per la sua specializzazione in questo settore. Saprebbe identificare 
nel contesto provinciale delle aree omogenee? In altre parole, è possibile 
identificare in Val Trompia un nucleo che si distingue rispetto al resto della 
produzione provinciale? 
Che ci sia un nucleo oggi in Val Trompia è fuori discussione. Il nucleo iniziale 
riguardava soprattutto Gardone Val Trompia, poi è chiaro che negli anni, anche solo 
per i nuovi sistemi di comunicazione, non è più stato necessario rimanere legati 
esclusivamente a questo nucleo. Il nucleo una volta era fondamentale in quanto 
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c’erano delle capacità manuali della lavorazione che erano specifiche di questa 
zona, la quale a sua volta era suddivisa in 3 o 4 micro nuclei. Per esempio nella 
zona di Magno c’erano gli incassatori, nella zona di Inzino c’erano quelli che 
facevano le lavorazioni con la forgia, in Gardone venivano realizzati soprattutto gli 
assemblaggi: erano delle vere e proprie specializzazioni. Perché proprio lì? Difficile 
da spiegare, probabilmente perché originariamente c’erano due o tre artigiani che 
sono stati in grado di formare una serie di apprendisti che, a loro volta, hanno aperto 
una loro piccola attività nella stessa zona. Con gli anni ’60 e soprattutto ’70, la 
lavorazione però si espanse, anche per una mera esigenza di spazi: rimase e tutt’oggi 
rimane il nome “Gardone Val Trompia”, perché sin dalle origini questo era il paese 
che produceva le armi, però nacquero e ancora ai nostri giorni esistono numerose 
aziende nei comuni limitrofi di Marcheno e di Sarezzo. Non solo, grazie alle nuove 
tecnologie che hanno ridotto l’importanza della manodopera specializzata, ha avuto 
luogo un fenomeno di decentramento che ha portato ditte a stabilire la propria sede 
nei comuni di Gussago, Brescia, Flero. Ad ogni modo tale decentramento ha avuto 
un impatto comunque limitato poiché in Gardone sono presenti delle attività 
collaterali di cui tutte le aziende di armi leggere hanno bisogno. Tra queste attività 
collaterali possiamo menzionare: il Banco Nazionale di Prova (l’unico esistente in 
Italia, fatta eccezione per un branch dello stesso presente a Urbino per la prova delle 
armi della ditta Benelli); la Scuola Armaioli che abbiamo riaperto come Consorzio 
Armaioli Italiani, partecipando ai costi di gestione e fornendo personale dei nostri 
associati al fine di collaborare alla formazione dei ragazzi (oggi gli studenti sono 
circa 90, fanno stage nelle nostre aziende e sono simbolo di un rinnovato senso di 
appartenenza al settore da parte del contesto locale, un senso di appartenenza che 
negli anni passati era andato indebolendosi); da ultimo possiamo menzionare certe 
lavorazioni, come quelle del legno ed i trattamenti termici, o professioni, quali 
quelle degli incisori e dei pulitori, che sono concentrate in Gardone. 
 
Negli anni ’60 -’70 si ricorda da dove proveniva la manodopera? 
La manodopera è sempre stata soprattutto locale, sebbene vi fossero diverse persone 
che venivano dal sud Italia. La maggior parte era gente della Valle, non 
esclusivamente di Gardone: venivano da Collio, San Colombano, Polaveno, 
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Tavernole, Marcheno, Sarezzo, qualcuno, ma pochi (essendo quello un altro centro 
d’attrazione), da Lumezzane; raramente provenivano dai comuni sotto Sarezzo. 
 
In quegli anni come era strutturato il processo produttivo? 
Negli anni ’60-’70 le aziende che producevano tutto il prodotto erano molto rare, 
più che altro c’erano delle aziende che producevano alcune parti che venivano 
vendute nello stato semigrezzo e acquistate dalle piccole aziende che le 
trasformavano in un prodotto finito, magari personalizzandolo. Queste parti 
venivano denominate “serie” che poteva essere un composto della bascula, un 
composto del manicotto, eventualmente parti di meccanica interna. Le aziende che 
producevano e vendevano la “serie” erano diverse; due esempi sono quelli delle 
ditte Sabatti e Marocchi: erano aziende che magari producevano la loro linea di 
fucili ma che avevano una capacità tecnica tale da poter produrre un certo 
quantitativo extra da vendere ad altre piccole ditte. Queste ultime, a loro volta, 
compravano da altre aziende specializzate i tubi e da altre ancora i calci grezzi, da 
ultimo assemblavano il tutto realizzando lavorazioni di saldatura, levigatura, 
incassatura, etc. Tuttavia, piano piano, le aziende si resero conto che, sebbene i 
fucili venissero personalizzati, le serie erano molto simili e non era possibile 
distinguere il proprio prodotto da quello di chi si riforniva della medesima “serie”. 
Ecco allora, soprattutto nella seconda metà degli anni ’80, nascere delle produzioni 
specifiche all’interno delle piccole ditte che finiscono con il produrre in proprio 
anche le parti basilari dell’arma, talvolta mettendo a punto anche brevetti specifici. 
Negli anni ’80, del resto, il comparto stava vivendo anni difficili e la 
diversificazione apparve come una strada inevitabile per poter sopravvivere: 
vennero messi a punto nuovi calibri, si iniziò a dedicare maggiore attenzione alla 
canna rigata (la specializzazione gardonese è sempre stata la canna liscia), si tentò 
di industrializzare la produzione della doppietta e, soprattutto, si iniziò a puntare 
sull’utilizzo sportivo dei fucili introducendo il fucile da piattello. 
 
Aziende che realizzavano lavorazioni di meccanica “generica” partecipavano 
al processo produttivo? 
Erano naturalmente presenti aziende “generiche”. A queste normalmente veniva 
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richiesta la produzione di alcune parti a disegno, tuttavia non avevano competenze 
tali da poter intervenire direttamente nella produzione e ciò rappresentava un forte 
limite, in un settore come quello delle armi, dove la balistica, materia assai 
complessa, è di primaria importanza. 
 
Del gran numero di aziende presenti in Val Trompia quante svolgevano 
lavorazioni per conto di Beretta? 
Tantissime, ce n’erano e ce ne sono ancora tante. Oggi devono avere specifiche 
certificazioni che un tempo non erano necessarie, ma ancora oggi sono molte le 
aziende che lavorano per Beretta. Una volta erano soprattutto contoterzisti; oggi 
non è disdicevole nemmeno per Beretta acquistare il prodotto di un’altra azienda e 
venderlo con il proprio brand, sebbene rimangano casi isolati e sempre studiati e 
collaudati dalla Beretta stessa. 
 
Che cosa mi può dire a proposito della lavorazione a domicilio? 
La lavorazione a domicilio una volta era in auge, così come importante era la 
lavorazione post orario di lavoro. Giuseppe Zanardelli diceva che a Gardone ogni 
famiglia era un’officina. Io rimasi stupefatto quando venni a sapere che il 
“becchino” del paese aveva una licenza di fabbricazione armi e, come seconda 
attività, lavorava i fucili. 
A domicilio come contoterzisti lavoravano gli incassatori, le zigrinatrici (erano tutte 
donne), i lucidatori, gli incisori, i pulitori; poi c’erano quelli che, una volta terminata 
la loro giornata lavorativa in Beretta, o presso una delle tante altre aziende locali, 
facevano qualche fucile o qualche riparazione in casa. Tutto il paese viveva per 
l’attività di lavorazione delle armi ed era usuale vedere persone spostarsi per il 
paese con una scatola di cartone con all’interno parti d’arma sciolte da consegnare 
al committente o al lavorante di turno. 
 
Immagino che talvolta questa attività venisse svolta anche senza un’apposita 
licenza e in nero… 
“Grigio” dai… più volte abbiamo domandato se per fare quelle lavorazioni fosse 
necessaria una licenza di fabbricazione o di riparazione armi e venne risposto in 
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maniera negativa. Tuttavia queste erano affermazioni fatte dalla Questura e non dal 
Ministero dell’Interno per cui non necessariamente il Questore successivo avallava 
la stessa regola. Ancora oggi, sebbene le lavorazioni a domicilio non siano più 
praticate ed il discorso riguardi solo le piccole aziende, c’è un dibattito aperto in 
merito alla necessità o meno di una licenza di riparazione per svolgere lavorazioni 
sulle singole parti. Io insisto nel sostenere che una licenza non serva perché a quel 
contoterzista non consegno l’arma intera ma un solo componente e comunque io, 
titolare di Licenza di Pubblica Sicurezza e dell’azienda committente, mi assumo la 
responsabilità e rispondo in prima persona per il materiale consegnato loro. 
 
Per quel che riguarda la rappresentanza sindacale nelle aziende del comparto 
armiero com’è la situazione in Val Trompia e come si è evoluta nel corso del 
tempo? 
La Val Trompia è sempre stata molto sindacalizzata. Direi che negli anni ’70 noi 
produttori ci siamo resi conto che il sindacato non difendeva il settore armiero, 
ovviamente difendeva il posto di lavoro ma una certa parte del sindacato era anche 
contraria al fatto che noi continuassimo la produzione armiera. Forse anche il 
sindacato era stato condizionato da quel falso perbenismo per cui si dava la colpa 
al settore delle armi per tutti i problemi legati agli anni di piombo; una logica che 
ancora oggi è purtroppo forte e che si concretizza in normative sempre più restrittive 
per il nostro settore di fronte a ogni evento tragico come i fatti del 13 novembre 
2015 di Parigi. 
Tornando ai sindacati io reputo che, sebbene essi abbiano fatto la loro parte, in certi 
casi abbiano esagerato o, in altri ancora, che i dipendenti abbiano prevalso sul 
sindacato stesso. Ciò è avvenuto soprattutto in alcune situazioni amministrative e 
un esempio è quello del Banco Nazionale di Prova. Quest’ultimo, infatti, è una sorta 
di imbuto dove tutti devono passare: è capitato di trovarsi in situazioni in cui o 
davamo ai suoi 40/50 dipendenti ciò che volevano o si rifiutavano di realizzare la 
prova delle armi obbligatoria per la commercializzazione, bloccando di fatto tutto 
il comparto. Abbiamo fatto battaglie importanti, sollevando anche la questione in 
merito all’ammissibilità dello sciopero in un servizio pubblico come quello della 
prova forzata delle armi. Tuttavia ancora oggi il problema non ha trovato una 
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soluzione e si stanno valutando strade come quella di creare banchi alternativi. 
 
La presenza dell’arsenale come incideva sul contesto locale? 
Quella dell’arsenale era certamente una bella realtà che occupava un discreto 
numero di persone e dipendeva dall’arsenale di Terni. Sebbene vi fosse una certa 
quota di produzione interna, esso provvedeva soprattutto all’assemblaggio e al 
collaudo di tutte le armi militari prodotte soprattutto dalla Beretta. Da lì sono uscite 
tante persone dotate di esperienza e sempre da lì provenivano molti di quelli che 
facevano il cosiddetto lavoro serale. Tuttavia progressivamente le mansioni sono 
state spostate a Terni e la sede locale ha perso completamente la sua importanza 
intorno alla fine degli anni ’70. 
 
Qual è stato il ruolo del comune nello sviluppo della specializzazione 
produttiva? 
Io faccio riferimento ancora agli anni ’70, in particolare al 1975: in quel periodo 
noi non siamo stati difesi. Di fronte a una stretta senza precedenti sul piano 
legislativo e a una campagna mediatica che ci dipingeva come la fonte di tutti i 
mali, molta gente si è lasciata condizionare: nessuno voleva più iscrivere i propri 
figli alla scuola armaioli e anche l’Amministrazione Comunale, fatta eccezione per 
qualche riunione nei momenti più difficili, non si è battuta più di tanto. In fondo 
questa è la ragione per cui è nato il Consorzio proprio in quegli anni: di fronte a una 
nuova normativa che ci costringeva a cambiare radicalmente le nostre abitudini, e 
al tentativo di introdurre nuove pesanti tasse, si è sentita l’esigenza di un Consorzio 
che facesse attività sindacale. 
Ci furono alcuni personaggi del mondo delle istituzioni che certamente si batterono 
per gli interessi del settore: tra questi Giuseppe Grazioli, sindaco di Gardone Val 
Trompia per quasi 20 anni, ma in genere ci siamo sempre scontrati con politici che 
qui parlavano in un certo modo e poi a Roma, isolati in un contesto ostile alle armi, 
non ci rappresentavano. 
Posso portare anche un esempio delle difficoltà con cui gli artigiani armaioli 
dovettero avere a che fare: in Commissione Consultiva Centrale delle Armi, 
costituita proprio secondo la normativa del 1975 presso il Ministero dell’Interno, la 
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produzione medio-piccola era vagamente rappresentata. Le aziende più grosse 
avevano rappresentati dalla retorica molto più aulica rispetto ai nostri che 
ascoltavano e ascoltavano, ma non riuscivano ad incidere sulle decisioni. Dal 1988, 
quando sono stato eletto Presidente, ritengo che le cose siano un po’ cambiate. 
Non abbiamo lesinato impegno nemmeno sul piano mediatico: pagando viaggio, 
vitto e alloggio, a inizio anni ’90 abbiamo portato un giornalista del Giornale di 
Brescia allo Shot Show chiedendogli di fare uno spaccato del mondo armiero 
americano e della reputazione delle aziende bresciane negli Stati Uniti e nel resto 
del mondo. A seguito di questa visita sono stati pubblicati una serie di articoli che 
non dico abbiano ribaltato la visione delle cose, ma certamente hanno riacceso quel 
senso di appartenenza che stava andando perso. 
 
Qual è stato il ruolo delle banche nel sistema produttivo locale? 
Le nostre banche di riferimento erano la Cariplo e il Credito Agrario Bresciano. 
Chiaro che la banca fa il proprio lavoro, fa le proprie scelte, ma tutto sommato 
ritengo che le banche locali, prima delle grandi aggregazioni, abbiano abbastanza 
aiutato le aziende. 
Ci sono stati fallimenti, però abbastanza limitati se facciamo un confronto con altre 
realtà come quella di Lumezzane. Le aziende locali non hanno mai avuto né grandi 
exploit né grandi crolli e ciò è in parte dovuto anche al fatto che tutti i nostri prodotti 
sono immatricolati e siamo pertanto impegnati al massimo della legalità. Dove tutto 
è tracciato, come nel settore armiero, è difficile non lavorare alla luce del sole, anzi 
direi impossibile. Qui non ci sono mai state delle grandi aziende, piuttosto aziende 
solide e patrimonializzate: non ci sono neppure case faraoniche. 
Comunque, per lo meno fino alla stagione delle grandi agglomerazioni, le banche 
hanno svolto il loro compito, anche se non si può dire che si siano mai distinte per 
particolari iniziative a favore delle associazioni. Oggi, poi, è sempre necessario 
lottare per ridurre i costi che impongono alle aziende. 
Da ultimo mi preme ricordare che l’agenzia di Gardone Val Trompia di UBI Banca 
spa è la più importante del gruppo perché qui c’è una grande raccolta, non ci sono 
grosse sofferenze e permane un’economia che si è mantenuta sufficientemente 
costante negli anni, sebbene anche a Gardone la crisi del 2008 si sia fatta sentire. 
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Per di più, la nostra economia si è basata, e ancora oggi si regge, su degli affezionati 
appassionati del settore armiero (cosa non da poco) e sull’esportazione. 
Un capitolo a parte è rappresentato invece dalle banche etiche, che da alcuni anni 
ci chiedono un impegno a non produrre armi da guerra, ma senza che loro stesse 
conoscano effettivamente la normativa in materia di armi comuni e da guerra. 
Ovviamente questo impegno deve essere scritto, cosa che come Presidente del 
Consorzio non ho mai sottoscritto, più per una questione di principio, anche perché 
sicuramente le mie armi e quelle dei nostri associati, difficilmente potrebbero essere 
associate al concetto di guerra. Credo invece che, parlando di etica, debbano essere 
le banche a farsi un esame di coscienza e studiare le normative italiane: potrebbero 
apprendere che, quando una licenza viene rilasciata dal Ministero dell’Interno e 
degli Esteri, significa che i funzionari, compresi i Servizi Segreti, hanno fatto tutte 
le verifiche che autorizzano l’azienda produttrice all’operazione e che il falso 
perbenismo della banca etica è privo di senso. 
 
Il Banco di Prova ha dato un contributo alla produzione dal punto di vista 
tecnologico? 
Faccio una premessa: io siedo nel consiglio d’amministrazione del Banco 
Nazionale di Prova e credo che se questa istituzione non esistesse bisognerebbe 
crearla. Il BNP è certamente un punto di riferimento e, anche tramite l’adesione al 
CIP, ha permesso ai produttori di fare importanti passi nella direzione della 
standardizzazione dei prodotti. In altre parole, noi produttori, dovendoci adeguare 
a determinati requisiti, abbiamo finito per creare un prodotto mediamente valido 
sotto il profilo qualitativo. Da ultimo, non bisogna dimenticare che il Banco di 
Prova offre una serie di servizi alle aziende: svolge ricerche specifiche sui materiali 
di produzione, fa delle prove su prototipi e fornisce suggerimenti di carattere 
tecnico. 
 
Che cosa mi può dire a proposito dell’idea di famiglia all’interno del contesto 
locale in cui lei è cresciuto? 
Io sono figlio d’arte e ho scelto autonomamente di fare il lavoro di mio padre. Lo 
stesso vale per mio figlio. Credo che questo sia il risultato di una cerchia famigliare 
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all’interno della quale è possibile vivere un senso d’appartenenza molto forte e 
ritengo che questo sia un aspetto molto importante non solo per il mio specifico 
caso ma per tutta la realtà gardonese. Se guardiamo al Consorzio, tra i suoi associati 
sono moltissime le aziende che sono alla seconda, terza o anche quarta generazione. 
 
La grande azienda, e in particolar modo Beretta, ha interpretato anche un 
ruolo di rappresentante del resto del comparto? 
La Beretta parla per sé, diciamolo chiaramente, però è evidente che svolga un po’ 
il ruolo di “mamma” del settore e che da questa cosa noi produttori medio-piccoli 
traiamo dei vantaggi. Non si può dimenticare anche il fatto che molti degli 
imprenditori delle ditte artigiane hanno imparato il mestiere all’interno della Beretta 
e in certi casi, una volta aperta la loro attività, hanno mantenuto una relazione con 
l’azienda, magari in un rapporto di contoterzismo. 
A proposito di questo tema mi sembra sia da sottolineare anche il fatto che il 
CONARMI lavora spesso in collaborazione con l’Anpam, ovvero l’altra 
associazione di categoria alla quale fa riferimento la grande azienda. Con questa 
realtà i rapporti negli ultimi anni sono andati intensificandosi e, in tal senso, si può 
fare l’esempio di Sigma (Sistema Integrato Gestione Movimentazione Armi). Il 
Consorzio Armaioli Italiani, avendo a disposizione dei contributi da parte di 
Regione Lombardia che dovevano essere spesi per la filiera, ha pensato di 
migliorare le comunicazioni e i rapporti con la Questura di Brescia informatizzando 
tutto il sistema per la richiesta e gestione dei permessi di vendita, trasporto, 
esportazione etc. Tre anni fa, partendo dalla creazione di una Rete d’impresa in cui 
è entrata anche la Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta spa, sono stati investiti più di 
600.000€ per creare un portale online che sta dando grandi soddisfazioni e che ha 
semplificato consistentemente la parte burocratica del nostro lavoro. È 
un’operazione, questa, di grande trasparenza e, credo sia opportuno sottolinearlo, 
uno dei pochi casi in Italia in cui è il privato a supportare il pubblico. Altre occasioni 
di collaborazione con la grande azienda sono state la sponsorizzazione della scuola 
armaioli, ma anche alcune questioni organizzative legate alla partecipazione a fiere 




Per concludere: se dovesse identificare i tratti caratterizzanti, sia in senso 
positivo che negativo, del sistema produttivo locale, quali indicherebbe? 
Direi quelle che sono le caratteristiche italiane: la fantasia, il design e la capacità 
lavorativa; e se anche è vero che la gente della Val Trompia può avere all’apparenza 
un carattere introverso, è altrettanto vero che è anche molto propositiva, generosa e 
costante. Noi produciamo un prodotto finito che è pensato per il divertimento della 
gente, a dispetto di tutto quello che dicono i nostri detrattori. Produciamo per la 
caccia, per il tiro al piattello o, ancora, per le rievocazioni storiche, certamente non 
per la morte. Realizziamo prodotti di alta qualità, una qualità che dagli anni ’50 in 
poi è andata sempre più crescendo anche grazie al lavoro di veri e propri artisti quali 
i locali maestri incisori. Siamo conosciuti nel mondo intero per il nostro lavoro e la 
passione che ci mettiamo: continueremo a volare in alto nonostante questo dia 




5.2 Interview with Cristina Abbiatico 




Cristina Abbiatico was chief executive officer of her family business, FAMARS, 
an Italian gun maker that produced bespoke shotguns and rifles. The company, 
founded in 1967 by Mario Abbiatico (her father) and Remo Salvinelli, became well-
known in the firearms world for its patented detachable-lock designs and 
handcrafted woodworking and engraving. 
Cristina, born in 1965, grew up in Gardone Val Trompia, and joined the firm to fill 
her father’s shoes when she was only 19. Since the 1980s, with Remo Salvinelli 
manufacturing the guns and Cristina managing the commercial side, FAMARS 
popularity grew immeasurably. The company used to carry out all the production 
in its factory in Gardone and produced no more than 110 guns in a year.  
FAMARS was considered one of the top-quality Italian gun manufacturers and the 
success of its guns played a significant role in making the art of Italian bulino 
engraving famous. Mario Abbiatico also wrote several books regarding firearms 
engraving, he published: Grande Incisione su Armi d’Oggi in 1976, Modern 
Firearms Engraving in 1980 and L’incisione delle Armi Sportive in 1982. Finally, 
in 1985, a year after his death, FAMARS published his last book, entitled Fra la 
Mia Gente, including interesting information regarding several gunsmiths and the 




Innanzitutto le chiedo di presentarsi. 
Mi chiamo Cristina Abbiatico, sono nata il 7 gennaio del 1965 a Brescia e sono 
cresciuta a Gardone Val Trompia. Sono diplomata al liceo linguistico e finito il 
liceo sono entrata subito nel campo lavorativo perché in quell’anno, il 1984, era 
morto mio padre, pertanto sono subentrata a lui nell’azienda di famiglia. La nostra 
era un’azienda che operava nel settore delle armi, nata nel 1967, e che all’inizio, 
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così come tante altre aziende della zona, ha iniziato assemblando parti e 
semilavorati realizzati da altre ditte. In seguito, tra il 1973 e il 1974, è stato deciso 
di prendere come punto di riferimento la produzione inglese, la più quotata sia dal 
punto di vista qualitativo che del valore di mercato, puntando molto sulla qualità 
dei prodotti e, pertanto, iniziando a utilizzare parti realizzate all’interno della nostra 
fabbrica e/o in maniera industriale. 
 
Quando venne presa la decisione strategica di puntare sulla qualità dei 
prodotti? 
Tra il 1973 e il 1974. All’inizio, come dicevo, si realizzava soprattutto un’attività 
di assemblaggio, poi si è iniziato con il fucile a cani esterni, il cosiddetto “comune”, 
che però era stato fatto già in modo un po’ alternativo, ovvero con estrattore e 
armamento automatico. 
 
L’azienda come nacque? 
L’azienda venne fondata nel 1967 da mio papà, Mario Abbiatico, e da Remo 
Salvinelli. Quest’ultimo era il figlio di un incisore amico di mio padre e, sebbene 
non avesse ancora alcuna esperienza quando la società venne aperta, ebbe poi modo 
di acquisire numerose competenze, soprattutto legate alla produzione, all’interno 
della stessa azienda. Mentre mio padre si occupava della parte commerciale. 
 
Lei invece con che compiti entrò in azienda? 
Era una ditta a livello familiare, quindi non vi erano molti incarichi dirigenziali o 
particolari schemi organizzativi: mio papà seguiva il commerciale per cui anch’io 
ho continuato ad occuparmi dello stesso ambito. Io ho proseguito con lo stesso 
Salvinelli fino a quando nel 1989 è subentrato un altro socio, un cliente che decise 
di entrare solo, però, a livello finanziario. 
 
Che cosa si ricorda della sua infanzia e gioventù a Gardone Val Trompia? 
Gardone Val Trompia e, in particolare la frazione di Inzino, me li ricordo come un 
agglomerato di alcune famiglie molto amiche, tutte legate al settore delle armi; 
sebbene non ci sia mai stata a Gardone una collaborazione vera e propria, come era 
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a Lumezzane dove si andava tutti insieme sul mercato a comprare l’acciaio. 
Comunque ricordo dei buoni rapporti tra la gente e i nuclei familiari del paese. 
Un altro aspetto che mi è sempre rimasto impresso sono quelle micro strutture che 
oggi non esistono più. Ad esempio, c’era chi faceva la brunitura delle canne in 
piccoli laboratori che assomigliavano più che altro a delle cantine da cui uscivano 
fumi e odori di ogni tipo: sembrava di entrare in un girone dell’inferno. Facevano 
le “tartarughe” alla vecchia maniera: c’erano Ricetti e Mandora che avevano la loro 
ricetta speciale per donare quella particolare colorazione blu-verde che si vede sui 
fucili antichi, una ricetta che non fa ricorso a nulla di chimico ma richiede l’utilizzo 
di ossa di mucca e altri materiali coriacei. Tutte cose che oggi non sono più legali e 
che oggi sono state sostituite da trattamenti chimici che vengono effettuati sotto 
strettissimi controlli. 
Un’ulteriore cosa che ricordo molto bene che oggi non c’è più, o che se è ancora 
presente lo è in maniera molto ridotta rispetto al passato, sono gli operai di aziende 
come Beretta che alla sera lavoravano a casa loro: nei garage o in qualche angolo 
della casa c’era una morsa e in questo modo la gente si guadagnava il secondo 
stipendio. Ovviamente, come dicevo, anche questo è andato scomparendo: nel bene 
e nel male. Nel bene perché non era una pratica legale. Nel male perché è stato un 
fenomeno che comunque è stato cruciale nello sviluppo del comparto armiero 
locale, soprattutto per le aziende artigiane che, solitamente, non potendo permettersi 
dipendenti specializzati su singole operazioni, avevano i due operai per il 
montaggio, spesso membri della famiglia, e poi si affidavano a figure esterne per 
fare altre lavorazioni. Un altro aspetto negativo del venir meno di questo fenomeno 
è legato alla particolare mentalità della gente valtrumplina che non ama molto 
trasmettere le proprie conoscenze ed esperienze: è andata così perdendosi questa 
componente molto manuale del lavoro che anche grazie al lavoro a casa, 
generalmente affidato ai lavoratori più dotati, aveva sempre rappresentato un tratto 
distintivo della produzione locale. A proposito di questa particolare mentalità del 
luogo, posso raccontare che all’interno della mia azienda abbiamo dovuto assumere 
i nipoti dell’incassatore e dell’operaio che faceva l’ejector perché erano disponibili 




In sostanza si può dire che l’esternalizzazione di fasi del processo produttivo 
era pratica diffusa… 
Sì, certamente! Per realizzare un fucile sportivo non basta un operaio, ci sono tante 
operazioni da svolgere che necessitano di competenze specifiche e un operaio si 
può specializzare su una di queste operazioni. L’azienda artigiana, pertanto, 
assumeva il lavoratore che faceva il montaggio finale e le altre operazioni 
intermedie le esternalizzava. Non c’era abbastanza volume di lavoro per poter 
assumere una persona specializzata in un’operazione sola; inoltre, passando gli 
anni, alcune figure diventavano numericamente sempre più esigue. Ad esempio, c’è 
stato il periodo della mancanza degli incassatori. L’incassatura è un lavoro di 
grandissima precisione, di responsabilità (perché sul fucile di qualità il calcio ha un 
costo importante) e non riconosciuto da un punto di vista artistico come nel caso 
dell’incisione. Per tutta questa serie di motivi c’è stato un periodo in cui gli addetti 
a questa mansione erano rimasti veramente in pochi. Adesso grazie alla scuola e 
alla formazione in Beretta la situazione è un po’ cambiata. C’è anche da dire che 
per quel che riguarda questo tipo di mansione ho sempre visto poca intraprendenza: 
pochi incassatori hanno avuto il coraggio di mettersi in proprio e, questo, 
nonostante sulle lavorazioni del legno le opportunità di fare del nero non 
mancassero. Gli incisori invece, quanto a imprenditorialità, hanno sempre 
dimostrato maggiore dinamismo anche perché c’era, e c’è tutt’oggi, un abisso tra 
quello che un incisore guadagna da dipendente o da lavoratore in proprio. 
 
Le armi ricoprivano un ruolo importante nella vita delle persone? 
Le armi e la loro lavorazione erano tutto per Gardone e la sua gente. La vita allora 
era scandita dal suono della sirena della Beretta: la sirena suonava a mezzogiorno e 
tutti alle 12:15 pranzavano e lo stesso avveniva alle ore 18:00 con la cena. Anche 
oggi l’attività armiera riveste un ruolo importante e influenza gli aspetti della vita 
del paese se si pensa che tutte le aziende chiudono ad agosto perché in quel mese 
chiude il Banco di Prova; anni fa tutto ruotava intorno a questo settore e, in 
particolare, alla Beretta. Del resto la Beretta è sempre stata la grande “mamma” del 
sistema produttivo locale e il titolare era molto legato al contesto locale: addirittura 
il titolare faceva il padrino ai figli dei suoi capiofficina e dei suoi dipendenti. Inoltre 
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si era creata una grande sintonia anche grazie al fatto che la famiglia proprietaria 
avesse contribuito alla creazione di luoghi di aggregazione e utilità sociale come il 
cinema, la casa di riposo, la mensa, la colonia per i bambini in Maniva. Poi, nel 
tempo, le cose sono un po’ cambiate con la creazione della holding, c’è stato anche 
un vero e proprio allontanamento fisico dal paese. Ad ogni modo anche gli attuali 
componenti della famiglia sono persone molto stimate e sono molto disponibili 
quando hai a che fare con loro. 
Anche il Banco di Prova è sempre stato un centro nevralgico del contesto locale 
perché era e ancora oggi è lo snodo da cui tutti devono passare. Per fare un paragone 
il Banco era un po’ come la lavanderia di un tempo, dove tutte le donne si recavano 
e scambiavano due chiacchere: il Banco era il luogo dove ai produttori spesso 
capitava di incrociarsi e, inoltre, rappresentava un importante punto di riferimento 
sul piano tecnologico. 
 
La Bernardelli invece? 
La Bernardelli per numero di dipendenti e impatto sociale sul paese aveva un peso 
minore rispetto alla Beretta, però era comunque un punto di riferimento e i titolari 
erano persone splendide, di una cultura immensa e ben voluti dalla gente. Come 
dimensioni aziendali poi c’era Zoli che assieme allo stesso Ciso Bernardelli 
rappresentavano un po’ i gentlemen del paese. 
 
Mi sembra molto interessante ciò che in precedenza diceva a proposito della 
trasmissione delle competenze: è singolare che la gente del posto avesse un 
legame così forte con il lavoro delle armi, ma fosse poco incline alla 
trasmissione delle proprie conoscenze… 
È una cosa effettivamente curiosa ma è un aspetto che era presente nella realtà 
locale. La gente era molto orgogliosa del proprio lavoro, ma non era insolito vedere 
persone gelose del proprio mestiere e delle proprie competenze. Certo, non erano 
tutti così, però la mentalità piuttosto diffusa era “io ho impiegato tanti anni a 
imparare e a uno che non conosco non insegno” e solitamente il canale di 
trasmissione del mestiere era quello della famiglia. Questo è anche uno dei motivi 
per cui è possibile incontrare molte ditte con lo stesso nome, perché all’interno dello 
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stesso nucleo famigliare si tramandava un mestiere e i componenti della famiglia, 
dopo aver imparato dal papà piuttosto che da uno zio, aprivano la loro attività. 
A proposito delle capacità manuali, penso sia giusto anche sottolineare la grande 
importanza che si dava alla gavetta nella piccola ma anche nella grande azienda, 
dove a posizioni di responsabilità normalmente accedevano persone che avevano 
iniziato a lavorare come operai e da lì salivano nella scala gerarchica. In altre parole 
era molto importante per il lavoratore sapere che il suo responsabile avesse ben 
presente il suo lavoro e che in un certo senso provenisse dallo stesso “mondo”. 
 
C’era tra le aziende un movimento, uno “scambio” della manodopera? 
No, anzi, c’erano una sorta di taciti patti per cui non si dovevano portare via gli 
operai alle altre aziende. Per esempio noi collaboravamo con Beretta ed era bene 
inteso che quest’ultima non poteva fare offerte ai nostri dipendenti, questo perché 
formare un operaio non era una cosa da poco: ci volevano degli anni, penso in 
particolar modo agli incassatori. Non era cosa insolita, invece, che l’operaio, una 
volta appreso il mestiere, decidesse di aprire una propria attività: in questo caso 
penso soprattutto agli incisori che, formatisi alla scuola di Giovanelli, quando erano 
in grado, si staccavano per mettersi in proprio anche perché questo gli dava 
opportunità di guadagno ben diverse. 
 
Anche nel tempo libero le armi avevano questa grande importanza? 
Nel mio caso posso dire che il tiro al piattello non mi è mai piaciuto, mentre la 
caccia sì anche se, visto il grande impegno che l’azienda richiedeva, il tempo per 
poterla praticare era veramente poco. 
Nel contesto locale, invece, la caccia è sempre stata molto sentita e ancora oggi lo 
è, sebbene essa non abbia sulle nuove generazioni l’appeal di una volta. Comunque 
c’è sempre stato questo connubio: uno lavorava in una ditta di armi come la Beretta, 
a casa svolgeva qualche lavorazione manuale e nel tempo libero andava a caccia. Il 
tiro, invece, stranamente, non ha mai avuto grandissimo seguito. Innanzitutto 
bisogna dire che già per noi armaioli era un problema non avere un posto dove 
andare a sparare. L’unico campo che c’era era quello a Ponte Zanano che è stato 
chiuso per disturbo ambientale e un campo da tiro dove poter trovare i 
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rappresentanti di varie ditte e testare i fucili prima dell’acquisto non è mai esistito. 
Se si voleva far provare un fucile a un cliente bisognava salire in Val Duppo, dopo 
Lodrino, o a Lonato o a Ghedi. Evidentemente il sindaco e le varie amministrazioni 
di Gardone non hanno mai ritenuto questa una cosa fondamentale: c’è il tiro a 
segno, ma non un luogo attrezzato con macchine lanciapiattelli. 
 
Quali sono state le principali motivazioni che l’hanno spinta ad entrare 
nell’azienda di famiglia? 
Da un certo punto di vista l’ho sempre sentita come una cosa molto mia: i fucili, il 
lavoro di mio padre, il mondo delle incisioni. Certo, avrei preferito continuare gli 
studi, in particolare mi affascinavano gli studi umanistici e di giurisprudenza, ma, 
come detto in precedenza, il fato ha voluto così visto che mio padre è venuto a 
mancare. 
 
Ha dei fratelli e delle sorelle? 
Sì ho una sorella e un fratello, entrambi più giovani: rispettivamente hanno 7 e 8 
anni meno di me. Anche loro sono entrati in azienda: mia sorella mi aiutava 
nell’amministrazione, mentre mio fratello affiancava Salvinelli, sebbene 
quest’ultimo non gli abbia insegnato più di tanto i trucchi del mestiere. 
 
Leggendo e ascoltando testimonianze sulla vita del posto, ricorre l’idea 
secondo la quale tra la seconda metà degli anni ’70 e gli anni ’80 si sia 
affievolito il senso di appartenenza della comunità locale al lavoro delle armi. 
Erano gli anni in cui lei entrava in azienda, percepì questo clima che 
cambiava? 
È vero che un po’ il rapporto si era snaturalizzato: in Beretta i ragazzi entravano 
volentieri perché era la grande azienda e assicurava la sicurezza economica e del 
posto di lavoro. Sicuramente c’erano ragazzi che guardando a loro padre che aveva 
condotto una vita da artigiano o operaio non erano attratti dalla stessa prospettiva e 
c’è stato un po’ un abbandono. Ad ogni modo il Consorzio Armaioli ha cercato di 
fronteggiare questa problematica; in particolare, penso alla riapertura della scuola 
armaioli per la quale l’associazione, non senza difficoltà, se si considera che 
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all’inizio pagavamo l’iscrizione e spingevamo nostri due dipendenti a partecipare 
perché i corsi raggiungessero il quorum dei partecipanti, si è data molto da fare. Ora 
io non seguo più da vicino la cosa, ma sento dire che ci sono parecchi ragazzi che 
frequentano, diversi dei quali stranieri, che il Consorzio è molto attivo e che tutte 
le sue iniziative raccolgono una grande partecipazione; addirittura avevo sentito di 
una mezza idea di aprire una piccola foresteria per ragazzi che vengono dall’estero. 
Un altro fatto curioso, poi, che ricordo a proposito di questo tema della formazione 
e dell’interesse per il settore armiero è la nutrita presenza di ragazzi francesi in 
paese a inizio anni 2000. Il mondo delle armi è sempre stato concentrato in alcuni 
luoghi ben precisi dove trovava luogo anche il banco di prova delle armi: in Italia 
c’è Gardone, in Austria c’è Ferlach, in Spagna c’è Eibar e in Francia c’era Saint-
Étienne. Nella Loira c’era la scuola armaioli ma era poco il lavoro e le opportunità 
per fare pratica latitavano, pertanto un gruppo di giovani decisero di passare un 
certo periodo di tempo nelle aziende gardonesi: alcuni, poi, si son fermati mentre 
altri, dopo aver fatto esperienza, sono tornati in Francia e hanno aperto delle 
botteghe di riparazione o cose del genere. 
 
Sulla base della sua esperienza, secondo lei quali erano gli elementi che 
facevano la differenza e permettevano di ottenere successo nel settore 
armiero? 
Secondo me, ma vedo che è stata seguita da tanti, la strada era ed è quella della 
qualità. Come dicevo, l’evoluzione è stata: FIAS Sabatti che costruiva le “serie” in 
bianco e i vari Piotti, Rizzini, noi stessi che acquistavamo ed assemblavamo; poi, 
nel corso degli ultimi 40/50 anni, le aziende hanno cercato sempre più di fare 
qualcosa di proprio. In altre parole inizialmente si acquistava la “serie” e avevi ben 
poco margine di personalizzazione, con gli anni ’70 si è cercato di puntare sulla 
qualità dei propri prodotti realizzando sempre più parti all’interno della propria 
fabbrica. In fondo questo è stato il trend che hanno seguito, più avanti negli anni, 
anche quelle aziende che precedentemente avevano puntato su quantità e qualità 
medio-bassa. Questo credo sia stato determinato anche dalla concorrenza: fino agli 
anni ’90 sul mercato dei fucili ad uso sportivo c’erano gli inglesi che avevano 
prodotti di qualità eccelsa a prezzi intoccabili e poi, fondamentalmente, c’erano gli 
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italiani che abbinavano una buona qualità a prezzi più accessibili; qualcosa 
facevano anche i francesi e i tedeschi, con quest’ultimi che si rivolgevano 
soprattutto a una nicchia di mercato con un particolare gusto (per fare un paragone 
con il settore automobilistico si potrebbe pensare all’Alfa Romeo e agli “alfisti”). 
In seguito, a partire dagli anni ’90, hanno cominciato ad affacciarsi sul mercato gli 
spagnoli, che si sono specializzati nella produzione di doppiette e sono arrivati a 
livelli nel rapporto qualità-prezzo difficilissimi da eguagliare, e i turchi che, con 
prezzi stracciati, hanno fatto man bassa. 
Ad ogni modo la grande scuola è stata quella degli inglesi; la loro produzione è 
stata il principale punto di riferimento per gli italiani che hanno cercato di 
inseguirne la qualità mantenendo dei prezzi più accessibili, apportando qualche 
elemento di novità nel design e nei materiali di produzione. Ad oggi nessuno ha 
seriamente cercato di applicare le nuove tecnologie ai fucili sportivi, l’unico che ha 
provato a fare qualcosa è stato l’austriaco Peter Hofer che ha inserito un gps nel 
fucile che tiene conto del numero di colpi sparati e rileva la posizione dell’arma; 
per il resto, l’innovazione in questo settore è rimasta “limitata”, come dicevo, 
all’introduzione di nuove linee e nuovi materiali. C’è sempre stato questo gap, in 
un certo senso normale e giusto, tra l’arma militare, che dal punto di vista 
tecnologico è incredibile, e quella sportiva; però se qualcuno avesse voglia di fare 
qualcosa di nuovo gli spazi ci sarebbero: i due cani e il grilletto ormai l’han fatto 
un po’ tutti. 
 
Tra anni ’70 e ’80 si sente l’esigenza, anche tra le piccole aziende, di un 
cambiamento nella maniera di produrre in funzione della ricerca di una 
maggiore qualità, secondo lei questa esigenza da dove nasce? 
Credo due fenomeni, tra loro legati, stiano alla base di tutto ciò. Innanzitutto il 
“guardare in casa d’altri”: i produttori vedevano quello che i concorrenti facevano, 
le scelte che altri imprenditori adottavano e in un certo senso “copiavano”. In 
secondo luogo, la richiesta di standard qualitativi sempre più elevati da parte della 
clientela che portava gli stessi produttori a voler e dover offrire sempre qualcosa in 




Immagino che, in quegli anni, anche la meccanizzazione del processo 
produttivo sia aumentata… 
Già agli inizi c’erano alcune aziende come Sabatti che erano industrializzate, tanto 
è vero che facevano queste famose “serie”, ma tutti gli artigiani, che le serie le 
acquistavano, avevano al massimo un piccolo tornio; ad esempio la nostra ditta partì 
da un garage con due torni. Poi, poco a poco, sono state introdotte delle macchine, 
ma comunque erano delle macchine tradizionali (non a controllo numerico) anche 
perché, avendo una produzione molto limitata in termini quantitativi, ammortizzare 
i costi non era facile. Ancora oggi, per questo motivo, ci sono ditte che fanno 
prodotti di qualità che utilizzano macchinari tradizionali, mentre noi, negli ultimi 
anni, ci eravamo dotati di 3 centri a controllo numerico con 4 assi e 2 elettrolusioni. 
Discorso a parte, tra i produttori di fucili di qualità, è il caso di Fabbri, prima a 
Concesio e ora a Nave: Fabbri è un ingegnere che ha sempre avuto un approccio 
completamente diverso al fucile di qualità, un approccio più industriale. Questo, 
innanzitutto per la sua formazione e poi, probabilmente, per le sue origini visto che 
non è della Val Trompia ma romagnolo. Qualcuno diceva che il suo fucile non 
aveva un’anima perché fatto a macchina, ma non si può negare che fosse molto 
bello e che avesse pochissimi problemi sotto il profilo meccanico.  
 
Quali furono le sue difficoltà nell’approcciare il settore delle armi? 
Devo dire che grosse difficoltà non ne ricordo; anche il fatto di essere in un settore 
maschile non rappresentò un ostacolo, anzi io ricordo che tanti clienti erano contenti 
di poter parlare con una donna di un fucile. Mentre per quel che riguarda gli aspetti 
più tecnici io sono nata in questo ambiente che viveva e vive di fucili: non è che di 
punto in bianco mi sono trovata catapultata in una realtà a me sconosciuta e, 
oltretutto, già l’anno prima che mio padre morisse avevo fatto uno stage in azienda. 
Era una realtà quotidiana sentir parlare di incisioni e calci, così come era esperienza 
comune incontrare persone con cui confrontarsi e che ti davano consigli a proposito 
di un acciarino o di qualche altra parte del fucile. Pertanto non ci fu l’esigenza di 
dovermi mettere a studiare il prodotto. 
 
Ritiene che questa cosa valesse anche per i suoi coetanei? 
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Un po’ dipendeva dalla famiglia, però direi di sì. Basti pensare che tra i miei 
coscritti praticamente tutti sono entrati nel settore prendendo in mano l’azienda di 
famiglia. 
 
Qual è stato il contributo più importante che ritiene di aver dato alla sua 
azienda? 
Passa ad altro dai [ride]… Beh, forse, una visione un po’ meno “valtrumplina” nella 
gestione dell’azienda; ad esempio le fiere del settore, come quella di Norimberga o 
altre in America, siamo stati i primi a farle e il sito internet con l’e-commerce 
l’abbiamo fatto più di 20 anni fa. Diciamo una visione un po’ più aperta… Negli 
Stati Uniti non partecipavo allo Shot Show, che era più per la produzione 
industriale, ma facevo 6 o 7 fiere. 
 
Ci sono state particolari difficoltà che la sua azienda, anche prima del suo 
ingresso, dovette affrontare? 
Io non ricordo grosse difficoltà; forse anche qui vale ciò che dicevo prima a 
proposito della reperibilità di alcune figure professionali specifiche. Per quel che 
riguarda invece gli aspetti legislativi, che sono sempre stati questione spinosa per il 
nostro settore, noi ce la siamo sempre cavata visto che i nostri fucili figuravano 
come armi sportive. Ricordo però diversi casi di aziende gardonesi che 
producevano parti, come caricatori e calci, che si ritrovarono la merce bloccata in 
dogana anche per lungo tempo. Problemi per il settore oggi sono le difficoltà 
naturali e indotte (si pensi ad esempio ai costi che vanno crescendo) legate alla 
pratica della caccia e, certamente, l’immagine che la gente ha della stessa: sia 
l’immagine della caccia a livello “tradizionale” che quella del safari. In particolare, 
è quest’ultima che, sebbene resista come attività d’élite, sta andando esaurendosi: è 
un peccato perché le armi per la caccia grossa sono molto belle, sopportano 
pressioni altissime e chi le sa produrre certamente ha grandi capacità. 
 
Quali erano i rapporti tuoi e di tuo padre con gli altri imprenditori della zona? 
C’erano famiglie con le quali eravamo legati da un buon rapporto d’amicizia e c’è 
sempre stato tra tutti un rapporto di rispetto. Per un breve periodo sono stata nel 
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Consorzio e pure in quel caso ho sempre visto buoni rapporti tra gli associati. Certo, 
è vero che l’associazione ha sempre fatto fatica a darsi dei grandi obiettivi comuni: 
c’era il momento di forte aggregazione per andare a Roma e fronteggiare una nuova 
normativa percepita come ostile, ma non si è mai arrivati a una vera condivisione, 
come accadeva a Ferlach, in Austria, dove i produttori utilizzavano in comune dei 
macchinari che servivano a tutti. 
 
A proposito dei rapporti con realtà imprenditoriali del resto della valle cosa 
può dire? 
Posso dire che Gardone è sempre stata una realtà molto chiusa. Le armi si facevano 
e si fanno qui, a Marcheno (che con Gardone è quasi la stessa cosa e dove molte 
aziende per ragioni di spazi si sono trasferite) e qualcosa a Sarezzo, anche se 
quest’ultimo è molto più legato a Lumezzane. A proposito di Lumezzane posso dire 
che con Gardone non c’è stata mai alcuna sinergia e hanno sempre costituito due 
nuclei ben distinti. Sono due realtà che sia per tipologia di prodotto che per 
mentalità differiscono. A Lumezzane, il cui mondo imprenditoriale ho potuto 
conoscere da vicino per mie vicende personali, c’è sempre stata più coesione e 
solidarietà: lì se qualcuno aveva bisogno di una mano gli altri si attivavano per 
aiutarlo, a Gardone questa cosa non l’ho mai vista. 
 
Come erano i tuoi rapporti e quelli di tuo padre con i dipendenti? 
Con i dipendenti c’era un rapporto quasi di tipo famigliare. Alcuni sono 
praticamente cresciuti con me: sono arrivati quando ero giovane e sono rimasti per 
moltissimi anni, uno addirittura più di 35 anni. Questa era una cosa abbastanza 
comune anche per altre aziende di dimensioni simili alla nostra, ma credo che nel 
nostro caso il legame fosse ancora più forte. 
 
La selezione del personale come avveniva? 
Come dicevo prima, c’era una sorta di “nepotismo” per cui si tendeva a passare per 
i canali famigliari propri e dei dipendenti. Si faceva venire il ragazzo in estate e si 
guardava se aveva un po’ di capacità manuale e, soprattutto, voglia di fare: da lì si 
partiva con l’apprendistato vero e proprio. Alcuni ragazzi ti venivano per l’appunto 
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segnalati, altri provenivano dalla scuola Zanardelli e altri ancora li avevamo assunti 
dopo un’esperienza di stage. Quella dello stage, secondo me, era una bella 
esperienza per questi ragazzi. 
 
Da dove provenivano i vostri dipendenti? 
Erano tutti locali, sostanzialmente tutti di Gardone. C’era qualcuno dell’alta valle 
ma risiedevano in zona. 
 
Quali erano i canali commerciali della vostra azienda? 
Dal punto di vista commerciale eravamo molto attivi, tanto è vero che non ci siamo 
fermati a fare EXA, la fiera locale che tutti quanti facevano. Certamente la fiera era 
il canale principale di vendita: ne facevamo tante, praticamente una al mese. Erano 
molto impegnative dal punto di vista della produzione perché, non avendo una 
selezione di fucili che utilizzavamo come campionatura, bisognava portare ciò su 
cui stavamo lavorando (magari partecipavamo con 3 fucili finiti e 2 in bianco). 
Abbiamo fatto parecchia pubblicità su riviste di settore americane (riviste dedicate 
a prodotti di lusso) e poi io ho sempre tenuto al sito internet con l’e-commerce (per 
gli accessori, ovviamente non per le armi). 
Il nostro mercato principale sono sempre stati gli Stati Uniti, inoltre ci eravamo 
dedicati molto all’Inghilterra grazie a dei buoni rapporti con dei forti distributori 
locali che ci permettevano di vendere parecchio. In Russia non siamo mai riusciti a 
entrare e anche nei Paesi arabi abbiamo sempre fatto molta fatica. 
 
Le altre aziende locali quando lei è entrata come si muovevano sul piano 
commerciale? Si ricorda episodi raccontati da suo padre a proposito di questo 
aspetto?  
Sostanzialmente quando sono entrata io le aziende locali erano “ferme” sotto il 
profilo commerciale. Come dicevo, i primi a fare le fiere siamo stato noi se si 
escludono le realtà di dimensioni maggiori e in pochissimi parlavano le lingue. Poi, 
più tardi, c’è stato qualche americano che si è inserito come tramite tra le ditte e i 
clienti, ma sostanzialmente gli artigiani non erano molto portati per le relazioni e 
gli aspetti commerciali. 
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In questo senso qual è stato il contributo di EXA? 
Io ad EXA, partendo dalla mia esperienza e dalla mia azienda, ho sempre guardato 
sotto il profilo della qualità e, da questo punto di vista, non è mai stata una fiera 
importante; la si faceva giusto perché era la fiera del territorio. Dal punto di vista 
organizzativo è sempre stata un disastro perché si faceva in locali poco consoni e 
con poca disponibilità di parcheggio. Diciamo che è stata una vetrina per il 
“cacciatore medio”. So che il Consorzio ha sempre cercato di collaborare con la 
Camera di Commercio per la buona riuscita di EXA, ad esempio organizzando 
un’esposizione di incisioni, però avevo anche sentito dire che la stessa Camera non 
si era dimostrata particolarmente sensibile alle richieste del Consorzio e degli 
espositori. 
 
Ritiene che la sua esperienza all’interno del settore armiero le abbia dato 
l’opportunità di acquisire delle capacità e competenze che le sono tornate utili 
anche al di fuori dello stesso settore.  
Sicuramente! Avendoci lavorato circa 30 anni mi ha dato molto. Innanzitutto, 
realizzando e vendendo prodotti di qualità ritengo di aver acquisito un occhio 
particolare per le cose belle. In secondo luogo, ho potuto viaggiare molto e 
incontrare molte persone di valore. 
 
Da ultimo, vorrei chiederle di individuare quelli che secondo lei sono i 
principali punti di forza e debolezza della produzione armiera locale. 
Senz’altro il punto di forza maggiore è rappresentato da una tradizione che c’è solo 
qua e che è legata al fatto alla concentrazione della produzione in una porzione così 
ridotta di territorio. Tuttavia, ritengo anche che proprio ragionando su questo 
aspetto si possano mettere in evidenza delle lacune nella promozione dei prodotti 
locali: il Consorzio si sta dando molto da fare, ma credo che si possa fare molto di 
più offrendo un’esperienza d’acquisto più accattivante ai clienti che si recano a 
Gardone. Dando maggiore coesione alle iniziative e alle realtà già presenti sul 
territorio (come la scuola Zanardelli) si potrebbe valorizzare molto di più la 




5.3 Interview with Giuseppe Pirlo 




Giuseppe Pirlo is an expert Val Trompia gunsmith, born on January 9, 1922, in 
Inzino. He attended the local professional school while working as an apprentice in 
a small workshop in Inzino. During World War II Giuseppe served in the Italian 
army on the Eastern Front. After miraculously returning home, he founded his gun 
making workshop. During his career he has learnt all the secrets of a gunsmith, 
working both on contract and as end producer. Due to his lengthy experience the 
interview brings out several important features of the actors in the industrial district 
of Gardone, in particular their adaptability and the spirit of competitiveness and 





Mi chiamo Giuseppe Pirlo e sono nato il 9 gennaio 1922 in Valle d’Inzino. 
Ho sempre avuto un’attrazione per i fucili e, fin da quando ero bambino, mi 
appassionava fermarmi ad osservare chi li lavorava. Per questo motivo, quando 
iniziai le scuole professionali Zanardelli, mio padre decise di affidarmi a un suo 
amico che era addentro al settore, un certo Mino Arturo, perché potessi imparare il 
mestiere. Alle ore 16 terminavo la scuola e correvo in officina da questo Mino; 
avevo 13 anni. 
All’età di 16 anni, essendo già armaiolo, trovai un impiego in Beretta: mi pagavano 
0,90 lire all’ora. Tuttavia dopo solo un mese venni a conoscenza del fatto che 
l’arsenale cercava dipendenti con una paga di 1,30 lire all’ora, pertanto decisi di 
presentarmi alle selezioni e immediatamente venni assunto. 
Tornato dalla guerra sono andato a lavorare come guardiano in OM, a Gardone, e 
arrotondavo vendendo qualche fucile (al tempo non c’erano tutte le restrizioni di 
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oggi per la vendita). Tuttavia, quando a fine anni ’40 l’azienda tornò nella sua sede 
in città decisi di licenziarmi e mi misi a produrre fucili per un avvocato di Brescia, 
appassionato di armi, che aveva un impiego in una banca della città. Questo signore 
era titolare dell’attività San Giorgio che successivamente divenne mia: la banca non 
gli permise più di fare il direttore e, allo stesso tempo, essere titolare di una ditta, 
pertanto egli decise di cedermela assieme alla licenza di fabbricazione. 
Nel corso degli anni ho imparato a conoscere sempre più approfonditamente i fucili 
da caccia; ero specializzato nella ramponatura ma mi dedicai anche ad altre 
lavorazioni del fucile. Con gli anni ’70 decisi di dedicarmi alla produzione di fucili 
fini: producevo pochi pezzi, di alta qualità e solo su ordinazione. 
 
Come era la vita e il lavoro all’interno dell’arsenale di Gardone Val Trompia? 
All’interno dell’arsenale veniva realizzato il fucile “Modello 38”: a Gardone si 
faceva l’intero prodotto ad eccezione della fusione delle barre che avveniva a 
Torino.  Io, inizialmente, venni impiegato come calibrista, ma dopo poco tempo la 
mia mansione cambiò: c’era bisogno di livellatori, una professione considerata 
difficile al tempo, e io accettai di applicarmi per imparare anche perché ciò mi 
permetteva di incrementare ulteriormente la paga arrivando a 2 lire e rotti all’ora. 
Non solo, dopo aver acquisito esperienza nella livellatura, spinto dal mio 
responsabile, decisi di fare il “capolavoro” per diventare livellatore maestro e vinsi 
il concorso. Una volta acquisita la qualifica di livellatore maestro mi venne 
assegnato un timbro con cui marchiare le canne da me livellate e controllate, inoltre 
venni mandato più volte a collaudare a Lumezzane le baionette che l’arsenale 
faceva realizzare ai produttori locali. 
 
Vi erano delle aziende che lavoravano per l’arsenale? 
Certo! La stessa Beretta produceva per l’arsenale. C’era una produzione interna, ma 
anche una quota di produzione che veniva affidata a aziende del territorio; vi erano 
pertanto dei collaudatori che, per conto dell’esercito, dovevano collaudare i prodotti 
realizzati da aziende come Beretta e Bernardelli. 
Al tempo c’erano anche aziende artigiane? 
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C’era anche qualche piccola azienda artigiana: in particolare ricordo i nomi di Gitti 
e Gardoncini. Producevano fucili da caccia oppure facevano stampaggio di parti per 
Beretta e Bernardelli; non realizzavano fucili ad anima rigata. 
 
Altri nomi di aziende di quegli anni? 
Altri due nomi che ricordo sono quelli della Bresciana e della Fabbrica Nazionale 
d’Armi; in particolare ebbi a che fare con quest’ultima. Quando, finita la guerra, mi 
misi in proprio acquistai materiale da lavoro e un buon numero di fucili della 
Nazionale che ancora dovevano essere terminati. L’azienda chiuse i battenti e io ne 
approfittati per comprare a buon prezzo dei prodotti che dovetti solo rifinire prima 
di poterli rivendere. Quella di acquistare i fucili da un’altra azienda che era in 
difficoltà, o fallita, era una pratica comune tra gli imprenditori locali. Soprattutto 
negli anni ’70, io ricordo di aver guadagnato delle belle somme in questo modo; ad 
esempio, da un certo Belleri (a cui avevano ucciso il padre e che doveva chiudere 
l’attività) acquistai circa 400 fucili per poi rivenderli a un cliente greco. 
 
Qual era la situazione della produzione armiera all’indomani della conclusione 
della seconda guerra mondiale? 
Negli anni ’50 a Gardone in molti si sono messi a lavorare le armi in proprio 
avviando delle aziende artigiane: ricordo Zoli Antonio, Zoli Angelo ma anche 
Pedersoli. Per quattro o cinque anni ho trasferito l’attività in località Castello ma 
era piuttosto scomoda come collocazione e quando mi sposai decisi di tornare nei 
locali dove avevo iniziato, nell’attuale vicolo Bolognini. 
Al tempo in pochi producevano l’arma intera, ma tutti si dedicavano a una parte 
specifica del fucile (a Magno, ad esempio, erano tutti incassatori e riparatori) e 
alcune aziende producevano la cosiddetta “serie” che poi veniva assemblata dal 
piccolo artigiano per comporre il proprio fucile. In tutte le case c’era una piccola 
morsa che il proprietario utilizzava per arrotondare un po’. 
Il lavoro era svolto quasi esclusivamente con utensili a mano e richiedeva molte ore 
di tempo. Tra gli artigiani locali io fui il primo a comprendere che bisognava trovare 
delle soluzioni che permettessero di velocizzare la lavorazione e, per questo, con 
dei pezzi recuperati da rottami misi a punto macchine per fresare le canne. Grazie 
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a questo ingegno mi guadagnai molti clienti tra i piccoli imprenditori della zona, i 
quali mi portavano le loro canne perché le lavorassi. Solo a inizio anni ’60 anche 
gli altri artigiani cominciarono a dotarsi di qualche macchina utensile; il primo che 
si incamminò su questa strada fu Zoli Antonio. 
 
Quindi era solito lavorare anche per gli altri artigiani? o avere collaborazioni 
con loro? 
Tra noi artigiani c’era una forte competizione e la concorrenza era piuttosto 
spietata: essendo in molti a svolgere il medesimo tipo di lavorazione ci si faceva la 
guerra sui prezzi. Non era raro che qualcuno che lavorava per te in un rapporto di 
contoterzismo cercasse di rubarti i clienti, o che gli altri artigiani contattassero i 
clienti che avevano visto entrare nel tuo laboratorio per convincerli ad affidare a 
loro la commessa. 
Comunque capitava anche di fare dei lavori insieme. Ricordo che i primi anni della 
mia attività lavorai con un certo Riva, di Brescia, e un altro artigiano gardonese per 
mettere a punto l’attrezzo per ramponare i fucili sovrapposti, ovvero per 
congiungere la canna con la bascula. Ognuno mise a disposizione le proprie 
capacità e i propri strumenti da lavoro e in una notte lo realizzammo. Sulla base di 
quell’esperienza lo stesso Riva decise di affidarmi la ramponatura dei suoi fucili 
sovrapposti: continuammo questa collaborazione per circa due anni. 
 
Per questi prodotti del suo ingegno non fece mai ricorso a dei brevetti? 
No, erano inutili. In zona eravamo tutti pratici del settore, se veniva messo a punto 
qualcosa che funzionava lo si copiava apportando qualche semplice modifica e il 
brevetto veniva aggirato.  
 
Chi erano i suoi clienti? 
Avevo clienti da tutta Italia, ma in particolare tanti all’estero. C’erano anche tanti 
produttori stranieri, ad esempio belgi e francesi, che, trasformatisi in rivenditori a 
causa della mancanza o dell’alto costo della manodopera, venivano in Italia ad 
acquistare i miei fucili e quelli di altri artigiani locali per poi commercializzarli nel 
loro paese. Poi avevo clienti americani, tedeschi, inglesi e di tantissimi altri paesi 
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europei. Un paese in cui non ho mai venduto è la Spagna, dalla quale, invece, mi 
capitò di acquistare una decina di fucili per poi rivenderli: esteticamente erano 
molto brutti, ma funzionavano bene ed erano resistenti.  
La soddisfazione più grande, ad ogni modo, è stata quella di avere tra i miei clienti 
un generale dell’esercito americano, William Childs Westmoreland, per il quale 
feci dieci paia di canne di calibro differente. Lavorai anche per altri militari della 
Nato; più volte mi recai allo spaccio interno della base di Vicenza per portare fucili 
da caccia ad americani che me li avevano commissionati. 
 
Per poter intrattenere i rapporti con gli stranieri come faceva? Conosce delle 
lingue? 
Mi affidavo a una ragazza che aveva studiato le lingue che mi faceva da traduttore. 
Io ricordo due ragazze che svolgevano questo lavoro per gli artigiani. Poi mia figlia 
è diventata insegnante di inglese quindi chiedevo a lei di aiutarmi. 
 
Nessuno della sua famiglia ha continuato l’attività? 
Io vengo da una famiglia che non era del settore, mi sono fatto da solo. Nessuno dei 
miei figli però ha deciso di continuare la mia attività e ammetto che questo è un po’ 
il mio cruccio. L’unico della famiglia che ha lavorato con me le armi è stato mio 
fratello Piero che nel 1985, quando è stato licenziato da Zoli, è venuto a fare il 
riparatore nella mia ditta. A dire il vero già prima faceva qualche ora da me e nella 
mia ditta ha imparato il mestiere anche perché, essendo mio fratello, ci tenevo molto 
che si dedicasse a questo lavoro e che avesse l’opportunità di imparare.  
 
Questo doppio impiego era comune in paese? 
Sì, certamente. Moltissimi, per non dire tutti, quelli che lavoravano in Beretta 
piuttosto che in Redaelli, finita la giornata in fabbrica, si recavano presso una ditta 
artigiana a fare ancora qualche ora o portavano a casa del lavoro. 
La gente imparava una determinata mansione in un’azienda come Beretta o 
Bernardelli (una mansione che erano soliti insegnare ai propri figli) e poi, sulla base 
dell’esperienza maturata, arrotondavano lavorando per gli artigiani: in tanti si sono 
costruiti la casa grazie a queste entrate extra. Anche dei ragazzi giovani che 
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venivano a lavorare nella mia officina avevano il doppio impiego: uno ad esempio 
al mattino andava alla Redaelli e poi nel pomeriggio, finito il turno, faceva altre ore 
da me. 
 
Chi produceva i fucili praticava anche la caccia?  
Una volta in questa zona tutti erano cacciatori, moltissimi prendevano le ferie a 
seconda del calendario venatorio o erano disponibili a fare i turni di notte per potersi 
dedicare di giorno a questa passione. Lavoro e hobby erano legati tra loro: tanti 
producevano il fucile che poi utilizzavano per andare a caccia, anche perché prima 
del ’75 era molto più semplice anche portarli al Banco di Prova e farli registrare. 
I fucili facevano parte della vita del posto, basti pensare alla tradizione secondo la 
quale quando nasceva il primogenito di una coppia i parenti regalavano al bambino 




5.4 Interview with Luigi Zanardini 




Luigi Zanardini is an old craftsman of the gun making industry in Val Trompia. He 
and his family come from Collio, in the upper valley. Like his brother, Angelo, he 
specialized in repairing and assembling historic firearm replicas. They worked at 
home and on contract for Tonolini, a local middleman, and Uberti, the first local 
company to enter the market of historic firearm replicas. 
Through Mr. Zanardini’s words, interesting details emerge regarding the social life 
of gunsmiths, and how people approached this profession in the post war period and 





Mi chiamo Zanardini Luigi, detto Gepi, sono nato il e la mia famiglia è originaria 
di Collio. Ho iniziato il mio lavoro nel mondo delle armi trasportando le canne da 
un laboratorio all’altro in bicicletta. In seguito, a inizio anni ’50, ho fatto un anno e 
mezzo da apprendista per imparare soprattutto il montaggio dei fucili: a quel tempo 
ti insegnavano a fare il fucile più semplice e poi, autonomamente, si doveva 
acquisire dimestichezza anche con altre tipologie di fucili. Nel 1952 iniziavo a fare 
i primi lavori a casa, dove ho sempre lavorato; al tempo si iniziava a lavorare 
rimanendo in famiglia: di quello che si guadagnava una buona parte veniva data 
alla famiglia e una piccola parte la si teneva per sé. 
Assieme a mio fratello, Angelo, mi sono dedicato soprattutto alla riparazione di 
armi antiche grazie all’incontro con il signor Tonolini, di Brescia, ma originario 
della Val Trompia. Prima lavoravamo per conto terzi e ci occupavamo di diverse 




Mi può spiegare meglio chi era il signor Tonolini? 
Negli anni ’50 cominciò a comprare tutte le armi antiche che poteva, tutte armi 
sportive. Bisogna considerare che la guerra finì nel 1945, ma fino agli anni ’50 la 
vita non si rimise in moto. Da quel momento, coloro che avevano fucili ad 
avancarica (in tanti fino al periodo della guerra non potevano permettersene uno 
diverso) cominciarono a venderli a poco e niente a “straccivendoli” e “rottamai”; 
Tonolini prese contatti con molti di questi e da loro comprava a buon prezzo. Si 
avvaleva anche della collaborazione del signor Sala di Breno, un esperto di armi 
antiche, e di tre agenti (uno in Francia, uno in Germania e uno in Inghilterra) per 
poter comprare nelle aste all’estero. Andò avanti ad acquistare armi e a farle riparare 
almeno fino al 1972-1973 e poi cominciò a venderle.  
Noi iniziammo a lavorare per lui nel 1964-65: non ci insegnò nulla perché non 
sapeva prendere in mano nemmeno una lima, ma ci portava alcuni modelli e dei 
libri e, basandoci su quelli, dovevamo riparare i fucili che aveva acquistato per poi 
poterli rivendere. In un certo senso dimostrò lungimiranza: aveva capito che la 
gente cominciava ad avere qualche soldo di più in tasca e che sarebbe stata disposta 
a pagare per un’arma antica che, per certi versi, è un pezzo d’arte. I suoi clienti 
erano sia italiani che stranieri, in particolar modo americani che per questo genere 
di cose andavano pazzi. 
Rimase favorevolmente colpito dal nostro lavoro, vedeva che avevamo passione e 
imparavamo in fretta. Proprio per questo, dopo cinque o sei anni, decise di farci 
rimettere mano ad alcune armi che avevamo riparato quando iniziammo a lavorare 
per lui e che, per ovvie ragioni, non potevano essere belle come quelle su cui ci 
eravamo applicati dopo aver acquisito esperienza. 
Tonolini ha sempre pagato quello che io e mio fratello gli chiedevamo; oltretutto a 
quel tempo si faceva anche tanto nero. Da lui prendevamo, grossomodo, il doppio 
di una busta paga di un operaio della Beretta; in fondo, non era molto se si pensa 
che l’artigiano che lavora in proprio deve togliere da quella cifra l’assicurazione, le 
ferie, etc. I nostri rapporti erano buoni, ma si fermavano all’ambito lavorativo e 
bisognava sempre stare attenti perché Tonolini era furbo e quando poteva se ne 




Quando avete smesso di lavorare per Tonolini? 
Quando abbiamo iniziato a lavorare per la ditta Uberti. Aldo Uberti era stato 
contattato da una società americana per riprodurre due pistole appartenute a George 
Washington, ma non aveva competenze su armi così antiche dato che era 
specializzato nella riproduzione di prodotti Colt e Remington. Pertanto, sapendo 
che anche noi eravamo specializzati sulle armi antiche, ci chiese se potevamo 
collaborare con lui e iniziare facendo due prototipi di queste due pistole: grazie ai 
nostri prototipi ottenne il contratto. Così nel 1974 iniziammo a lavorare con la 
Uberti facendo 975 copie per ciascuno dei due modelli di Washington. La ditta ci 
mandò anche tre dei suoi operai e noi assumemmo altre due persone: continuammo 
a lavorare come contoterzisti per Uberti per più di quindici anni, realizzando molti 
altri modelli di pistole. L’azienda ci forniva tutte le parti necessarie, che venivano 
lavorate a macchina al suo interno, mentre noi lavoravamo al banco, facevamo tutte 
le finiture a mano e mettevamo insieme le varie parti; quando le armi erano pronte 
le si portava a Uberti. Un’organizzazione del lavoro di questo tipo, in cui si 
affidavano le varie lavorazioni a artigiani specializzati esterni all’azienda, era una 
cosa comune ed è sempre stata propria di questo settore, dato che per fare un fucile 
o una pistola servono tante competenze. Anzi, direi che nel caso del fucile da caccia 
la cosa era ancora più marcata; come dicevo prima, infatti, per le armi antiche la 
Uberti realizzava al proprio interno e con macchine (tradizionali) tutte le parti, salvo 
i calci che faceva fare a Tirelli. 
Stimavo molto Aldo Uberti. È sempre stato il numero uno nel campo delle 
riproduzioni, era un pignolo e se c’era anche un minimo dettaglio che non gli 
andava non avviava la produzione: voleva la riproduzione uguale all’originale in 
tutto e per tutto.  
 
Quali erano le parti dell’arma su cui dovevate lavorare di più? 
Noi abbiamo lavorato su armi che vanno dal fucile a miccia a quelle utilizzate fino 
al periodo di Garibaldi. La parte su cui ci siamo concentrati di più è il meccanismo 
di accensione. Nell’Ottocento, con l’introduzione di capsula e luminello, molte armi 
che precedentemente funzionavano a pietra focaia sono state trasformate a 
percussione: il nostro compito era quello di ripristinare l’innesco originario. 
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Abbiamo fatto anche parecchi falsi, soprattutto per Tonolini, ma i lavori più belli e 
che ci piacevano di più erano quelli in cui dovevamo riparare l’originale. 
 
La sua famiglia lavorava le armi? 
Mio padre lavorava all’arsenale, mentre i miei nonni facevano lime. 
 
Da dove proveniva la manodopera? 
Gardone e comuni limitrofi, quindi Marcheno, Sarezzo, Polaveno. Le aziende erano 
concentrate soprattutto a Gardone anche se c’era un buon numero di ditte anche a 
Brescia; c’erano bravi artigiani anche in città. 
 
In media quante ore lavorava? 
Sia io che mio fratello passavamo tantissime ore a lavorare, ancora di più quando 
abbiamo iniziato con le armi antiche. [Interviene il fratello che sta ascoltando 
l’intervista mentre lavora alla morsa e chiosa: «è capitato tante volte che all’una, le 
due di notte mia moglie scendesse in laboratorio1 a chiamarmi dicendomi “allora 
vieni a dormire o no?”»]. 
Per tradizione il lunedì era festa per gli armaioli: si facevano poche ore poi si 
arrotolava il grembiule nella cintura e si andava all’osteria in compagnia. 
Comunque si lavorava tanto, ma avevamo grande passione e con questa passione si 
superava la fatica. L’artigiano deve metterci il cuore, in questo modo il suo lavoro, 
e soprattutto i suoi prodotti, acquisiscono un calore diverso. 
 
                                                          
1 As previously emerged in the interview the two brothers worked at home, more precisely in a 










• Archivio Storico del Comune di Gardone Val Trompia, box 69, file 1, 
“Prospetto della Fabbrica d’Armi da Fuoco in Gardone”. 
 
N.B.: 
This appendix contains summary tables (constructed by the author) from a detailed 
dossier regarding the state of the gun making industry in Val Trompia in 1860. The 
documents were produced by the Commissario Distrettuale di Gardone and the 
municipalities of the valley at the request of the governor of the province of Brescia 




Gardone Val Trompia 
Forges and Workshops  Owners Workforce 
Vecchia 
Paris heirs; 
Bros. of the late Girolamo Bertarini 
6 bollitori (2 masters, 2 hammer workers, 2 fire workers); 4 trivellatori (4 masters); 
4 livellatori (4 masters); 1 molatore; 4 fondellieri/vitonieri 
In Capo a Gardone Paris heirs 6 bollitori (2 masters, 2 hammer workers, 2 fire workers); 2 livellatori (2 masters) 
Rampinelli 
Moretta Antonio 6 bollitori (2 masters, 2 hammer workers, 2 fire workers); 8 livellatori (5 masters, 1 
worker, 2 apprentices); 5 molatori 
Gramineto 
Bros. of the late Antonio Beretta 9 bollitori (3 masters, 3 hammer workers, 3 fire workers); 2 trivellatori (1 master, 1 
apprentice); 2 livellatori (2 masters); 3 molatori 
Fornace 
Eredi Bertarini 6 bollitori (2 masters, 2 hammer workers, 2 fire workers); 5 trivellatori (3 masters, 
2 apprentices); 2 livellatori (1 master, 1 apprentice); 2 molatori; 2 
fondellieri/vitonieri 
Nuova 
F.lli Franzini fu Giuseppe 5 bollitori (2 masters, 1 hammer worker, 1 fire worker, 1 worker); 2 trivellatori (2 
masters); 5 livellatori (3 masters, 2 apprentices); 2 molatori 
Lazzaretto 
½ F.lli Angelo e Giov. Maria Mutti; 
½ Giovanna Mutti 
2 bollitori (1 masters, 1 workers); 3 trivellatori (1 master, 2 apprentices) 
Fucinale a mantice Franzini Antonio 2 bollitori (1 masters, 1 workers) 
Manenti 
½ Lodovico Beretta; 
½ Giuseppe and Antonio of the late Pietro 
Beretta 
2 trivellatori (2 masters); 6 molatori 
Cornella Bros. of the late Antonio Beretta 4 trivellatori (2 masters, 2 apprentices) 
Fucinetto Paris heirs 2 trivellatori (2 apprentices) 
Forge in Valle Inzino Ansaldi Angelo 3 fondellieri/vitonieri 
Workshop of the state State 8 impannatori; 2 mirinai; 10 controllori 
Homeworking - 1 mirinaio; 13 finitori 
Various workshops - 36 finitori 
Integrative notes 
• 3 molatori work in various forges. 
• The owners of the workshops where 36 finitori carry out their work are: the partnership of the forges owners, Antonio Franzini, Paris Heirs, Bros. of the late Antonio 
Beretta, Antonio Moretta, Bertarini, Beretta Ludovico Zambonardi Simone, some individual craftsmen. 
• Many bollitori and finitori apprentices are not included in this table because not able to work autonomously. 
Total 











Workshop/Owner Product Workforce 
Bosio Pietro Gunlocks 2 workers 
Foccoli Giovanni Gunlocks 4 workers 
Bosio Lorenzo Gunlocks 1 worker 
Contessa Domenico Gunlocks 2 workers 
Pirlo Pietro Gunlocks 3 workers 
Ceresoli Maurizio Gunlocks 12 workers 
Rossi Martino Gunlocks 2 workers 
Bosio Tullio Zaccaria Gunlocks 4 workers 
Ceresoli Giovanni Gunlocks 1 worker 
Ceresoli Mosè Gunlocks 2 workers 
Rossi Andrea Gunlocks 3 workers 
Marinelli Domenico Gunlocks 2 workers 
Zubani Pietro Gunlocks 1 worker 
Rossi Giuseppe Gunlocks 1 worker 
Total workforce: 39 workers 






Forge/Owners Products Workforce 
Luigi Minola Daggers and sabres 6 workers 
Angelo Zanetti Gunlocks 4 workers 
Giambattista Gardoncini and Bros. Nails 7 workers 
Angelo Ansaldi Ironworks and Farming tools 5 workers 
Giuseppe Rizzinelli and Giambattista 
Bonomi 
Nails and others 4 workers 
Bros. Francesco and Giacomo Ansaldi Nails and farming tools 4 workers 
Total workforce: 30 workers 




Forge/Owners Products Workforce 
Sabatti Pietro Gunlocks 1 workers 
Bros. Lecchi Carlo and Francesco Gunlocks 4 workers 
Bros. Lechi Carlo and Clemente Gunlocks 2 workers 
Sabatti Giovanni Gunlocks 3 workers 
Zoli Giuseppe Gunlocks 2 workers 
Sabatti Giuseppe Gunlocks 1 worker 
Tanfoglio Giovanni Gunlocks 4 workers 
Bros. Sabatti Antonio and Domenico Gunlocks 3 workers 
Total workforce: 20 workers 




Workshop/Owners Products Workforce 
Ghidini Vincenzo Rods and nosecaps for the Arsenal 13 workers 
Felice and Gaetano Gnutti Rods for the Arsenal 8 workers 
Seneci Angelo Rods for the Arsenal 3 workers 
Paolo and Geremia Bertoli Strips for Arsenal rifles 11 workers 
Seneci Domenico and Bros. Strips for Arsenal rifles 20 workers 
Bacchetti Francesco Daggers and sabres 3 workers 
Gnutti Bortolo Sabres and bayonets 4 workers 
Seneci Giacolo Daggers 3 workers 






Forges and workshops Owners Workforce (owners included) Products/Manufacturing 
2 forges Bros. Moretti 23 workers: 12 principals, 11 craftsmen Bayonets for the Arsenal 
1 forge Bianchi Giacinto 9 workers: 6 principals, 3 craftsmen Commercial cold weapons 
1 forge Pasotti Antonio 8 workers: 2 principals, 6 craftsmen Commercial cold weapons; Arsenal rifle 
rods 
3 forges Bros. Pietro and Battista Polotti 50 workers: 3 principals, 47 craftsmen Recoil pads; Arsenal gunlock manufacturing; 
cold weapons 
2 forges Polotti Angelo 6 workers: 2 principals, 4 craftsmen  
    
1 forge ½ Botti Bernardo and Domenico, 
½ Capra Marco 
8 workers: 3 principals, 5 craftsmen Ironworks for the Arsenal 
1 forge Bros. Albertini Antonio and Giacomo 10 workers: 3 principals, 7 craftsmen Parts of gunlock; ironworks for the Arsenal 
1 forge Facchinetti Bernardo 15 workers: 4 principals, 11 craftsmen Hand guards; ironworks for the Arsenal 
1 house Gnali Battista 2 workers: 1 principal, 1 craftsman Rings for hand guards 
1 forge and 1 house Zanetti Domenico 15 workers: 9 principals, 6 craftsmen Screws and rings for hand guards 
1 house Facchinetti Giuseppe 2 workers:2 principals Hand guards 
1 house and 1 forge Gnali Gianmaria and Mori Battista 12 workers: 4 principals, 8 craftsmen Hand guards 
1 house Zani Giovanni 2 workers: 1 principals, 1 craftsman Parts of hand guards 
1 house Zani Gianmaria 9 workers: 1 principal, 8 craftsmen Parts of hand guards and of rifles 
1 house Zani Domenico 8 workers: 1 principal, 7 craftsmen Parts of hand guards and of rifles 
1 house Bossini Serafino and Zani Giacomo 11 workers: 2 principals, 9 craftsmen Gunlocks 
1 house Zanetti Maurizio 2 workers: 2 principals Gunlocks 
1 house Botti Carlo 2 workers: 1 principal, 1 craftsman Gunlocks 
1 house Zanetti Maurizio 2 workers: 1 principal, 1 craftsman Gunlocks 
1 house Zanetti Nicola 1 worker: 1 principal Gunlocks 
1 house Zanetti Antonio 4 workers: 3 principals, 1 craftsman Gunlocks 
1 house Zanetti Antonio 4 workers: 3 principals, 1 craftsman Gunlocks; recoil pads 
1 workshop Polotti Francesco 3 workers: 3 principals Gunlocks for civilian firearms 
1 house Botti Ludovico 3 workers: 1 principal, 2 craftsmen Screws for rifle 
1 house Botti Faustino 2 workers: 1 principal, 1 craftsman Screws for rifle 
Total: 235 workers; 31 buildings employed for the firearms manufacturing (14 forges, 16 houses, 1 workshop) 











































• Archivio Storico del Comune di Gardone Val Trompia, box 180, file 1, 
“Prospetto di Statistica della Industria Manifatturiera nell’Anno 1861 nel 
Comune di Gardone, Mandamento di Gardone, Provincia e Circondario di 
Brescia. Statistica da Diversi Fabbricanti Gardonesi per le sole Canne”. 
 
N.B.: 
This appendix transcribes an original table with detailed data on gun barrel 
production in Gardone Val Trompia in 1861. The document was produced by the 
local administration and specifies the names of producers, production data, raw 
materials, machinery, the workforce and factories. 
Due to lack of space, the table is shown on two pages. 
 
Legend: 
• “D.”  - “Ditta” (Company). 
• “S.” - “Società” (Company). 
• “C. di l.” - “Carbone di legna” (Coke). 














































Regio Erario 376 24440 8000 - - - 120000 




49 12 - - - - 
C. di l. 1400 9400 
D. Franzini 
Antonio 
330 20400 3200 1070 1900 200 95100 C. di l. 1400 9380 
D. Fratelli 
Beretta 
107 6430 1246 81 815 - 18618 C. di l. 600 3390 
D. Moretta 
Giacomo 
8 400 - 16 200 - 2640 
Mole a pietre 
di Sarnico 
7 7 - - - - 
C. di l. 37 249 
D. Bertarini 
Fratelli 
40 2455 600 160 200 50 15713 C. di l. 181 1221 
D. Beretta 
Pietro 
94 5212 700 500 1200 320 36560 
Magli 12 12 - - - - 
C. di l. 475 3206 
D. Paris 
Crescenzio 
244 15430 4500 397 794 100 79050 C. di l. 977 6594 
S. Premoli 
Micheloni etc 
404 26260 9000 - - - 117000 
Fuochi animati 
da aria con 
trombe 
idrauliche 
25 10 - - - - 
C. di l. 1444 9747 
S. Beretta 
Lodovico 
18 1105 300 20 150 - 5440 C. di l. 79 533 
S. Baiguera 
Giulio 
13 810 200 - 150 - 3900 C. di l. 56 378 
S. Zambonardi 
Simone 
18 1065 250 25 200 - 5600 
Torni 2 - - - - - 
C. di l. 80 540 
S. Bertolotti 
Giulio 
27 1685 500 20 150 - 8040 C. di l. 141 749 
S. Ghinelli 
Antonio 
25 1585 300 - 80 - 6720 
Macchine per 
rigare le canne 
3 - - - - 6 
C. di l. 93 627 
S. Beltrami 
Francesco 
4 200 - 25 200 - 2600 C. di l. 40 270 
S. Cortesi 
Giuseppe 
22 1324 350 12 150 - 5284 C. di l. 84 567 
S. Daffini 
Annibale 
26 1600 450 - 200 - 6300 
Fuochi animati 
da mantici 
7 - - 7 - - 
C. di l. 104 702 
Diversi Piccoli 
Fabbricanti 
58 3590 1000 - 400 - 13600 C. di l. 224 1512 
Totale 1814 113991 30796 2326 6789 670 542165  105 43 - 7 - 6  7385 43243 
 Qualità e condizione dei 
lavoranti 
Lavoranti addetti Salario giornaliero pei lavoranti 
Spesa annua totale della mano 
d’opera 
Mesi nei quali si sospende la 
lavorazione 




a giornata a fattura a giornata a fattura  Uomini Donne Uomini Donne 
Fucinatori o Bollitori - 50 - - 
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L. 6,00 - L. 2,00 - 
L. 240.000 La lavorazione non viene mai sospesa 
Trapanatori - 50 - - L. 2,50 - L. 1,20 - 
Livellatori - 50 - - L. 3,00 - L. 1,50 - 
Tornitori - 8 - - L. 4,00 - L. 1,20 - 
Molatori - 14 - - L. 3,00 - L. 1,20 - 
Limatori - 70 - - L. 5,00 - L. 1,50 - 
Vitonieri, Bombardieri ed altri - 25 - - L. 6,00 - L. 2,00 - 
Politori - - - 20 - L. 2,00 - L. 0,75 
Osservazioni: 
Il ferro per le canne fucili per la Guardia Nazionale proviene dalla ghisa di Val Trompia raffinata dai fratelli Glisenti in Lavenone; quella per la fabbricazione dei fucili Erariali proviene dalla Val D’Aosta; quello poi per le canne di commercio proviene 
tutto dal Val Trompia. 
Il combustibile si ritrae tutto dal Comune. Gli opifici nei quali si fabbricò le controscritte canne sono i seguenti: 
1) Edificio detto la fucina Fornace con n. 6 motori di proprietà Bertarini condotto in affitto dal Governo del valore L. 36.000. 
2) Idem detto fucina Rampinelli con n. 5 motori di proprietà Moretta condotto in affitto dal Governo del valore di L. 25.000. 
3) Idem detto fucina del Mulino con n. 5 motori di proprietà della Ditta Crescenzio Paris, condotto in affitto dall’Erario del valore di L. 30.000 esclusa la macchina pel torno di proprietà Erariale del valore di L. 4.000. 
4) Idem detto fucina Nuova con n. 5 motori di proprietà di Franzini Antonio, del valore di L. 30.000. 
5) Idem detto del Ponte Zanano come sopra con n. 3 motori del valore di L. 20.000. 
6) Idem detta fucina Vecchia con n. 6 motori di proprietà Paris del valore di L. 25.000. 
7) Idem detto la Fucina in capo a Gardone con n. 2 motori di proprietà Paris del valore di L. 5.000. 
8) Idem come sopra di n. 1 motori di proprietà Bertarini del valore di L. 1.500. 
9) Idem detto la Fucina Manenti con n. 2 motori del valore di L. 6.000 di proprietà Beretta Sig.ri Lodovico e Pietro. 
10) Idem detto la Fucina del Gramineto con n. 4 motori di proprietà Beretta fu Antonio del valore di L. 12.000. 
11) Idem detto la Fucina Cornelle con n. 2 motori di proprietà Calini del valore di L. 5.000. 
12) Idem detto la Fucina Lazzaretto di proprietà Mutti con n. 3 motori del valore di L. 7.000. 
13) N. 7 fuochi animati da mantice a vento di proprietà diverse del valore di L. 7.000. 












• Camera di Commercio e Industria di Brescia (1910), Statistica Industriale al 30 
Giugno 1910. Industrie Mineralurgiche, Metallurgiche e Meccaniche, Geroldi, 
Brescia, pp. 24-28, 52, 59-61. 
 
N.B.: 
This appendix transcribes data regarding factories and the workforce in the firearms 
industry in the province of Brescia in 1910. 
Since the content of the appendix is a transcription, the original language (Italian) 






BRESCIA – La Cooperativa Lavoranti Armi ha una fabbrica di armi da caccia 
e da difesa; lavora col sussidio di 2 motori elettrici della forza di 30 cav.; impiega 
N. 120 operai di cui 10 fanciulli che lavorano 300 giorni all’anno, 10 ore al giorno; 
gli adulti col salario massimo di L. 6, minimo L. 3, i fanciulli L. 1,50. 
La Ditta Luigi Franchi ha una fabbrica di armi da caccia e da difesa; lavora col 
sussidio di 1 motore elettrico della forza di 2 cav.; impiega N. 35 operai di cui 4 
fanciulli che lavorano a cottimo in media 10 ore al giorno, per tutto l’anno e 
percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di L. 7; minimo di L. 3. 
La Ditta Colturi e Lorenzotti ha una fabbrica d’armi: fucili da caccia; impiega 
N. 9 operai che lavorano a cottimo in media 10 ore al giorno, 300 giorni dell’anno 
e il salario va da un massimo di L. 4 a un minimo di L. 1,75. 
La Metallurgica Bresciana già Tempini ha uno stabilimento dove si fabbricano 
munizioni e armi portatili per l’esercito e la marina e in modo speciale bozzoli di 
ottone, granate, shrapnels, spolette, e un tipo di pistola automatica; lavora col 
sussidio di 33 motori elettrici della forza di 220 cav. adibiti alla fabbricazione, e di 
125 cav. per la luce; di 4 motrici a vapore della forza complessiva di 95 cav.; 
impiega N. 1100 operai che lavorano in media 292 giorni dell’anno divisi per 
squadre, giorno e notte, per la durata di 10 ore, e percepiscono il salario giornaliero 
massimo di L. 6,50, minimo di L. 3,20. 
La R. Fabbrica d’Armi della quale la data d’impianto risale al 1806, fabbrica 
armi per l’esercito e in modo speciale moschetti ed armi bianche; lavora col sussidio 
di N. 5 motori elettrici della forza di 40 cav.; impiega N. 102 operai che lavorano 
in media 300 giorni dell’anno 10 ore al giorno, e percepiscono il salario giornaliero 
massimo di L. 5,50, minimo di L. 3. 
La Ditta Toschi e Castelli – data d’impianto – 1900 – ha una fabbrica d’armi 
con fonderia di ghisa malleabile; fabbrica armi da caccia, revolvers e moschetti da 
guerra; lavora col sussidio di 3 motori elettrici della forza di 27 cavalli; impiega N. 
200 operai di cui 20 fanciulli e 10 donne che lavorano in media 290 giorni dell’anno, 
10 ore al giorno gli adulti percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di L. 5,50, 
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minimo di L. 2; i fanciulli massimo di L. 1,45, minimo di L. 0,50; le donne massimo 
di L. 1,80, minimo di L. 1. 
GARDONE V. T. – La Ditta Bernardelli Vincenzo – data di impianto 1870 – 
fabbrica armi da caccia e da difesa: fucili revolvers, parti d’arme; lavora col sussidio 
di 1 turbina della forza di 25 cav., e impiega N. 50 operai dei quali 3 fanciulli e 2 
donne che lavorano 250 giorni dell’anno, 10 ore al giorno; gli adulti hanno il salario 
giornaliero massimo di L. 7, minimo di L. 2, le donne massimo L. 1,40, minimo L. 
1,25. 
La Ditta Cavagna Giovanni ha una fabbrica d’armi e di lime – data d’impianto 
1880 –; fa fucili da caccia e lime; lavora col sussidio di 3 ruote idrauliche della 
forza di 25 cav.; impiega N. 40 operai interni, N. 15 esterni; gli interni lavorano 300 
giorni dell’anno, 10 ore al giorno e percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di 
L. 6, minimo di L. 2. 
La Ditta Pietro Beretta ha una fabbrica di armi da caccia e da difesa – data 
d’impianto 1680 –; costruisce fucili da caccia, revolvers, parti d’arme, spingarde 
piccole e grosse; lavora col sussidio di 2 turbine della forza di 70 cav. che servono 
anche per la illuminazione dell’albergo Beretta e delle case operaie; di 1 alternatore; 
impiega N. 170 operai interni, N. 100 esterni, gli operai interni lavorano in media 
300 giorni dell’anno, 10 ore al giorno e percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo 
di L. 7, minimo di L. 3. La ditta sta costruendo una centrale elettrica a Inzino. 
La R. Fabbrica d’Armi (sezione di Gardone) fabbrica parti d’arme, granate ed 
accessori per i materiali dell’esercito; lavora col sussidio di 3 motori a vapore della 
forza di 90 cavalli che sostituiscono la forza idraulica nei periodi di magra; di 4 
motori idraulici della forza di 150 cav.; impiega N. 150 che lavorano 300 giorni 
all’anno, 10 ore al giorno e percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di L. 5,50, 
minimo di L. 2. 
INZINO – La Fabbrica Bresciana d’Armi – data d’impianto 1907 – produce 
armi da caccia, revolvers, spingarde; ha anche una fonderia che si accende ogni 
tanto; lavora col sussidio di 4 motori elettrici della forza di 40 cavalli; impiega N. 
150 operai di cui 8 fanciulli (ne potrebbe impiegare anche 300 come per il passato) 
cje lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno, tutto l’anno, gli operai a cottimo guadagnano 
al giorno un massimo di L. 7, e un minimo di L. 2; i facchini, attrezzisti a giornata 
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hanno un salario massimo di L. 6, minimo di L. 2,50; i fanciulli massimo di L. 1,50, 
minimo di L. 0,80. La ditta ha una centrale elettrica che può sviluppare 300 Hp. 
La Ditta Gardoncini fu Battista ha una fabbrica d’armi – la data d’impianto 
dell’officina è immemorabile – la Ditta ha cominciato il lavoro nel 1870 – si fanno 
armi da caccia e parti d’arme. Lavora col sussidio di 2 ruote idrauliche della forza 
di 6 cav. che potrebbero diventar 10 se l’acqua fosse sufficiente (vi sono 2 magli 
inoperosi per mancanza di lavoro); impiega N. 15 operai con una donna che 
lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno; gli operai percepiscono il salario giornaliero 
massimo di L. 4,50, minimo di L. 2 (lavoro a cottimo); la donna guadagna L. 1,40 
giorno. 
LUMEZZANE PIEVE – La Ditta Albertini Carlo ha una officina – data 
d’impianto 1908 – per la fabbricazione di bacchette da fucile, e parti di revolvers; 
lavora col sussidio di 1 motore elettrico della forza di 2 cav., e con 8 operai di cui 
3 fanciulli che lavorano 10 ore al giorno, 260 giorni dell’anno; gli adulti hanno il 
salario giornaliero massimo di L. 2,25, minimo di L. 1,75; i fanciulli di L. 0,40. 
La Ditta Bianchi Francesco fu Geremia ha una fabbrica d’armi da scherma e da 
guerra: fioretti, sciabole, e fornisce la scuola militare di Roma, e manda le sua armi 
in ogni paese d’Europa; - la data d’impianto della fabbrica risale al 1544; lavora col 
sussidio di due ruote idrauliche della forza di cav. 3, ½, impiega N. 12 operai di cui 
un fanciullo che lavorano 10 ore al giorno, 260 giorni dell’anno; gli operai lavorano 
tutti a cottimo, e sono pagati mensilmente. 
La Ditta Botti Bortolo fu Bernardo – data d’impianto immemorabile – ha una 
officina per costruzioni di armi da difesa e parti d’armi da guerra, rivoltelle fine 
pistolette per ciclisti, delle quali ha la privativa industriale, e sono costruite in modo 
che il cane funziona da otturatore e da percussore insieme. Lavora col sussidio di 2 
motori elettrici della forza di 2 ½ cav.; impiega N. 8 operai che lavorano in media 
10 ore al giorno, 260 giorni dell’anno, e percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo 
di L. 4,25, minimo di L. 3. Gli operai a cottimo raggiungono il massimo giornaliero 
di L. 5,50. 
La Ditta Botti Onofrio ha una officina – data d’impianto 1864 – per la 
lavorazione di parti di revolvers: cani e grilletti; lavora con 1 ruota idraulica della 
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forza di 4 cav.; impiega N. 7 operai che lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno, 260 
giorni all’anno; e hanno un salario giornaliero massimo di L. 3, minimo di L. 2. 
La Ditta Gambera Bortolo fu Giacinto ha una officina per la costruzione di parti 
d’arme, acciarini – data d’impianto 1870 –; lavora col sussidio di 1 motore idraulico 
della forza di 8 cav.; impiega N. 20 operai di cui 2 fanciulli e 1 fanciulla che 
lavorano 10 ore al giorno; gli adulti percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di 
Lire 3,50, minimo di L. 2; i fanciulli L. 1; la fanciulla L. 1,50. 
La Ditta Gnali Salvatore ha una officina – data d’impianto 1867 – per la 
fabbricazione di parti d’arme; lavora con 1 motore elettrico della forza di un cavallo. 
La Ditta Serafino e F.lli Gnutti ha una fabbrica di armi bianche da guerra e da 
scherma in genere – data d’impianto 1860 – lavora col sussidio di 3 ruote idrauliche 
della forza di 25 cav.; impiega N. 60 operai di cui 4 fanciulli che lavorano in media 
10 ore al giorno, 300 giorni dell’anno; gli operai a cottimo guadagnano il massimo 
di L. 7 al giorno; gli altri un massimo di L. 5, minimo di L. 1,20; i fanciulli massimo 
di L. 1,20, minimo di L. 1. 
La Ditta Mori G. Battista ha una officina – data d’impianto 1909. per la 
fabbricazione di revolvers e coltelli da tavola; lavora col sussidio di un motore 
elettrico della forza di 3 cav.; impiega N. 20 operai di cui 3 fanciulli e 1 fanciulla 
che lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno, 260 giorni dell’anno; gli adulti hanno il 
salario massimo di L. 5, minimo di L. 2,25; i fanciulli massimo di L. 1, minimo L. 
0,50, la fanciulla L. 1. Si lavora a cottimo. 
La Ditta Fr.lli Polotti fu Giacomo ha uno stabilimento dove si fabbricano parti 
d’armi, fero laminato, sciabole, foderi, scalpelli, piccozze, picconi, leve, palanchini, 
forchette acciaio, assi da vagoni tramvie, acciaio per canne da fucili, eccentrico per 
munizionamento da cannoni; – la data d’impianto dell’opificio risale al 1800 – 
lavora col sussidio di 8 motori idraulici della forza di 80 cav. circa; di 5 motori 
elettrici, a intervalli, della forza di 45 cav.; impiega N. 100 operai di cui 10 fanciulli 
che lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno, 300 giorni dell’anno; gli adulti percepiscono 
il salario giornaliero massimo di L. 7, minimo di L. 2; i fanciulli massimo di L. 2, 
minimo di L. 1. 
La Ditta Rocca Giacomo Primo ha una officina – data d’impianto 1885 – e la 
nuova officina 1909 – per la fabbricazione di revolvers, parti d’arme da guerra e da 
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caccia; ora sta cominciando la fabbricazione dei fucili da caccia nuovo modello con 
chiusura speciale e grilletto unico; lavora col sussidio di 1 ruota idraulica della forza 
di 2 cav., di 1 motore elettrico della forza di 3 cav.; impiega N. 45 operai di cui 10 
fanciulli e 2 donne, che lavorano 10 ore al giorno, 280 giorni dell’anno; gli adulti 
percepiscono il salario giornaliero massimo di L. 10 minimo di L. 3, fanciulli 
massimo di L. 1,50, minimo di L. 0,70, le donne massimo di L. 1,30, minimo di L. 
1. 
La Ditta Zanetti Angelo e F.lli Bernardo – data d’impianto 1883 – ha una 
officina per la fabbricazione di parti d’armi: luminelli, parti di pistola anche per la 
R. Fabbrica d’Armi, lavora col sussidio di 1 ruota idraulica della forza di 2 cav.; 
impiega N. 10 operai che lavorano 10 ore al giorno, 240 giorni dell’anno con un 
salario massimo di L. 3,50, minimo L. 2. 
La Ditta Zani Luigi ha una officina – data d’impianto 1907 – per la 
fabbricazione di piccole parti d’arme: anelli, luminelli, porta cinghie per fucili, parti 
di pistola per l’esercito; lavora col sussidio di 1 motore elettrico della forza di 1 
cavallo; impiega 6 operai di cui 2 fanciulli che lavorano in media 10 ore al giorno, 
240 giorni dell’anno; gli adulti hanno un salario giornaliero massimo di L. 3,50, 






Fabbriche d’armi in Provincia di Brescia N. 24 
 
Forza Motrice in cavalli 
dinamici 
a vapore HP. 185 
idraulica HP. 400 
elettrica HP. 416 
Totale HP. 1001 
 
Operai 
adulti N. 2456 
fanciulli N. 80 
donne N. 17 
Complessivamente N. 2553 
 
Medio lavoro annuo giorni 240-300 




massimo L. 7 
minimo L. 1,75 
fanciulli 
massimo L. 3 
minimo L. 1 
donne 
massimo L. 1,80 








La Valle di Lumezzane 
 
Nel passato anche lontano, la valle di Lumezzane tenne sempre un posto 
eminente nelle industrie del ferro e dell’ottone; e se l’industria del ferro oggi non 
ha più l’importanza di un tempo, ciò dipende dal prevalere crescente dell’industria 
dell’ottone. Infatti la lavorazione dell’ottone, che nel resto d’Italia è rappresentata 
in pochi luoghi, nella nostra Provincia è tutta concentrata in questa Valle. 
Questa fu la ragione che ci indusse a dare speciale risalto a questa Valle, 
presentando lo stato industriale di essa, oltre che nel complesso della statistica 






Fabbriche d’armi N. 12 
 
Forza Motrice in cavalli 
dinamici 
idraulica HP. 112 ½  
elettrica HP. 57 
 
Operai 
adulti N. 257 
fanciulli N. 35 
donne N. 2 
fanciulle N. 2 
Complessivamente N. 296 
 
Medio lavoro annuo giorni 240-300 




massimo L. 7 
minimo L. 1,20 
fanciulli 
massimo L. 2 
minimo L. 0,40 
donne 
massimo L. 1,30 
minimo L. 1 
fanciulle 
massimo L. 1,50 
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Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV). 
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